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Trade theory predicts that developing economies converge with developed economies as they open up to trade. 
This convergence occurs in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) and wages. Mexico has experienced increased 
wealth and access to technology since opening its economy through international mechanisms, most notably 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. However, Mexico’s economy has not converged 
with the U.S. and Canada or kept up with the social development of many of its less wealthy Latin American 
counterparts. Although there has been an overall increase in GDP, the gains have been unevenly distributed, and 
have not done enough to correct the economic disparity that exists in the country. This lack of convergence is 
evident when examining the human rights situation of women working in Mexico, especially in the maquila-
doras—factories that manufacture goods for export. Although trade liberalization improved labor-market ac-
cess for working-age women in Mexico, these women are not necessarily better off nearly three decades later. 
The machismo culture in Mexico acts as a compounding factor, emphasizing gender stereotypes and correspond-
ing obligations which weigh heavily on women. These domestic expectations, in addition to long and inflexible 
working hours, leave women taking on a doble jornada—a double shift—one at home and the other at work. This 
burden, coupled with hiring and workplace discrimination, as well as a significant gender wage gap, leave women 
unrewarded and underpaid, or in the case of women who work at home, entirely unpaid The case of working women 
in Mexico calls for an examination of trade law from a gendered human rights perspective in order to analyze the 
distribution of its benefits among different groups. Ultimately, this report aims to understand the intersection be-
tween trade, human rights, and women by looking through the lens of women who work in the maquiladora sector. 
The case of working women in Mexico calls for an examination of trade law from a gendered human rights per-
spective in order to analyze the distribution of its benefits among different groups. Ultimately, this report aims to 
understand the intersection between trade, human rights, and women by looking through the lens of women who 
work in the maquiladora sector. 
This report contains eight parts. Part I describes political and economic history with a focus on labor rights and 
trade liberalization. It goes on to discuss the relevant legal framework at the domestic, regional, and international 
levels, as well as voluntary commitments. Part II focuses on applied economic theory to establish the framework 
with which to analyze the relationship between free trade and working women in Mexico. Part III provides an 
overview of the protection gaps in Mexico that affect the ability to safeguard the rights of working women in 
the country. In that respect, this part covers generalized insecurity, violence, corruption, as well as limitations 
of the state’s capacity and willingness to enforce the law. Furthermore, it includes a discussion of private sector 
efforts to close the aforementioned protection gaps. Part IV introduces some of the gendered cultural and struc-
tural barriers which hinder the rights of working women in Mexico. The most prominent barrier discussed is 
that of the doble jornada, a phenomenon in which women are expected to perform paid work outside the house 
and are then expected to put in unpaid hours at home—whether through domestic work, child care, or elderly 
care. Part V addresses the case study of women working in the maquiladora sector. Trade liberalization brought 
employment opportunities for women in this sector, but not without a cost. This part goes on to address issues 
of wage inequality, lack of social mobility, and lack of access to leadership positions. It further discusses gen-
der-based discrimination in the workplace concerning harassment and pregnancy, as well as health and safety. 
Part VI addresses governmental, civil society, and private sector efforts to combat gender-based discrimination, 
particularly in areas directly or indirectly related to jobs prospects. Part VII briefly concludes on the need for a 
gender perspective and due diligence in free trade agreements. It goes on to highlight how the double shift—a 
phenomenon framed by societal norms and expanded due to the opportunities brought by free trade—limits 
women’s advancement. This part further emphasizes the continued presence of gender discrimination in em-
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ployment, an issue that is exacerbated by the lack of capacity or willingness of the Mexican government to 
enforce labor laws. Next, this part discusses both the hope and challenge for the rights of working women pre-
sented by the AMLO administration. Lastly, the conclusion proposes that it is an opportune time for Mexico to 
examine the situation of working women due to the need to combat gender discrimination, the changing free 
trade landscape in North America, and the importance of women’s labor participation to economic development.
Finally, Part VIII offers policy recommendations for both the short and long term. The short-term policy recom-
mendations firstly include extending paid parental leave. Concerning maternal leave, extending it could bring 
Mexico on par with other OECD countries, as well as provide women with more choices. When it comes to paid 
paternal leave, increasing it may help combat the traditional role of women as the primary caregiver. It may further 
decrease gender discrimination in hiring, as any prospective parent, regardless of sex, would cost a company the 
same amount money. Secondly, the report recommends that Mexico institute a higher penalty for social security vi-
olations to deter companies from denying workers this constitutionally recognized benefit. Thirdly, Mexico should 
increase the number of labor inspectors as well improve transparency of inspections. Invariably, to have proper 
labor enforcement, a state must have an adequate number of well-trained labor inspectors. The sixth recommenda-
tion attempts to increase awareness of human rights and remediation options through the use of informational pro-
grams directed towards working women in Mexico. This is an area where the Mexican government and civil soci-
ety should work in tandem to create tailored outreach mechanisms. In a similar vein, the seventh recommendation 
calls for information-sharing in the form of gender-sensitivity training for law enforcement. This training may 
encourage more women to come forward and allow authorities to more adequately respond to gender-based vio-
lence. Mexico can draw upon experiences from the international community to design these programs. The final 
short-term recommendation is for Mexico to mitigate the adverse effects of free trade on human rights with spe-
cial attention to women. One tool in which they could accomplish this goal is a human rights impact assessment. 
Furthermore, the report details five long-term recommendations. The first is to establish gender-sensitization pro-
grams in school with the thought that textbooks and lessons that do not reinforce gender stereotypes will help pro-
mote gender equality. The second recommendation advises for an increase in consultations with a diverse set of 
stakeholders prior to entering into trade agreements. This would correct some of the issues with a top-down process 
like the one Mexico used in committing to NAFTA. Along the same lines, the third recommendation recognizes 
the need for a gender lens and explicit gender language in future trade agreements. To ensure that women are not 
left behind by free trade, a gender perspective would promote inclusive economic growth in Mexico. The fourth 
recommendation advocates for an increase in female participation and leadership roles in unions. This would 
better reflect the Mexican labor market and represent the interests of working women. Finally, the last long-term 
recommendation calls for Mexico to continue and expand its efforts of gender mainstreaming at all levels of gov-
ernment and across political, economic, and legal frameworks. This mainstreaming would prevent the official re-
inforcement of gender stereotypes and would invariably combat structural barriers to the advancement of women.
Finally, the report presents recommendations to the private sector—an essential actor in realizing the rights of 
women working in the maquiladoras in Mexico. The first recommendation advocates for MNCs to increase their 
use of third-party firms that conduct social compliance audits. This audit would allow companies to monitor the 
working conditions at their Mexico-based factories and suppliers and to respond accordingly. This action would 
help close the current protection gaps caused by the limited labor enforcement capacity of the Mexican govern-
ment. The second private-sector recommendation calls for changes to corporate governance to both promote a 
gender balance in management and prevent sexual harassment. The last recommendation highlights the need 
for safe and secure travel to and from work. The private sector should reach out to their employees to assess 




Design and Sampling 
The report is the culmination of a year-long academic research course through Johns Hopkins University – Paul 
H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). The research team is composed of nine graduate stu-
dent researchers with concentrations or minors in international law and organizations, international economics, 
Latin American studies, and conflict management, as well as one professorial lecturer in the SAIS International 
Law and Organizations Program. The study design is exploratory, using qualitative methods including interviews, 
to examine, understand, and describe the intersection between free trade and human rights in Mexico. The case 
study has a specific focus on women working in the maquiladoras sector. Along with the literature review and 
desk research, the interviews and field research provide the basis for the findings and policy recommendations in 
this report. 
During the fall of 2018, the team began studying the broad theme of the relationship between free trade and hu-
man rights in Mexico. Initial research involved scanning a wide array of relevant literature and documents on the 
topic from international organizations, governments, civil society, and the media. After nearly a month of initial 
research, the team drafted competing research proposals. In consultation with a group of experts, the proposal was 
narrowed down to focus on the rights of women workers. Subsequently, the research was further focused on the 
maquiladora sector. Initially, further research sites were planned, but it was ultimately decided to concentrate on 
Mexico City in an effort to narrow the scope of research.
The desk research included conducting background consultations with experts, identifying relevant actors, attend-
ing local events on the issue, and speaking with country representatives at the Embassy of Mexico in Washington 
D.C. By November, the team developed a questionnaire meant to guide semi-structured interviews in the field. 
Through December and January, the team planned for in-country fact-finding, establishing local contacts and 
arranging interviews with key stakeholders. 
The team split into two groups. One group traveled to Mexico City the week of January 7, 2019, and the second 
group began interviewing in Mexico City on January 18, 2019. Due to resource and academic schedule con-
straints, the teams could not spend more than one week in their locations. As stated, the groups used a purposive 
sampling method to arrange interviews with key stakeholders, although the snowball method was used to find 
additional contacts while in-country. These interviews followed a strict ethical protocol described in the “Sample 
Description” section below. Interviews were conducted during the week, generally lasting approximately one 
hour. Some interviews were in English and some were in Spanish, requiring translation from team members. In 
total, the researchers conducted over 19 interviews with experts in the field.
The team returned to Washington to analyze the data collected. Groups gave presentations summarizing their 
data. Throughout the spring semester, the teams continued to conduct research and follow-up interviews with 
stakeholders. Individual team members drafted sections of the report, which were cross-edited. To ensure credi-
bility and accuracy, the draft report was sent out to research participants and additional experts for comments and 
certification of citations. The team then made further edits and drafted the final report. 
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Sample Description 
During each meeting, a research team member explained the project, the research goals, and requested informed 
consent. Interviewees gave express consent to be included in the study and indicated whether the meeting could 
proceed on the record. An audio recording was not used but, when allowed for, researchers took written notes. The 
research was determined to present no more than minimal risk to the professional participants as the risks associ-
ated with participation were no greater than those encountered in daily life. Nor were members of the following 
populations recruited for interviews: children (younger than 18 years old), Johns Hopkins University students, 
Johns Hopkins University employees, emancipated minors, wards of the state, individuals with cognitively im-
paired/impaired decision-making capacity, pregnant women, critically ill or injured patients, or prisoners. 
In late January, the research team returned to Washington, D.C. and analyzed the meeting notes to ensure con-
sistency, accuracy, and to flag items for follow-up. Subsequently, informed by follow-up communications with 
meeting participants and further desk research as necessary, researchers jointly developed this report. In April, a 
draft version of the report was circulated to all individuals with whom the team had met throughout its study to 
solicit feedback. Comments from all those who responded were duly incorporated into the final version of the 
report. On May 16, 2019, the research team will publish the report and present its findings and recommendations 
to the public at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C.
Research Limitations 
This report is limited in scope. Firstly, it focuses on a formal sector of the economy, rather than the informal. Sec-
ond, though NAFTA had a noticeable impact on the agricultural sector in Mexico, especially in the South, we did 
not focus on that sector due to a lack of information. There was a significant amount of preexisting information 
on the maquiladora industry, which made it a more feasible case study.
Furthermore, due to resource and academic schedule constraints, team members could only spend a limited 
amount of time conducting in-person interviews. These constraints restricted the number of interviews conducted 
as well as the geographical area covered. As such, with the interviews limited to Mexico City, the report does 
not recognize any distinctions among states or urban/rural divides. The most significant limitation is the lack of 
interviews with women working in the maquiladoras in Mexico. Personal interviews were not possible due to lo-
gistical and resource constraints. However, we recognize the irreplaceable value of direct testimony from women 
working in the maquiladoras in Mexico to ensure a robust understanding of their experiences and needs. Despite 
those limitations, team members arranged meetings with a variety of stakeholders in government, civil society, 
the private sector, and international organizations.
Finally, this report focuses broadly on women. As such, it does not distinguish between experiences among pop-
ulations with increased vulnerabilities, such as indigenous populations, Afro-Mexicans, and migrants, among 
others. We recognize that these populations may have added difficulties and threats to their human rights.
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While the primary objectives of trade 
and human rights law differ, trade is 
increasingly codified alongside human 





A. The Relationship Between Human 
Rights and Trade
International trade and human rights law can be seen 
as at odds with one another. Though trade can certain-
ly create a climate in which human rights are better 
protected and promoted, the stipulations of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) do not explicitly mandate 
respect for human rights in trade relations. The rights 
promoted under the WTO include the rights of export-
ers to enjoy their property, freely enter into contracts, 
fairly compete on the basis of non-discrimination in 
relation to like industries both foreign (most favored 
nation treatment) and domestic (national treatment), 
and, finally, the right to the free movement of goods 
and services across borders. However, according to the 
former Director-General of the WTO, Pascal Lamy, 
“human rights and trade rules, including WTO rules, 
are based on the same values: non-discrimination, in-
dividual freedom and responsibility, transparency, and 
welfare through peaceful cooperation 
among individuals.”1
Regardless, the primary objectives of trade and human 
rights law differ. The WTO system aims to “produce 
certain market conditions which would allow this in-
dividual [business] activity to flourish” by reducing 
barriers to trade.2 On the other hand, human rights law 
seeks to define, guarantee, and protect economic, po-
litical, social, civil, and cultural rights and freedoms. 
Despite these differing objectives, trade is increasing-
ly codified alongside human rights in regional trade 
agreements. 
1  Pascal Lamy, ‘Towards shared responsibility and greater 
coherence: human rights, trade and macroeconomic policy’ 
(Speech at the Colloquium on Human Rights in the Global 
Economy, Co-organized by the International Council on Human 
Rights and Realizing Rights, Geneva, 13 January 2010) https://
www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl146_e.htm
2  World Trade Organization. “United States—Sections 
301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974,” WTO doc. WT/DS152/R (22 
December 1999) (Report of the Panel) para 7.73. https://www.
wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/wtds152r.pdf.
Part I - Background
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Beginning in the 1980s, the United States, along 
with other developed countries, began incorporating 
non-binding human rights language in regional trade 
agreements (RTAs). Today, other major trading nations 
like Chile and Brazil also include human rights lan-
guage in their RTAs.3 The human rights endorsed in 
these agreements can include due process, access to 
information, labor rights, privacy, indigenous rights, 
and political participation, among others. The grow-
ing inclusion of human rights in these bilateral and 
multilateral free trade agreements reflects an emerg-
ing norm in trade relations and the acknowledgement 
by policymakers that effective economic integration 
necessitates good governance.4 Despite this growing 
intersection of trade and human rights, few academic 
studies have focused on examining the effects of free 
trade agreements on human rights in the countries par-
ty to these agreements. This report attempts to address-
es this gap in the research through an examination of 
the human rights of working women in Mexico today, 
in the context of NAFTA and Mexico’s current socio-
political and economic situation.
B. Political History
To fully understand Mexico’s current sociopoliti-
cal and economic situation and how it affects gender 
dynamics, it is necessary to provide a brief historical 
context. This section will stress critical events that re-
late, whether directly or indirectly, to the development 
of labor rights and the economic liberalization of the 
country. In this regard, this section will highlight the 
provenance of Mexico’s progressive labor laws, the 
rule of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the 
political liberalization of Mexico, and the current po-
litical context under President Andrés Manuel López 
3  Susan Ariel Aaronson and Jean Pierre Chauffour, “The 
Wedding of Trade and Human Rights: Marriage of Convenience 
or Permanent Match,” World Trade Organization: Discussion Fo-
rum, (2011). https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/
wtr11_forum_e/wtr11_15feb11_e.htm. 
4  J-P Chauffour and J-C Maur (2010). “Beyond Market 
Access: The New Normal of Preferential Trade Agreements”, 




Drafted in the context of the Mexican Revolution 
(1910-1920), which was spearheaded by workers, the 
1917 Constitution provided robust labor protections.5 
To this day, it is considered one of the most progres-
sive constitutional documents of its time because of 
its inclusion of individual guarantees and its emphasis 
on human rights.6 Furthermore, it was the first national 
constitution to incorporate significant labor protections 
in its text.7 Its pioneering social provisions were a re-
sponse to the demands of two decades of social unrest 
during the revolution.8 As such, the new Constitution 
positively transformed Mexican society by providing a 
framework of social protections that previously did not 
exist. Its legacy is exemplified by the fact that, despite 
some reforms, it continues to govern Mexico over a 
century since its inception and is the longest-standing 
constitution in Latin America.9 
Article 123 of the Constitution is one of the most crit-
ical sections and continues to be the subject of period-
ic reforms. Throughout its 30 subsections, Article 123 
added a labor and social welfare dimension that was 
nonexistent within previous Mexican constitutions.10 
5  Brian R. Hamnett, A Concise History of Mexico, 2nd ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 214-215.
6  “The Mexican Constitution: Young at 100,” Mexico 
Official Website, Federal Government of Mexico, March 2, 
2017, https://www.mexico.mx/en/articles/the-mexican-constitu-
tion-young-at-100.
7  William Suarez-Potts, “La Constitución de 1917 y la Ley 
Federal del Trabajo de 1931,” in Cien Ensayos para el Centenar-
io. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, ed. 
Gerardo Esquivel, Francisco Ibarra Palafox, and Pedro Salazar 
Ugarte, vol. 3 (Mexico City: Universidad Autonoma de Mexico, 
Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, and Instituto de Belisario 




8  Alicia Hernández Chávez, Mexico: A Brief History, trans. 
Andy Klatt (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 2006), 232.
9  “The Mexican Constitution: Young at 100,” Mexico Official 
Website
10  H. N. Branch and L. S. Rowe, “The Mexican Constitution 
of 1917 Compared with The Constitution of 1857,” The Annals 
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At its inception, the Constitution enumerated a series 
of new labor protections that regulated contracts, im-
proved working conditions, and outlawed debt peon-
age.11 It banned gender-based salary discrimination, es-
tablished minimum wage regulations, recognized the 
right to unionize and strike, banned female and child 
night work, and established a six-day workweek with 
a daily maximum of eight hours of work.12 As such, 
the 1917 Mexican Constitution was a positive devel-
opment in labor rights.
Despite the advances in labor laws, the army and the 
government did not consistently enforce these provi-
sions and often violently broke up strikes.13 Further-
more, the federalist nature of the Mexican state made it 
such that certain states were more favorable to unions 
than others, meaning that there were disparities in the 
implementation and protection of the new laws.14 This 
contradiction between law and practice is a defining 
characteristic of Mexico’s labor climate to this day. 
The labor protections of Article 123 were later consoli-
dated by Congress’ enactment of Federal Labor Law in 
1931. This law, which consisted of 685 articles, further 
expanded workers’ protections and enlarged the role of 
the federal government in their implementation.15 The 
expanded protections included six days of paid vaca-
tion, eight days of paid maternity leave for mothers 
before delivery and one month after, and penalties for 
wrongful discharge.16 This law was in place until the 
new Federal Labor Law of 1970. 
To put this change into historical context, the Federal 
Labor Law of 1931 occurred amid a highly significant 
shift in Mexican politics—the rise of the PRI in 1929. 
The PRI held a monopoly on political power from 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 71 
(1917): I-116, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1013370.
11  Hernández Chávez, Mexico: A Brief History, 232. 
12  Hamnett, A Concise History of Mexico, 215.  
13  Hamnett, A Concise History of Mexico, 215.
14  Hernández Chávez, Mexico: A Brief History, 232.
15  Joseph M. Cormack and Frederick F. Barker, “The Mex-
ican Labor Law,” Southern California Law Review 7, no. 3 
(March 1934): 255-256, https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/fac-
pubs/1484/.
16  Cormack and Barker, “The Mexican Labor Law,” 259.7.
1929 to 1997, in what Peruvian Nobel Laureate, Mario 
Vargas Llosa, called “the perfect dictatorship.”17 Al-
though there was a semblance of democracy, the PRI 
maintained power for almost 70 years through coer-
cive measures including buying votes, election fraud, 
and cracking down on the opposition.18 Consequently, 
Mexico was under a sham democracy for an extended 
period.
During this time, the relationship between unions and 
government emerged. Centrals, which are unions that 
represent and guide firm-level unions at the national 
level and participate in the Mexican Congress of La-
bor, tend to be the most powerful unions in Mexico 
due to their historically close relationship with the 
national government and widespread participation by 
private sector employees. Beginning with the election 
of the PRI in 1929, the government has been strongly 
connected with the Mexican labor movement. The PRI 
used Centrals to support economic development by 
containing workers and stagnating wages. Predictably, 
a majority of private sector Centrals are associated 
with the PRI.19
In total, there are 33 central union confederations, fed-
erations, and national unions in Mexico representing a 
majority of workers in the public, private, and banking 
sectors.20 This unique relationship helped shape Mex-
ico’s labor environment, with lasting impacts which 
can still be seen today. 
In the 1980s, the pressure for democracy started to 
build with the mild success of opposition candidates in 
regional elections but came to the fore during the 1994 
17  Shannon K. O’Neil, “Mexico Makes It: A Transformed 
Society, Economy, and Government,” Foreign Affairs, March/
April 2013, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/mexi-
co/2013-03-01/mexico-makes-it.
18  O’Neil, “Mexico Makes It.”
19  Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Af-




20  Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Af-
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economic crisis, which occurred after NAFTA came 
into effect on January 1, 1994.21 In 1996, under pres-
sure from constituents and opposition parties due to 
increasing dissatisfaction with the government, Pres-
ident Ernesto Zedillo of the PRI enacted reforms that 
made electoral fraud more difficult to commit.22 This 
reform effectively opened up the system to opposition 
by granting open access to media, setting controls on 
election spending, and ending the PRI’s control over 
the election process.23 Thus, in 1997, for the first time 
in 28 years, the PRI lost control of Congress. In 2000, 
Vicente Fox from the National Action Party (PAN) was 




A distinct and notable characteristic of Mexico’s his-
tory is that economic liberalization preceded the polit-
ical transformation and democratization described in 
the previous section.24 The following section will detail 
chronologically how Mexico designed this economic 
liberalization agenda. The first section will describe 
how Mexico began to push this agenda in the 1960s, 
with a new orientation towards the export manufactur-
ing sector. The second section will detail the reforms 
necessary for Mexico’s accession to the GATT in the 
1980s, when the PRI was still in power. It concludes 
with the negotiations between the United States, 
Mexico, and Canada, and the eventual ratification of 
NAFTA, a process which began in 1990, a full six 
years before the election reform of 1996.
21  O’Neil, “Mexico Makes It.”
22  Sam Dillon, “Major-Party Deal in Mexico to bring Political 
Reforms,” The New York Times, July 27, 1996, https://www.
nytimes.com/1996/07/27/world/major-party-deal-in-mexi-
co-to-bring-political-reforms.html.
23  Dillon, “Major-Party Deal in Mexico to bring Political 
Reforms.” 
24  Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera, “Mexico’s Economic Dilem-
mas and Democratic Challenges in an Era of Reform,” Latin 
American Politics and Society 54, no. 4 (2012): 179-88, http://
www.jstor.org/stable/23322105.
i. Maquiladoras 
Before the 1980s, Mexico based its economic strategy 
on an import-substitution industrialization model (ISI) 
and, therefore, required significant government regula-
tions and market protections. This strategy translated 
into a weighted average tariff of 23.5 percent, an import 
license requirement covering 92.2 percent of national 
production, and a cap on foreign ownership of firms to 
49 percent.25 This government involvement served to 
protect Mexican industries from foreign competition to 
allow them time to develop. However, protection came 
at a high financial cost to the Mexican government, no-
tably stagnant economic growth. 
The implementation of “Mexico’s Border Industrial-
ization Program” in 1965 began the boom of the ma-
quiladora industry, the only exception to the protec-
tionist strategy that characterized Mexico before the 
1980s.26 Maquiladoras, or maquilas, are factories in 
Mexico that assemble parts into finished goods for ex-
port. When shipped, these products are largely exclud-
ed from duties and tariffs. The Mexican government 
designed the program in response to the termination of 
the bracero program, an agreement between the Unit-
ed States and Mexico which enabled Mexican men to 
enter the United States as guest workers to fill a labor 
shortage gap after World War II.27 The industrialization 
program was characterized by the unrestricted entry of 
foreign capital into the border region, the allowance 
of directly owned subsidiaries or subcontractors by 
foreign corporations, and the provision of tax-exempt 
status, except for the value added from manufacturing 
labor.28 The Mexican American Chamber of Commerce 
25  Hildegunn Kyvik Nordås, Is Trade Liberalization a Win-
dow of Opportunity for Women?, August 2003, https://papers.
ssrn.com/abstract=925793. 
26  Gautam Hazarika and Rafael Otero, “Foreign Trade and 
the Gender Earnings Differential in Urban Mexico,” Journal of 
Economic Integration 19, no. 2, (June 2004): 353-373, https://
www.jstor.org/stable/23000785.
27  Raúl Delgado-Wise and Humberto Márquez Covarrubias, 
“The Reshaping of Mexican Labor Exports under NAFTA: Par-
adoxes and Challenges,” International Migration Review 41, no. 
3 (September 2007): 656-679, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/
doi/abs/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2007.00089.x.
28  Hazarika and Otero, Foreign Trade and the Gender Earn-
24
estimated that “the average cost advantage of a ma-
quiladora plant over its U.S. counterpart at over $13 
per worker per hour.”29 Given this calculation, foreign 
corporations, particularly U.S. companies, realized 
that they could significantly reduce costs by import-
ing the raw materials into Mexico and re-exporting the 
finished goods with U.S. import duties levied only on 
the relatively cheap Mexican labor. As a result, the ma-
quiladoras quickly became the fastest growing sector 
of the Mexican economy and the second largest source 
of foreign exchange.30 Between 1982 and 2005, exports 
of the maquiladora industry increased 28-fold from 
$96.756 billion to $147.521 billion and between 1980 
and 2006, employment increased tenfold from 0.12 
million to 1.2 million.31 
ii. General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) and NAFTA
The transition of the entire Mexican economy away 
from the import-substitution model ushered in a ‘sec-
ondary-exporting model’ which targeted manufactur-
ing exports as the dynamic factor of national economic 
growth.32 To implement this model, Mexico successful-
ly joined the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) in 1986 (later leading to accession to the WTO 
in 1995), which required complying with unilateral 
tariff reductions and a lower cap on foreign ownership. 
Mexico applied these reductions rapidly, such that by 
1987, the highest tariff was reduced to 20 percent and 
the tariff structure was simplified to include only five 
ings Differential in Urban Mexico.
29  Laura Catharine Macdonald and C. Gabriel, NAFTA, 
“Women and Organising in Canada and Mexico: Forging a 
‘Feminist Internationality,’” Millennium - Journal of Internation-
al Studies 23, vol. 3, (March 1994): 535-562, https://journals.
sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/03058298940230030601.
30  Patricia Fernández-Kelly, “Gender and Economic Change 
in the United States and Mexico, 1900-2000,” American Behav-
ioral Scientist 52, no.3 (November 2008): 377:404, https://doi.
org/10.1177/0002764208323512.
31  Delgado-Wise and Covarrubias, The Reshaping of Mexi-
can Labor.; Paul R. Bergin, Robert C. Feenstra, and Gordon H. 
Hanson, “Offshoring and Volatility: Evidence from Mexico’s 
Maquiladora Industry,” American Economic Review 99, no. 4 
(September 2009), pp. 1664-71, http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.
php?doi=10.1257/aer.99.4.1664. 
32  Delgado-Wise and Covarrubias, “The Reshaping of Mexi-
can Labor Exports under NAFTA: Paradoxes and Challenges.”
different rates: 0 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent, 15 per-
cent, 20 percent.33 These reforms led to an increase in 
inflows of foreign capital, from $478 million in 1983 
to $3.635 billion in 1989.34
Starting in 1990, Mexico’s economic strategy pivot-
ed towards prioritizing bilateral free trade agreements, 
most notably NAFTA in 1994. NAFTA is a regional 
trade agreement which removed barriers to trade and 
investment between the United States, Canada, and 
Mexico. Between 1993 and 2016, regional trade and 
investment increased by over $810 billion to reach $1.1 
trillion.35 NAFTA transformed and revitalized Mexi-
co’s centralized economy after the harmful economic 
effects of a debt crisis in the 1980s. NAFTA solidified 
these new market economy reforms and accelerat-
ed foreign direct investment (FDI), creating approx-
imately a half-million new jobs before 2000.36 These 
jobs were primarily in the maquiladora sector, which 
expanded from northern Mexican border states into 
central Mexico.37 Over the first five years of NAFTA, 
maquiladora employment increased by 86 percent.38 
Beginning in 2017, NAFTA was renegotiated. The new 
agreement, renamed the US-Mexico-Canada Agree-
ment (USMCA), was signed by all three Parties in No-
vember of 2018 at the G20 Summit in Buenos Aires. 
However, the agreement has yet to be ratified by each 
country’s respective legislature. As written, the USM-
CA increases labor and environmental regulations, up-
33  Ernesto Aguayo-Tellez, Jim Airola, and Chinhui Juhn, 
“Did Trade Liberalization Help Women? The Case of Mexico in 
the 1990s,” Research in Labor Economics, Vol. 38 (July 2010), 
pp. 1-35, http://www.nber.org/papers/w16195.
34  Hildegunn Kyvik Nordås, Is Trade Liberalization a Win-
dow of Opportunity for Women?
35  Congressional Research Service, North American Free 
Trade Agreement, by Ian Fergusson and M. Villarreal, (Washing-
ton, D.C., 2017) https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42965.pdf.
36  William Gruben, “Did NAFTA Really Cause Mexico’s 
High Maquiladora Growth?” Center for Latin American Eco-
nomics, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (2001). https://www.
dallasfed.org/~/media/documents/research/papers/2001/wp0106.
pdf.
37  Dr. Eva O. Arceo-Gomez (Professor, Centro de Investi-
gación y Docencia Económicas A.C.) in discussion with the 
authors, January 2019.
38  William Gruben, “Did NAFTA Really Cause Mexico’s 
High Maquiladora Growth?” 
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dates intellectual property protections, imposes a quota 
for Candian and Mexican automotive production, in-
creases the duty-free limit for online purchases, and 
expands the United States’ access to Canada’s dairy 
market.39
D. Mexico Today
In 2018, AMLO, the former mayor of Mexico City, 
was elected president of Mexico. Currently, his par-
ty, the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA), 
holds the majority in both the Senate, with 59 seats, 
and the Chamber of Deputies, with 259 seats.40 
The 2018 elections played out in the context of broad 
dissatisfaction with democracy in Mexico. Misuse of 
public funds, lawbreaking, and issues with campaign 
finance have all contributed to this erosion of public 
support for traditional Mexican politics.41 Thus, Mex-
icans went into the elections with a deep sense of dis-
satisfaction for the country’s politics, including anger 
at the slow economic growth, the rampant corruption, 
and the widespread gang, cartel, and political vio-
lence.42 This displeasure engendered a desire for po-
litical transformation, and thus support for AMLO’s 
anti-establishment populist agenda.
AMLO’s policy proposals include the creation of a 
39  “Agreement between the United States of America, the 
United Mexican States, and Canada,” signed November 30, 
2018, Government of the United States, Retrieved 9 April 2019. 
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/unit-
ed-states-mexico-canada-agreement/agreement-between.
40  “Senadores por Grupo Parlamentario,” Senado de la 
República de Mexico, http://www.senado.gob.mx/64/senadores/
por_grupo_parlamentario; “Diputadas y Diputados por Entidad 
Federativa,” LXIV Legislatura, Honorable Camara de Diputados 
de Mexico, last modified March 5, 2019, . (Since Mexico is a 
multiparty system, MORENA’s majoirty in the Senate accounts 
for 46.1 percent of the seats, and its majority in the legislature 
for 51.8 percent of the seats, which both represent a majority 
vote in the chambers.).
41  María Amparo Casar, “The Shadow Hanging Over Mexi-
co’s 2018 Elections,” Americas Quarterly, https://www.ameri-
casquarterly.org/content/shadow-over-mexicos-2018-elections.
42  “AMLO will be the Most Powerful Mexican President 
in Decades,” The Economist, December 1, 2018, https://www.
economist.com/the-americas/2018/12/01/amlo-will-be-the-most-
powerful-mexican-president-in-decades.
National Guard to fight violence, several plans for 
curbing corruption and cutting public sector spending, 
an apprenticeship program for youth, and higher pen-
sions for the elderly, as well as cutting his own sal-
ary and those of other senior government officials.43 
In terms of labor rights, AMLO and MORENA have 
promised many changes, including increasing the min-
imum wage to keep up with inflation, overhauling la-
bor unions to give workers a larger say, and improving 
workers’ conditions.44
That being said, AMLO has faced some controversy 
over his criticism of civil society.45 In fact, in February 
2019, AMLO distributed an internal memorandum to 
his cabinet banning funding for “social organizations, 
unions, civil society organizations, NGOs, or philan-
thropic societies,” arguing that it leads to corruption, 
misuse of funds, and lack of transparency.46 Instead, the 
new policy is to give aid directly to beneficiaries in or-
der to avoid using civil society and other organizations 
as intermediators for government benefit transfers.47 
In terms of the future of international trade, the current 
administration has proven supportive of USMCA, de-
spite AMLO’s previous history of anti-free trade rhet-
oric.48  In this regard, the argument is that USMCA will 
provide stability, secure investment, and contribute to 
43  “AMLO will be the Most Powerful Mexican President in 
Decades,” The Economist.
44  Juan Montes, “Mexico’s President-Elect Prepares La-
bor Overhaul to Empower Workers,” The Wallstreet Journal, 
September 11, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/mexi-
cos-president-elect-prepares-labor-overhaul-to-empower-work-
ers-1536704229. 
45  Flor Hernández, “Diálogo y Distinción Pide la Sociedad 
Civil a AMLO,” Newsweek en Español, March 13, 2019, https://
newsweekespanol.com/2019/03/dialogo-distincion-pide-socie-
dad-civil-amlo/.
46  Isabel Gonzalez, “El Ejecutivo Ordena No dar Dinero a 
ONG; Medida Ante Discrecionalidad,“ Excelsior, February 19, 
2019,  https://www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/el-ejecutivo-orde-
na-no-dar-dinero-a-ong-medida-ante-discrecionalidad/1297259.
47  Gonzalez, “El Ejecutivo Ordena No dar Dinero a ONG.”
48  Elisabeth Malkin, ”Mexico‘s New Leader, Once a NAFTA 




job creation in Mexico.49 It is also worth noting that 
AMLO campaigned on revitalizing the sectors of the 
economy which have lagged behind since the imple-
mentation of NAFTA, with a particular focus on devel-
oping the South.50 
E. Legal Framework
In order to understand the context in which NAFTA 
was applied in Mexico (and the context in which USM-
CA will be applied when it is ratified by Mexico’s Con-
gress), it is necessary to gain an understanding of the 
legal framework in Mexico. The following section will 
examine the legal regime regarding women’s rights, 
labor rights, and international trade to help frame the 
discussion of working women in Mexico. It will be-
gin with a survey of Mexico’s domestic laws, with an 
emphasis on the Mexican Constitution of 1917. This 
will be followed by a review of relevant regional and 
international law, including Mexico’s legally binding 
obligations and voluntary commitments. 
a. Domestic Law
i. Protection of Workers 
The 1917 Constitution devoted more than 60 subsec-
tions to labor and social security, and dedicated entire 
articles to free education, property rights, and worker 
rights. It is important to recall that the Constitution was 
written following Mexico’s Revolutionary War, which 
was spearheaded by workers. Consequently, the 1917 
Constitution emphasizes the right to work in Article 4. 
This grants the right to employment or some trade, in 
which a person will receive a salary in exchange for 
their work. Article 4 further states that people have the 
right to work in any profession. Thus, the Constitution 
does not expressly limit what constitutes as “work.” 
Article 5 expands on this by asserting that a worker is 
entitled to remuneration and by declaring that a labor 
contract cannot “[restrict] any civil or political right.”51 
This article signifies that no type of work that a person 
does can impede their right to exercise political or civil 
49  Malkin, ”Mexico‘s New Leader, Once a NAFTA Foe, 
Welcomes New Deal.“ 
50  Malkin, ”Mexico‘s New Leader, Once a NAFTA Foe, 
Welcomes New Deal.“
51  Mexican Constitution of 1917, art.5(a). 
rights as laid out in the Constitution. 
Section 6 of the Constitution delves deeper into labor 
and social security rights. Article 123, the only arti-
cle of this section, defines laborers as “workers, day 
laborers, domestic servants, artisans, and in a general 
way to all labor contracts.”52 There is no mention of 
the formality of labor contracts. The Constitution does 
not clearly define contracts, which can lead to many 
issues for laborers—significantly, that many people 
with informal contracts do not have guaranteed rights, 
or, at least, recognition of their rights. For example, 
many domestic workers in Mexico do not receive so-
cial security benefits. A recent Supreme Court ruling 
in December 2018 hopes to alter this, by stating that 
domestic workers should be enrolled in social securi-
ty.53 The Court said it will give the government three 
years to comply with this mandate.54 However, based 
on how Article 123 defines this group (as laborers), 
they should have received these benefits beforehand. 
Thus, there exists an irregularity in practice.
Furthermore, the Constitution protects citizens who 
have been wrongfully treated. It states that employers 
have to compensate workers with three months of wag-
es in the event that the employee leaves due to ill treat-
ment towards either himself or herself, or his or her 
family.55 This provision can be interpreted as a mecha-
nism installed to ensure that workers, or their families, 
are not abused by their employees. While this inclu-
sion of family demonstrates the progressiveness of the 
constitutional drafters, it also complicates the interpre-
tation of this article. Defining family and ill-treatment 
is no small task, especially since the Constitution does 
not explicitly explain either of these concepts. 
Article 123 defines the length of the workday, giving 
the “maximum duration” of a regular work day as 
eight hours.56 It also stipulates that the duration of a 
52  Mexican Constitution of 1917, art 123.
53  Amy Guthrie, “After ruling, hit film, Mexico re-
considers domestic workers,” AP News, December 20, 
2018, accessed April 11, 2019, https://www.apnews.com/
e89d8dd061ac40b590d1fb606bece49f .
54  “Corte: seguridad social obligatoria para servicio domésti-
co,” Telemundo, December 7, 2018, https://www.telemundo62.
com/noticias/mexico/suprema-corte-ordena-seguridad-social-o-
bligatoria-para-servicio-domestico-502178101.html
55  Mexican Constitution of 1917, art.123. (v). 
56  Mexican Constitution of 1917, art.123. (a).
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night shift is seven hours. A day of rest is required for 
every six working days. The issue of overtime is also 
addressed in Article 123; if a laborer’s hours increase, 
they must be fully compensated. The Constitution fur-
ther imposes limits on the amount of overtime, stating 
that “overtime work may never exceed three hours a 
day nor three times consecutively.”57 Thus, the maxi-
mum amount of time a laborer can work in a day, per 
the Constitution, is 11 hours. 
Furthermore, the Constitution of 1917 dictates that the 
local municipality must notarize every contract with a 
foreign employer.58 This means that all foreign compa-
nies that have factories, or maquiladoras, in Mexico, 
must notarize every employee’s contract. Thus, every 
employee has a contract that is recognized by the com-
pany and government, and should be entitled to receive 
benefits. This protects workers since companies would, 
legally, not be allowed to deny proof of employment or 
social security benefits. 
The Constitution sets restrictions to prevent employ-
ers from taking advantage of their workers. The article 
also states that laborers must receive a minimum wage 
either “in general or according to occupation.”59 The 
wage “must be sufficient to satisfy the normal material, 
social, and cultural needs of the head of a family and 
to provide for the compulsory education of [their] chil-
dren.”60 This provision essentially describes the right 
to a living wage. However, defining “normal” presents 
itself as a challenge—normal to whom? Furthermore, 
it states that “equal wage shall be paid for equal work, 
regardless of sex.”61 This “equal pay for equal work” 
provision is essential when considering the effects that 
free trade has had in Mexico, especially towards wom-
en workers.
In 2006, the Mexican Congress passed the General 
Law on Equality between Women and Men.62 Article 1 
57  Mexican Constitution of 1917, art.123. (k). 
58  Mexican Constitution of 1917, art.123. (z). 
59  Mexican Constitution of 1917, art.123. (f). 
60  Mexican Constitution of 1917, art.123. (f). 
61  Mexican Constitution of 1917, art.123. (g). 
62  Mexican General Law on Equality Between Women and 
states that the law was created to regulate and guaran-
tee equal opportunities and treatment between women 
and men in all sects of life.63 It further states how every 
aspect of society is included in the law, for example, 
economic life, social life, and stereotypes that perme-
ate Mexican society. Article 42 describes a method to 
eliminate stereotypes through adopting gender-per-
spective language.64 Furthermore, the law illustrates 
the importance of co-responsibility in work, and life, 
between men and women, as well as establishing ac-
cess to work for women and promoting equality within 
the workplace.65
In the following year, the Mexican government contin-
ued implementing new laws on gender equality, with 
its passage of the General Law on Women’s Access 
to a Life Free of Violence of 2007. This law specifi-
cally includes a section on violence in the workplace. 
It describes gender-based violence in the workplace 
as sexual harassment, sexual assault, discrimination, 
threats, or humiliation.66 It also includes measures that 
the government must take to address these, such as cre-
ating mechanisms to eradicate gender-based violence 
through education and labor centers.67 The law also de-
scribes the government’s aim to end gender-based vio-
lence in Mexican society at all levels of government.68 
The law defines the different types of violence against 
women, such as: psychological, physical, economic, 
sexual, and other forms that are prone to damaging the 
integrity, dignity, or liberty of women.69 
The Constitution does not limit pregnant women from 
Men, 2006, http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/
LGIMH_140618.pdf.
63   Mexican General Law on Equality Between Women and 
Men, 2006, art.1. 
64  Mexican General Law on Equality Between Women and 
Men, 2006, art. 42.
65  Mexican General Law on Equality Between Women and 
Men, 2006, art. 33. 
66  Mexican General Law on Women’s Access to a Life Free 
of Violence, 2007, art. 11, art. 12., art.13.
67  Mexican General Law on Women’s Access to a Life Free 
of Violence, 2007, art. 15.
68  Mexican General Law on Women’s Access to a Life Free 
of Violence, 2007.
69  Mexican General Law on Women’s Access to a Life Free 
of Violence, 2007, art.6.
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working; thus, theoretically women should not need to 
choose between motherhood and work. Employers are 
not permitted to subject pregnant women to excessive 
labor.70 If a woman is six months pregnant or more, her 
employer cannot legally oblige her to do certain work, 
nor can they dismiss her for not doing “excessive” 
work. Nevertheless, it is important to note that “exces-
sive” is not defined. 
Social security also provides for maternity leave. Arti-
cle 123 continues by stating, “in the month following 
childbirth they shall necessarily enjoy the benefit of rest 
and shall receive their full wages and retain their em-
ployment.”71 In 1917, the Mexican Constitution grant-
ed women one month of paid maternity leave, during 
which their employers could not dismiss them. Today, 
women are granted 12 weeks of maternity leave, with 
six weeks occurring before birth and six weeks given 
after birth, under Article 120 of the Mexican Federal 
Labor Law.72 Furthermore, Article 123 grants nursing 
mothers two 30-minute breaks throughout the day to 
nurse their children. In 2017, Article 123 of the Federal 
Labor Law was reformed to include paternity leave.73 
This new provision grants five days of paternity leave, 
whereas it was nonexistent before.
Forced pregnancy testing is prohibited by law. Under 
Mexican Federal Labor Law Article 133, “employers 
are now prohibited from demanding medical proof 
that a worker is not pregnant as a condition of em-
ployment.”74 Furthermore, employers cannot dismiss a 
worker for being pregnant or “pressuring her, directly 
70  Mexican Constitution of 1917, art.123. (e).
71  Mexican Constitution of 1917, art.123. (e). 
72  Maquila Solidarity Network, Comparison of Mexico’s 
Federal Labor Law, International Labor Organization stan-




73  Secretary of Work and Social Provision, “Tienen padres 
trabajadores derecho a cinco días de licencia por paternidad,” 
News Release, June 18, 2017, https://www.gob.mx/stps/prensa/
tienen-padres-trabajadores-derecho-a-cinco-dias-de-licen-
cia-por-paternidad?idiom=es.
74  Maquila Solidarity Network, Comparison of Mexico’s Fed-
eral Labor Law, International Labor Organization standards, 
and FLA Code and Benchmarks. 
or indirectly, to resign.”75
Mexico has robust legislation regarding employment 
benefits. These benefits should be provided without 
discrimination based on gender, race, and sexual orien-
tation. Furthermore, there are certain benefits which are 
explicitly targeted for new mothers and fathers, such 
as maternity and paternity leave. These rights cover 
“work accidents and occupational diseases, non-occu-
pational illness and maternity; and retirement, disabil-
ity, old age, and death.”76 However, to be entitled to 
these benefits, a worker must generally be employed in 
the formal sector.
These benefits are primarily derived from social secu-
rity which is stipulated in Article 123 of the Consti-
tution. The Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS) 
oversees these programs and funds social security 
through contributions by employees and employers. 
To qualify for social security, employees must be reg-
istered by their employers. Mexican law requires em-
ployers to register each employee with the IMSS with-
in five days of hiring.77
ii. Collective Bargaining
Mexico’s collective bargaining laws are strong. Inter-
national Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. 
87, the Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organise, was codified domestically in Article 
123 of the Mexican Constitution and has formed the 
basis of collective bargaining protections within the 
country since its ratification in 1951.78 In 2017, Arti-
cle 123 was further amended to require the formation 
of a government agency and Conciliation and Arbitra-
tion Boards (CABs) to register all workers’ unions and 
manage associated administrative processes.79 
75  Maquila Solidarity Network, Comparison of Mexico’s Fed-
eral Labor Law, International Labor Organization standards, 
and FLA Code and Benchmarks.
76  Mexican Constitution of 1917, art.123. (k) (k) (a).
77  United States Social Security Administration Office of 
Retirement and Disability Policy, “Social Security Programs 
Throughout the World: The Americas,” Social Security Ad-
ministration (2017) https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/
ssptw/2016-2017/americas/mexico.html.  
78  Mexican Constitution. Article 123(j).
79  Jorge De Presno. “Mexico: Articles 107 and 123 of the 
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There are also protections in place for laborers who 
join a union; for instance, employers do not have just 
cause to terminate a labor contract solely due to the la-
borer’s participation in a union.80 If an employer dis-
misses a worker due to his or her involvement in a 
union, the employer must compensate the worker with 
the equivalent of three months wage.81 However, some 
companies could afford to pay the three months wage, 
demonstrating that current repercussion may not deter 
wealthier companies from dismissing unionized work-
ers. This presents itself as a gap that could be mediated 
if the government added more sanctions to companies 
who fire employees for their involvement in a union, 
especially for those who can afford to pay the current 
fine.
iii. Constitutional Reform of 2017 
As mentioned previously, the Mexican government has 
reformed Article 123, related to collective bargaining, 
several times, most recently in 2017.82 The two main 
areas of reform are tripartite CABs and unions, as well 
as collective bargaining agreements (CBAs). 
A special federal entity was further created to oversee 
the registration and administration of CBAs. The tri-
partite system that existed previously was inefficient 
and acted independently of the judicial system.83 Its 
dismantling does not eradicate the need for concilia-
tion and labor tribunals. According to the decree, labor 
tribunals—local and federal—under the guise of the 
judiciary will now be responsible for resolving con-
flicts between workers and employers.84 Before going 
Mexican Constitution (Political Constitution of the United Mex-
ican States).”
80  Mexican Constitution of 1917, art.123. (v). 
81  Mexican Constitution of 1917, art.123. (v). 
82  Maquila Solidarity Network, Labor Justice Reform in Mex-
ico: A Briefing Paper, July 2017, http://www.maquilasolidarity.
org/sites/maquilasolidarity.org/files/resource/Labour_Justice_Re-
form_Mexico_MSN-2017.pdf. 
83  Dr. Kimberly A. Nolan Garcia (Professor, Facultad Amer-
icana de Ciencias Socials, FLACSO) in discussion with the 
authors, February 2019.
84  Mexican Federal Decree 231 of 2017, http://dof.gob.mx/
nota_detalle.php?codigo=5472965&fecha=24/02/2017. 
to court to resolve a dispute, workers and their employ-
ers are required to go before a local conciliation center, 
which will have judicial personality. The same center 
is also required to register the collective bargaining and 
union agreements, as well as aid in an administrative 
manner.85 Additionally, these conciliation centers are 
constitutionally obliged to register unions and CBAs. 
The purpose of this change is to provide clarity and 
transparency within the country as well as with work-
ers. However, until these courts are fully implemented, 
CABs will continue to register and administer collec-
tive bargaining agreements, as well as hear employ-
ment disputes. 
The decree to reform the Constitution also “elevates 
to the constitutional level the right for workers to be 
represented by the union of their free choice.”86 The 
Constitution now guarantees the principle of represen-
tation in a union, as well as assures the signature and 
registration of the CBAs or union contracts. Therefore, 
this decree has further promoted workers’ freedom to 
choose the union in which they would like to partici-
pate. It is important to establish and solidify this legal 
standard, given the current tenuous state of unions in 
the country, as will be discussed in Part III. 
Annex 23-A in the proposed free trade agreement be-
tween Mexico, the United States, and Canada (USM-
CA) prompted this new constitutional and labor reform. 
As a consequence of this new free trade agreement, 
Mexico is obliged to extend protection to laborers.87 
These protections include 1) the right to unionize with-
out employer interference, 2) the right for independent 
organizations to register unions and to resolve conflicts 
3) the right to hold a secret vote to resolve disputes. 
Furthermore, the agreement includes revisions of wage 
and work conditions within unions themselves.88 The 
Annex explicitly calls for publication of the union 
agreements that are “readily accessible” to the public. 
85  Mexican Federal Decree 231 of 2017.
86  Maquila Solidarity Network, Labor Justice Reform in Mex-
ico: A Briefing Paper, July 2017.
87  Salomón, “Se prepara una nueva reforma laboral.”
88  Salomón, “Se prepara una nueva reforma laboral.” ; United 
States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, Annex 23-A.
30
The Constitutional reforms demonstrate Mexico’s com-
mitment to assuring the right of collective bargaining 
and unions and its commitment to laborers. However, 
Mexico also has regional and international obligations 
under various treaties. Article 1 of the Constitution 
states that every person in Mexico is guaranteed the 
human rights laid out in the Constitution, as well as 
international treaties to which Mexico is a state party. 
Since Mexico is a monist state, international treaties 
are integrated into its domestic framework.89 On May 
1, 2019, the Mexican government passed this reform, 
granting workers the right to “organize freely and en-
gage in collective bargaining.”90 This represents a huge 
step for Mexico, and demonstrates the strong implica-




The Mexican government is obliged to codify interna-
tional texts it has signed and ratified into its domestic 
legal system. In the Inter-American regional human 
rights system, Mexico is a party to the American Dec-
laration of the Rights and Duties of Man (American 
Declaration), the Protocol of San Salvador, and the 
Convention of Belém do Pará.  The American 
Declaration grants the right to work, the right to social 
security, and the right to create and participate in a la-
bor union.91 
The Protocol of San Salvador, ratified by Mexico in 
1996, includes the obligations of non-discrimination 
and the right to work. Under the Protocol, states are 
also obliged to “implement and strengthen programs 
that help to ensure suitable family care, so that wom-
en may enjoy a real opportunity to exercise the right 
89  David Sloss, “Domestic Application of Treaties,” Santa 
Clara Law, April 7, 2011, https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1620&context=facpubs. 
90  Alexia Fernández Campell, ”Workers in Mexico just won 
the right to organize real labor unions. Trump helped,” Vox, May 
1, 2019, https://www.vox.com/2019/5/1/18523972/may-day-
2019-mexico-labor-reform. 
91  Organization of American States (OAS), American Decla-
ration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 2 May 1948, art. (XIV), 
art. (XVI), and art. (XXII), https://www.oas.org/dil/access_to_in-
formation_human_right_American_Declaration_of_the_Rights_
and_Duties_of_Man.pdf 
to work.”92 The inclusion of the latter in the Protocol 
of San Salvador demonstrates the importance of rec-
ognizing the dual role that many women play within 
society as both mothers and workers. Although Mexi-
co already has in place similar constitutional rights for 
women, the Protocol explicitly states that this provi-
sion is intended to ensure that women enjoy a real op-
portunity to work and that the structure of society does 
not impede women’s will to work. The Protocol’s key 
provision is that women are not solely caretakers. In 
practice this could translate to states providing child 
care for women to grant them an honest opportunity 
to work. 
Notably, Mexico has one reservation to the Protocol 
of San Salvador, related to Article 8. Article 8 states 
that “no one may be compelled to belong to a trade 
union.” 93 The reservation states that Mexico ratified the 
Protocol with the understanding that Article 8 will be 
applied according to the Mexican constitution.94 Under 
the Mexican constitution, the Mexican people have the 
right to form and join unions; however, there is no ex-
plicit mention of being “compelled” to join a union. 
The Convention of Belém do Pará, ratified by Mexico 
in 1998, concerns itself with the prevention, punish-
ment, and eradication of violence against women. This 
Convention requires states to “refrain from engaging 
in any act or practice of violence against women” as 
well as applying “due diligence to prevent, investigate 
and impose penalties for violence against women.”95 In 
the context of labor, this means that states are obliged 
to prevent and investigate working conditions that pro-
mote violence against women. This has been incorpo-
rated into Mexican law, as can be seen with the Gener-
al Law on Women’s Access to a Life Free of Violence, 
92  Organization of American States (OAS), Additional Proto-
col to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“Protocol of San Salva-
dor”), November 17, 1988, art. 6. http://www.oas.org/juridico/
english/treaties/a-52.html. 
93  OAS, “Protocol of San Salvador”, art.8(b).
94  OAS, “Protocol of San Salvador”, Mexico Reservation, 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-52.html. 
95  Organization of American States (OAS), Inter-American 
Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of 
Violence against Women (“Convention of Belem do Para”), 
June 1994, art. 7, https://www.oas.org/en/CIM/docs/Belem-do-
Para[EN].pdf. 
Part I - Background
31
which includes a section on gender-based violence in 
the workplace.96 
ii. The Cotton Field Case
 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) 
case of González et al. (“Campo Algodonero”) v. Méx-
ico, known colloquially as the “Cotton Field Case,” 
highlights gender-based violence, the dangers of trav-
eling between work and home, as well as the gen-
der-based stereotypes that impede women’s rights.97 In 
November 2001, the bodies of three women—identi-
fied as those of Claudia Ivette Gonzalez, Esmerelda 
Herrera Monreal, and Laura Berenice Ramos Monar-
rez—were found in a cotton field outside of Ciudad 
Juárez. Monarrez and Monreal disappeared on their 
journeys home from their jobs as a maid and a student, 
respectively, while Gonzalez disappeared after being 
turned away from work after she arrived two minutes 
late for her shift at a maquiladora.98
When their families reported the disappearances of 
the women to the police, authorities told them that the 
women were “probably with their boyfriends.” Upon 
discovery of the bodies, the investigation by police 
was completely botched, leading the families of Gon-
96  Mexican General Law on Women’s Access to a Life Free 
of Violence, 2007, http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/
pdf/LGAMVLV_130418.pdf. 
97  ”Gonzales, Monreal, and Monarrez (”Cotton Field”) v. 
Mexico,“ London School of Economics Centre for Women, 
Peace, and Security: March 20, 2019, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/
vaw/landmark-cases/a-z-of-cases/gonzalez-et-al-v-mexico/.
98 Organization of American States Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights, ”Application filed with the Inter-Amer-
ican Court of Human Rights in the case of Campo Algodonero: 
Claudia Ivette González, Esmeralda Herrera Monreal and Laura 
Berenice Ramos Monárrez (Cases 12.496, 12.497 and 12.498) 
against the United Mexican States“, https://www.cidh.oas.org/
demandas/12.496-7-8%20Campo%20Algodonero%20Mexi-
co%204%20noviembre%202007%20ENG.pdf;  London School 
of Economics Centre for Women, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/vaw/
landmark-cases/a-z-of-cases/gonzalez-et-al-v-mexico/; ”Applica-
tion Filed with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the 
Case of Campo Algodenero: Claudia Ivette González, Esmeralda 
Herrera Monreal and Laura Berenice Ramos Monárrez (Cases 
12.496, 12.497 and 12.498) against the United Mexican States,” 
Organization of American States (November 2007): https://www.
cidh.oas.org/demandas/12.496-7-8%20Campo%20Algodone-
ro%20Mexico%204%20noviembre%202007%20ENG.pdf.
zalez, Monreal, and Monarrez to bring a case against 
Mexico to the IACtHR.99
In 2009, the IACtHR ruled that Mexico violated seven 
articles of the American Convention on Human Rights 
and one article of the Belém do Pará Convention.100 Of 
particular significance is the ruling on Article 7 of said 
Convention; Article 7 obligates states to “condemn all 
forms of violence against women” and “...pursue...pol-
icies to prevent, punish, and eradicate violence...”101 The 
Court determined that the Mexican government violat-
ed Article 7 because it “went through the formalities 
of taking down statements, but did not diligently try to 
find victims” and “did not prove that it had adopted or 
implemented the necessary measures as mandated in 
Article 2 (obligation to Give Domestic Legal Effect to 
Rights) of the American Convention and Article 7(c) 
of the Convention of Belém do Pará.”102 
The Court issued several recommendations in light of 
its findings, among them that Mexico must “include 
a gender perspective in all investigations” and that 
Mexico must “continue implementing permanent ed-
ucation and training programs and courses in (para. 
541): ...elimination of stereotypes of women’s role in 
society.”103 The Court’s decision illustrates a recurring 
problem in Mexico: although Mexico has ratified many 
international instruments related to human rights, and 
has integrated most of these instruments into its do-
mestic legal framework, implementation of these laws 
frequently does not occur. 
99  ”Gonzales, Monreal, and Monarrez (”Cotton Field”) v. 
Mexico,“ London School of Economics Centre for Women, 
Peace, and Security, 
100  ”Gonzales, Monreal, and Monarrez (”Cotton Field”) v. 
Mexico,“ London School of Economics Centre for Women, 
Peace, and Security
101  ”Gonzales, Monreal, and Monarrez (”Cotton Field”) v. 
Mexico,“ London School of Economics Centre for Women, 
Peace, and Security.
102  ”Gonzalez et. al (”Cotton Field”) v. Mexico,” Loyola Law 
School.”  Los Angeles: 2009. https://iachr.lls.edu/sites/default/
files/iachr/Cases/Gonzalez_et_al_-Cotton_Field-_v_Mexico/
Gonzalez%20et%20al.%20v.%20Mexico.pdf. 
103  ”Gonzales, Monreal, and Monarrez (”Cotton Field”) v. 
Mexico,“ London School of Economics Centre for Women, 
Peace, and Security.
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c. International Human Rights Law
In addition to the regional documents described above, 
Mexico has also ratified several international docu-
ments related to human rights. For the purpose of this 
report, the most relevant international human rights in-
struments ratified by Mexico are the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), and the Convention on the Elimi-
nation of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW). 
The ICCPR provides for, among others, the principle 
of equality before the law. Article 26 establishes that 
everyone is equal before the law, as well as grants 
equal protection of the law without discrimination.104 
Article 7 of the ICESCR outlines the right to work. 
It stipulates the right to upward mobility in the labor 
force, regardless of gender. It states that there is “equal 
opportunity for everyone to be promoted.”105 Thus, 
by signing, Mexico demonstrated its commitment to 
equality in the labor force.
Given the interdependence of human rights, realiz-
ing women’s rights will contribute to the realization 
of the right to work. In Article 2, CEDAW mandates 
that parties to the Convention take up policies of elimi-
nating discrimination against women.106 Discrimination 
against women includes gender-based violence (GB-
V).107 Further, and particularly relevant for the context 
in Mexico, is Article 5 concerning gender stereotyping 
and prejudice. Pursuant to Article 5(a), Parties are obli-
gated to pursue measures changing social and cultural 
104  UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights.
105  UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights.
106  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrim-
ination against Women, New York, December 18, 1979, United 
Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1249, art. 2, available at, http://www.
un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm#arti-
cle12. [hereinafter: CEDAW].
107  UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW), CEDAW General Recommendation 
No. 19: Violence against women, 1992, para. 1,  http://www.
refworld.org/docid/52d920c54.htl
norms with the aim of removing practices that promote 
gender stereotypes or are founded on ideas of inferior-
ity or superiority of the sexes.108 Moreover, Article 5(b) 
provides for measures that ensure a family education 
that identifies, among others, the shared responsibility 
of women and men in raising children.109 
CEDAW also addresses workplace discrimination 
in Article 11, enshrining the state’s responsibility to 
“eliminate discrimination against women in the field of 
employment” as well as the right to job promotion and 
social security.110 The CEDAW Committee, in General 
Comment No. 19, observes how GBV, such as work-
based sexual harassment, hurts women’s equality in 
employment.111 The convention continues by express-
ing the right to maternity leave, as well as a prohibition 
of “dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy or maternity 
leave.”112 As described above in Part I (E)(a)(i), Mexi-
co has incorporated these international obligations into 
its domestic framework through the Federal Law on 
Equality between Men and Women. This law guaran-
tees the right to equal opportunities between women 
and men.113  
Further, article 7 of CEDAW obliges states to “elimi-
nate discrimination against women in the political and 
public life of the country.”114 Additionally, states must 
ensure the right of women to hold public office and to 
be included in policymaking. This has been incorpo-
rated into the domestic legal framework through the 
General Law on Equality between Women and Men, 
which is discussed above. Furthermore, gender parity 
requirements have been established in both the Federal 
Code on Institutions and Electoral Procedures and Arti-
cle 41 of the Constitution.115 Mexico has a gender parity 
108  CEDAW, art. 5(a).
109  CEDAW, art. 5(b).
110  CEDAW, art 1. (1).
111  CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19: Violence 
against women, 1992, para. 17.
112  CEDAW, art 1. (2).
113  Mexican General Law on Equality Between Women and 
Men, 2006, http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/
LGIMH_140618.pdf. 
114  CEDAW, art 7.
115  Federal Code on Institutions and Electoral Procedures, 
2008, art. 218.3, http://ieepco.org.mx/biblioteca_digital/legisla-
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requirement for political parties. However, it has been 
abused in a multitude of ways. For example, women 
are sometimes forced to run in districts in which the 
party is guaranteed to lose. In another case, women, 
once elected, step down and allow a male counterpart, 
often a husband, to hold office.116
Despite the 2006 Federal Law on Equality between 
Men and Women, the actual fulfillment of Mexico’s 
obligations under CEDAW have been lacking. In its 
most recent comments on Mexico’s country report, 
CEDAW expressed concern with the low economic 
participation of women, the gender pay gap, and “un-
equal distribution of domestic and care work between 
women and men…[forcing] many women into low-in-
come part-time jobs in the informal sector.”117 Although 
the legal foundations against gender discrimination al-
ready exist in Mexico, implementation remains a prob-
lem.
 
i. International Labour Organization (ILO)
Other critical international human rights documents 
that Mexico has ratified include several ILO conven-
tions. Mexico’s 2017 constitutional reform was instru-
mental in ensuring compliance with the ILO conven-
tions that it has signed onto, such as the Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 
Convention (No. 87), the Equal Remuneration Con-
vention (No. 100), and the Discrimination (Employ-
ment and Occupation) Convention (No. 111), as well 
as the most recent signing of the Right to Organise and 
Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 98). 
ILO conventions No. 87 and No. 100, which have been 
in effect in Mexico since the early 1950s, highlight the 
right to organize, elect representatives without employ-
er interference, as well as equal remuneration for work 
cion/COFIPE.pdf ; Mexican Constitution of 1917, art.41. 
116  Glover, “Mexico Seeks to Empower Women in Politics.”
117  Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, Concluding observations on the ninth periodic report 
of Mexico, 20 July 2018, 39(c), https://ilsb.org.mx/wp-content/
uploads/2018/07/INFORME_CEDAW_MEXICO_2018_EN-
GLISH.pdf. 
of equal value.118 Mexico has already established equal 
remuneration as a constitutional right. Thus, this illus-
trates the state’s nominal commitment to eradicating 
wage discrimination between genders. Furthermore, in 
1961, convention No. 111 came into force in Mexico. 
This convention specifically focuses on discrimina-
tion. All signatories must ensure that they “pursue a 
national policy designed to promote…equal opportu-
nity and treatment.”119
In practice, the state has adopted reforms to certain 
laws to meet its international obligations. ILO No.100 
defines remuneration and equal remuneration as the 
“the minimum wage or salary…by the employer to the 
worker and arising out of the worker’s employment…
without discrimination based on sex….” In March of 
2017, the Mexican Congress approved a reform to fur-
ther incorporate the law for equal wage between men 
and women as a way to combat gender discrimination 
and economic and labor violence.120 This law complies 
with the Constitutional and Federal Laws on Work and 
on Gender Equality. It also falls in accordance with 
ILO No. 100. 
Furthermore, the November 30, 2012 amendment to 
sections 2 and 3 of the Mexican Federal Labor Law 
gave effect to Mexico’s legal obligations under Con-
vention No. 111, establishing the prohibition of dis-
crimination concerning “ethnic or national origin, 
gender, age, disability, social status, state of health, 
118  International Labor Organization (ILO), Freedom of Asso-
ciation and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention (No. 
87), July 1948, https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORM-
LEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312232. 
;International Labor Organization (ILO), Equal Remuneration 
Convention (No. 100), June 1951, art.3.3, https://www.ilo.org/
dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_
ILO_CODE:C100. . 
119  International Labor Organization (ILO), Discrimi-
nation (Employment and Occupation) (No.111), June 1958, 
art.2, https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEX-
PUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C111. 







religion, migration status, opinions, sexual preference, 
and marital status.”121 Section 56 of the same amend-
ment prohibits discrimination related to sex, pregnan-
cy, or family responsibilities.122 Further, Section 113 
prohibits forced pregnancy testing, in that employers 
cannot require women to possess certificates con-
firming that they are not pregnant.123 During the 2016 
periodic review for Convention No. 111, the ILO ex-
pressed concerns about the specific application of Sec-
tion 113, requesting that Mexico provide more infor-
mation on its application.124 This particular convention 
has not been up for periodic review with the ILO since 
2014, and therefore, the response of Mexico to these 
ILO concerns is not available. 
Mexico most recently signed Convention No. 98, 
which establishes the right to organize and the right to 
collective bargaining. The first two articles proclaim 
that unions should be protected from “acts of interfer-
ence” as well as anti-union discrimination.125 Although 
this does not go into force until November 2019, the 
signing of this convention demonstrates Mexico’s 
commitment to independent unions.
Per the Mexican constitution, the state must ensure that 
its domestic laws are consistent with ratified interna-
tional treaties. If Mexico can successfully implement 
collective bargaining rights for its workers such that 
unions are accessible, transparent, and advocate for the 
rights of workers, rather than factory owners, it will 
be a particularly important step for labor protections. 
The lack of effectiveness of unions is an oft-cited con-
tributor to poor labor conditions and benefits in Mexi-
121  International Labor Organization, 24 March 2019, https://
www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100
:P13100_COMMENT_ID:3296885:NO
122  International Labor Organization, https://www.ilo.org/
dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COM-
MENT_ID:3296885:NO
123  International Labor Organization, https://www.ilo.org/
dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COM-
MENT_ID:3296885:NO
124  International Labor Organization, https://www.ilo.org/
dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COM-
MENT_ID:3296885:NO
125  International Labor Organization (ILO), Right to Orga-
nize and Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 98), July 1949, 
art.2, https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEX-
PUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312243. 
co. Other areas of difficulty that have been singled out 
by experts include issues of familiarity with the law, 
meaning that public and local officials are not aware 
of all the laws that protect their rights, and the issue 
of grievance mechanisms for workers to request labor 
inspections.
ii. Business and Human Rights 
 
The issue of business and human rights is one to which 
the international community is increasingly turning its 
attention. The UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights (UNGPs), endorsed by the UN Human 
Rights Council in 2011, created a voluntary interna-
tional framework for companies and states on business 
and human rights. The framework, composed of three 
pillars, touches on the importance of the state’s duty to 
protect human rights, companies’ responsibility to re-
spect human rights, and the right to access a remedy if 
rights have been violated.126 The goal of the UNGPs is 
to bridge the governance gap between companies and 
states to ensure that human rights are protected. This 
bridge is particularly important in the Mexican context 
considering that a significant part of Mexico’s GDP 
comes from exports. 
As part of the UNGPs, states are encouraged to create 
a National Action Plan (NAP). Mexico has been de-
veloping its NAP since 2014 but has been delayed in 
releasing it. Its NAP stems from its National Human 
Rights Program (2014-2018), which outlines the gov-
ernment’s objectives regarding human rights.127 It fo-
cuses on four broad goals: strengthening mechanisms 
and guarantees for human rights, encouraging compa-
nies to create their human rights policies, promoting 
legislation that regulates companies’ human rights 
policies, and working closely with companies to help 
them know their obligations towards human rights. 
However, at the time of this report’s publication, there 
126  United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Com-
missioner, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect, and Remedy’ 
Framework, 2011, https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publica-
tions/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_eN.pdf. 
127   Government of the Republic of Mexico, National Human 
Rights Program: 2014-2018, https://mk0globalnapshvllfq4.kin-
stacdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/mexico-pndh-2014-18.
pdf.
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have been no announcements to renew this program.
The UN Human Rights Council Special Procedures’ 
Working Group for Business and Human Rights’ first 
official visit to Mexico took place in August 2016 to 
examine how the Mexican government and businesses 
were complying with the UNGPs.128 On September 7, 
2016, the group issued a statement summarizing their 
findings, pointing to labor rights as a major business 
and human rights issue in Mexico. Specifically, the 
group identified the weak capacity to enforce labor 
standards, restrictions on freedom of association of 
workers, child labor, and the difficulties of agricultural 
day laborers.129 Additionally, the group noted that the 
participation of women in the labor force was, at the 
time of the publishing of the report, the lowest of any 
Latin American country. High rates of women in the 
labor force reported discrimination and sexual harass-
ment in their workplaces. Further, the experts reported 
a general lack of awareness of the UNGPs among busi-
nesses in Mexico.130
iii. UN Development Goals
Another UN initiative pertinent to the rights of wom-
en in Mexico is the UN Development Goals. The 
current Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and 
their founding program, the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals (MDGs), strive to eradicate global poverty 
by 2030. MDG 3 called for the promotion of gender 
equality and the empowerment of women. Specifically, 
the goal called for the elimination of gender dispari-
ty in education by 2015.131 The deadline of the MDGs 
128  “Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council: 
Human Rights and Transitional Corporations and other busi-
ness enterprises,” United Nations. July 6, 2011. https://docu-
ments-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/G11/144/71/
PDF/G1114471.pdf?OpenElement 
129  “Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council: 
Human Rights and Transitional Corporations and other business 
enterprises,” United Nations. 
130  “Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council: 
Human Rights and Transitional Corporations and other business 
enterprises,” United Nations. 
131  ”Millennium Development Goal 3,” United Nations, Ac-
cessed on: May 10, 2019. https://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/
gender.shtml.
passed in 2015, ushering in the SDGs which pushed 
the goalpost on achievement indicators. SDG 5 calls 
for the achievement of gender equality and empower-
ment of all women and girls. In addition to the general 
goal being more ambitious, the SDG also increases the 
number of specific indicators necessary for achieve-
ment, including ending all discrimination, eliminat-
ing violence, ensuring full and effective participation 
in economic, social, and public life, and recognizing 
the value of unpaid work, among others.132 These SDGs 
are nonbinding; however, the UN notes that “countries 
are expected to take ownership and establish a national 
framework for achieving the 17 goals.”133 
Mexico takes the implementation and achievement 
of these goals seriously. In its 2013 Progress Report, 
Mexico reported almost complete compliance with 
MDG 3 with it just barely missing complete compli-
ance in gender parity in primary education.134 Turning 
to the SDGs, Mexico has shown a commitment to de-
veloping institutions and data collection mechanisms 
in order to streamline the implementation process. 
Notably, they launched a data portal which allows us-
ers to interact with their progress on achieving each 
goal, making it one of only five countries to have such 
a dashboard.135 In its 2018 Voluntary National Review 
(VNR) for the SDGs, Mexico demonstrated awareness 
of implementation issues in gender equality. Further-
more, the Mexican government recognized the gender 
pay gap, as well as discrepancies in the application of 
laws between the state and the federal government.136 
Specifically, the VNR describes the need for state 
132  ”Sustainable Development Goal 5,” The United Nations.
133  ”The Sustainable Development Agenda,” The United 
Nations.
134  ”Los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio en Mexico,” 
Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia, 2013, Accessible 
through: https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypa-
ge/mdg/mdg-reports/lac-collection.html.  
135  INEGI, “Sistema de Informacion de los Objetivos de 
Desarrollo Sostenible, Mexico.”
136  Mexican Federal Government, Voluntary National Review 
for the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development: 





“governments [to] harmonize their laws and regula-
tions with the National Policy on Equality Between 
Women and Men.”137 Although they are nonbinding, 
the transparency and highly publicized status of prog-
ress in achieving the UN Development Goals provides 
a mechanism of international peer pressure for making 
real improvements in important social development in-
dicators. 
d. Trade Law 
Finally, Mexico has also taken on international obli-
gations through its ratification of regional trade agree-
ments. In addition to the obligations arising from these 
agreements, a WTO Panel referring to Article 31(3)(c) 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties es-
tablished that customary international law is relevant 
in the application of trade law.138 The Appellate Body 
and Panels of the WTO should thus interpret WTO law 
in conformity with international customary law when-
ever possible, including human rights law.139 However, 
when customary law is inconsistent with WTO norms, 
a panel ruled that customary law cannot supersede 
trade law.140 Given these circumstances, it appears un-
likely that a WTO dispute settlement body would de-
cide that human rights obligations prevailed over WTO 
obligations unless a human rights issue was found to 
be jus cogens—norms that cannot be derogated from. 
Regardless, these panel rulings are significant. While 
trade law is under no obligation to promote human 
rights, trade measures cannot explicitly contradict or 
137  Mexican Federal Government, Voluntary National Re-
view, 78. 
138  According to the Vienna Convention any relevant rules of 
international law applicable to the relations between the parties’ 
should be taken into consideration when interpreting a treaty. 
United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 
May 1969, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331, 
available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a10.html 
[accessed 11 April 2019]
139  Korea—Measures Affecting Government Procurement, 
WTO doc. WT/DS163/R (19 June 2000) (Report of the Panel) 
para 7.96. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cas-
es_e/ds163_e.htm.
140  World Trade Organization, EC—Measures concerning 
Meat and Meat Products (‘EC—Hormones’), WTO doc. WT/
DS48/AB/R (16 January 1998) (Report of the Appellate Body) 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds26_e.
htm.
deprive persons of human rights.
i. Regional Trade Agreements (RTA)
A regional trade agreement (RTA) allows parties to of-
fer each other more favorable treatment in trade than 
other trading partners, in addition to whatever stipula-
tions parties of the agreement settle on.141 Such discrim-
inatory treatment would generally be inconsistent with 
basic principles of WTO law, but RTAs are permissible 
if specific requirements are met.142
Unlike WTO law, RTAs between trading partners offer 
more than just favorable treatment. Increasingly, RTAs 
include human rights principles, labor standards, trans-
parency requirements, restrictions on corruption, and 
environmental criteria that trading partners must up-
hold. Labor provisions are the most common stipulation 
in preferential trade agreements. According to the ILO, 
over 80 percent of trade agreements convened since 
2013 have included labor provisions of some kind.143 
ii. North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA)
NAFTA was one of the first RTAs to include human 
rights and environmental provisions. These provi-
sions were included in a later corresponding accord, 
the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation 
(NAALC). Though the provisions were aimed to pro-
tect labor rights, the NAALC fails to reference relevant 
international labor standards or establish any minimum 
labor protections. Instead, the NAALC calls upon each 
party to “ensure that its labor laws and regulations pro-
vide for high labor standards.”144 The NAALC provided 
141  Regional trade agreements can also be referred to as 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs) or free trade agreements 
(FTAs). 
142  Generally, these requirements involve the reduction of 
tariffs to a particular level and/or a currency union according 
to Article XXIV and the Enabling Clause of the GATT 1994 as 
well as Article V of the GATS.
143  International Labour Organization. International Labour 
Organization Handbook: On Assessment of Labor Provisions 
in Trade and Investment Arrangements. (Geneva, Switzerland: 
International Labour Organization, 2017).
144  “North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation,” 
Signed September 13, 1993, Government of the United States, 
Accessed 9 April 2019. https://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/
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dispute settlement for any parties’ failure to enforce its 
occupational safety and health standards, child labor 
laws, and minimum wage. However, in comparison to 
NAFTA, violations of the NAALC were met with far 
weaker dispute settlement processes and sanctions. 
Since the NAALC was signed and ratified by all three 
governments, there have been 39 submissions.145 Of 
these, 25 complaints were made in regards to labor vi-
olations in Mexico, and seven were explicitly related 
to breaches in maquiladoras. These maquiladora sec-
tor violations included collective bargaining, gender 
discrimination, workplace safety, overtime pay, as well 
as others.146 In each of these cases, the weakness of the 
NAALC’s dispute settlement mechanism is apparent. 
To handle disputes, the NAALC created the Commis-
sion for Labor Cooperation and National Administra-
tive Offices (NAOs) in each country. The goal of these 
offices is to create a forum for formal and informal 
cooperative consultations to resolve issues. Under the 
NAALC, sanctions in the form of a monetary penalty 
or the withholding of trade benefits can only be used 
if a Party persistently fails to enforce child labor laws, 
minimum wage, or occupational health and safety 
standards.147 To date, sanctions have never been applied 
under the NAALC as the scope for applying sanctions 
is narrow.
Two NAALC cases are particularly relevant to this 
analysis. The Han Young Case, filed in 1997, involved 
a maquiladora that manufactured car parts for Hyun-
dai in Tijuana, Mexico. After an injured worker filed 
a complaint regarding workplace safety, a year-long 
conflict between workers and the plant began over the 
naalc.htm. 
145  Bureau of International Labor Affairs, “Submissions 
under the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation,” 
Department of Labor, Accessed 9 April 2019. https://www.dol.
gov/ilab/trade/agreements/naalc.htm. 
146  These seven maquila specific NAALC cases include Han 
Young Case, Gender Discrimination Case, Auto Trim/Custom 
Trim Case, Puebla Case, Sony Case, General Electric Case, and 
Maxi Switch Case. 
147  Congressional Research Service, Overview of Labor En-
forcement Issues in Trade Agreements, by Mary Boyle, (2016). 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22823.pdf  
right to collectively bargain. Attempts to previously 
unionize were met with intimidation and threats by the 
employer. The NAALC was incapable of handling the 
dispute despite numerous U.S. NAO hearings and min-
isterial agreements on the matter. Though ultimately, 
a Mexican federal court ruled in favor of the striking 
workers and a public seminar was held in Tijuana on 
the right to bargain collectively, the plant was moved 
to the other side of the city, and all of the workers were 
fired.148 
The same year another case involving gender-based 
discrimination in the maquiladora industry was filed 
by Human Rights Watch (HRW), the International La-
bor Rights Fund, and the National Association of Dem-
ocratic Lawyers of Mexico. According to U.S. NAO 
Submission 9701, women were frequently required to 
verify their pregnancy status as a condition of employ-
ment in maquiladoras throughout Mexico. Women 
found pregnant during their job interviews were often 
denied employment. The submission further implicat-
ed employers, some of whom were subsidiaries of U.S. 
companies, of mistreating or firing pregnant employ-
ees to avoid providing the maternity benefits mandat-
ed by Mexican law. Though the practice of pregnancy 
testing has decreased, antipathy for pregnant women 
in the workplace continues to be a common problem in 
maquiladoras. 149
iii. US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA)
As previously mentioned, NAFTA was renegotiated 
in 2018 as the USMCA, updating the labor provisions 
associated with NAFTA. Chapter 23 of the USMCA 
requires Mexico, Canada, and the U.S. to adopt, main-
tain, and enforce labor laws established by the ILO’s 
Fundamental Conventions.150 Explicit attention is giv-
148  U.S. National Administrative Office, Bureau of Interna-
tional Labor Affairs, U.S. Department of Labor, “Public Report 
of Review of Submission No. 9702,” (1998). https://www.dol.
gov/ilab/reports/pdf/Public%20Report%209702%20(Han%20
Young).pdf.  
149  U.S. National Administrative Office, Public Report of 
Review of Submission No. 9701;  Dr. Kimberly A. Nolan Garcia 
(Professor, Facultad Americana de Ciencias Socials, FLACSO) 
in discussion with the authors, February 2019.
150  Refers to the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
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en to banning forced or compulsory labor, eradicating 
violence and eliminating discrimination in the work-
place, raising minimum wage standards in Mexico for 
automotive workers, and ensuring migrant workers 
are included in labor protections regardless of nation-
ality.151 Unlike the NAALC, the new labor obligations 
under the USMCA are enforceable under the general 
dispute mechanism.
Additionally, NAFTA’s non-specific labor protections 
will soon be replaced with collective bargaining re-
quirements in Annex 23 of the USMCA. Annex 23 re-
quires Mexico to recognize and guarantee collective 
bargaining rights effectively. This annex explicitly 
highlighted Mexico’s compliance with ILO No. 98, 
and further prohibited the Mexican government from 
engaging in practices that might interfere or influence 
the activities of labor unions. The USMCA and ILO 
No. 98 prohibit efforts to coerce or discriminate against 
workers attempting to exercise their right to collective 
action.152 
Finally, the USMCA contains some reference to gen-
der. Although Canada originally suggested an entire 
chapter of the USMCA devoted to gender, this notion 
was eventually dropped during negotiations. Still, ref-
erences to gender are made throughout the USCMA. 
In the labor chapter, in particular, the USMCA seeks 
to address “gender-related issues in the field of labour 
and employment,” including eliminating discrimina-
tion in employment and wages; promoting equal pay 
for equal work; consideration of gender issues related 
to occupational safety and health, including child care 
and nursing mothers; and preventing gender-based 
workplace violence and harassment.”153 According to 
Convention 98. “Right to Organise and Collective Bargain-
ing Convention,” adopted July 1, 1949, International Labour 
Organization, Retrieved 9 April 2019. https://www.ilo.org/dyn/
normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_IN-
STRUMENT_ID:312243.
151  USMCA requires that 40-45% of a car built in North 
America be built by workers earning at least $16 per hour. 
“Agreement between the United States of America, the United 
Mexican States, and Canada,” signed November 30, 2018, Gov-
ernment of the United States. Retrieved 9 April 2019. https://ustr.
gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexi-
co-canada-agreement/agreement-between. 
152  “Agreement between the United States of America, the 
United Mexican States, and Canada,” signed November 30, 
2018.
153  “Agreement between the United States of America, the 
Julia Quiñonez, coordinator for Comité Fronterizo 
de Obrer@s (CFO), the Border Committee of Work-
ers, one of the main problems of NAFTA is that the 
agreement lacked a gender perspective. Quiñonez, 
who worked in maquiladoras for several years and 
is currently part of this committee that advocates for 
the rights of female maquiladora workers in northern 
Mexican states, affirms that the absence of a gender 
perspective in NAFTA had a disproportionate effect 
on women due to their already precarious condition 
in Mexican society. 154 The inclusion of gender in the 
USMCA is a significant step forward in addressing the 
rights of women and ensuring that the gains from trade 
are shared equally between women and men. However, 
it remains to be seen if USMCA will come into force. 
Though the agreement was signed in November of 
2018, the national legislatures of Canada, Mexico, and 
the United States have not yet ratified the agreement.
iv. Other Regional Trade Agreements
Beyond NAFTA, Mexico is a member of 11 other 
regional and bilateral trade agreements spanning 44 
additional countries. Of these 11, the Comprehensive 
and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Part-
nership (CPTPP) and the recently revised European 
Union-Mexico FTA both include additional provisions 
for labor rights. The CPTPP, though not yet ratified by 
Mexico, has a chapter entirely devoted to labor. Simi-
lar to the USMCA, parties of the CPTPP are required 
to adopt, maintain, and enforce a set of minimum la-
bor laws established by the ILO Right to Organise and 
Collectively Bargain Convention. The CPTPP pro-
vides robust dispute settlement mechanisms which can 
be accessed by any party and engage members of the 
public.155
The EU-Mexico FTA, signed in 2000 and revised in 
2018, includes a chapter on sustainable development. 
This chapter asks parties to respect, promote, and im-
plement fundamental ILO Conventions particularly 
concerning women, the elderly, and those with disabil-
United Mexican States, and Canada,” signed November 30, 
2018.
154  Julia Quiñonez (Coordinator, Comité Fronterizo de Obre-
r@s, CFO), in discussion with the authors, January 2019. 
155  See Chapter 11 on Labour from the “Comprehensive and 
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership,” opened 
for signature March 5, 2018, From the Government of New Zea-
land. Retrieved 9 April 2019. https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/
Trans-Pacific-Partnership/Text/19.-Labour-Chapter.pdf. 
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ities.156 Additionally, this chapter creates a forum for 
Mexico and the EU to discuss issues regarding human 
rights, security, and justice. Though a dispute settle-
ment mechanism is included in this chapter, the lan-
guage of the trade agreement is weak and less specific 
compared to the protections and mechanisms in the la-
bor chapter of the CPTPP and the USMCA. 
If these three regional trade agreements go into effect, 
Mexico has significant labor obligations to meet by 
2020. However, these obligations do not require signif-
icant changes in the law. Rather, enforcement is Mex-
ico’s biggest future hurdle in complying with these 
trade agreements. 
Even after WTO accession and numerous trade agree-
ments with labor provisions, women in Mexico remain 
left behind. According to a report in June 2018, over 
8,000 sexual harassment complaints were investigated 
by the Mexican Ministry of Labor between 2013 and 
2016. Of these, only 91 resulted in sentencing.157 Ac-
cordingly, some Mexican NGOs have expressed res-
ervations about the effectiveness of labor provisions 
in free trade agreements.158 Moving forward, a more 
in-depth analysis of the well-being of women in the 
workforce is needed to understand the measures that 
trade agreements should include to ensure the benefits 
of trade take into account the needs of women.
156  Mexico ratified ILO Convention No. 98 in 2018. See 
Chapter XX, Trade and Sustainable Development from “Mod-
ernisation of the Trade part of the EU-Mexico Global Agreement 
Without Prejudice,” From the European Union. Retrieved 9 
April 2019.  http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/april/
tradoc_156822.pdf.  
157  Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 
Shadow Report on employment discrimination against women 
in Mexico (Geneva, Switzerland: OHCHR, 2018). https://tbin-
ternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/MEX/
INT_CEDAW_NGO_MEX_31406_E.pdf.  
158 Chris Mendoza (Coordinator of the Program on Gender 
and Economic, Cultural, and Social Rights, Simone de Beau-
voir), in discussion with the authors, January 2019; Representa-
tive from Maquila Solidarity Network (MSN), in discussion with 
the authors, January 2019.
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Although women increased their participation 
in the labor force  as a result of trade liberal-
ization, there are documented negatives which 
include its volatility and the weak organizing 







This section will examine the welfare effects that trade liberalization has had on 
women through earnings and economic participation. It will begin by examining 
how trade liberalization in Mexico fits into a more general discussion of relevant 
trade theories. It then continues by examining empirical findings to test the ro-
bustness of these trade theories in practice. Finally, it concludes by delineating 




The prominent trade theories that help explain the re-
lationship between trade liberalization and working 
women in Mexico include Heckscher-Ohlin, Stolp-
er-Samuelson, and Becker. Heckscher-Ohlin predicts 
that trade results in producing goods/services for ex-
port, based on the relatively abundant and cheap input 
factors found in the economy. Theoretically speaking, 
in the case of Mexico, Heckscher-Ohlin would predict 
that Mexico would specialize in semi- and unskilled 
labor, given that it is their abundant factor of produc-
tion relative to the United States. Stolper-Samuelson 
builds on this theory by predicting that trade will cause 
the relative price of that good/service to increase in-
side that country because the economy is now con-
centrating on producing that good/service for export. 
Continuing with the case of Mexico, this theory would 
predict that the relative price of semi- and unskilled 
labor would rise due to trade liberalization. These the-
ories relate to gender parity insofar as women tended 
to have fewer observable job skills than men in pre-
trade liberalization in Mexico. Post-liberalization then 
should result in: the economy shifting towards using 
semi- and low-skilled factors of production (e.g., 
women), a relative price increase in this semi- and 
low-skilled work, and eventually, a decrease in the 
gender wage gap.159 
Becker’s theory posits that gender discrimination is 
inefficient. The theory reasons that gender discrimina-
tion might work in non-competitive markets because 
firms will have excess profits that they can use to ‘pur-
chase discrimination.’ However, when markets open 
up to competition, this discrimination prohibitively 
raises the cost to the firm.160 The strong machismo cul-
ture in Mexico, coupled with the ISI policies of the 
1980s, fostered exactly this sort of non-competitive 
environment which allowed for discrimination. Giv-
en this context of pre-trade liberalization, Becker’s 
159  Wendy Cunningham and Raquel Artecona, Effects of 
Trade Liberalization on the Gender Wage Gap in Mexico, (The 
World Bank Development Research Group, May 2002), http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGENDER/Resources/tradeart-
econa.pdf. 
160  Cunningham and Artecona, Effects of Trade Liberaliza-
tion.
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theory would predict that trade liberalization would 
debilitate these firms if they chose to continue to dis-
criminate when faced with competition. To examine 
the economic welfare impacts of trade on female la-
borers, this report will use the case of maquiladoras to 
examine whether trade liberalization did indeed lead 
to increased female labor force participation, gender 
wage parity, and decreased labor force discrimination. 
B. Heckscher-Ohlin/Stolper Samuel-
son Theory
The explosion of the maquiladora industry, and subse-
quent female labor force participation, provides sup-
port for the validity of the Heckscher-Ohlin/Stolper 
Samuelson theories. However, due to the difficulty of 
isolating the causal effect of trade on overall women’s 
economic participation, scholars have taken a more 
granular approach to tease out the dynamic of this re-
lationship. At this more micro level, some ambiguities 
exist about whether or not trade had a positive effect 
on women’s economic participation. For example, in 
terms of positions requiring low-skilled labor, trade 
improved female outcomes, yet this improvement was 
not observed in more white-collared (e.g., manage-
rial) positions.161 One reason given for this continued 
segmentation of women into the lowest-skilled jobs 
is the difference in opportunities for on-the-job train-
ing. Specifically, women received only eight days of 
training on average compared to an average of 22 
days for men.162 In another study, De Hoyos found 
that increased female participation was related to the 
relationship between the woman and the head of the 
household. For wives, their likelihood of being em-
ployed in the formal sector was negatively correlated 
with their husband’s participation in the labor force 
(a relationship which is increasingly becoming more 
independent); however, for daughters, their likelihood 
161  Chinhui Juhn, Gergely Ujhelyi, and Carolina Ville-
gas-Sanchez, Men, Women, and Machines: How Trade Impacts 
Gender Inequality, (National Bureau of Economic Research, 
May 2012), http://www.nber.org/papers/w18106.
162  Kathryn Kopinak, “Gender as a Vehicle for the Subor-
dination of Women Maquiladora Workers in Mexico,” Latin 
American Perspectives 22, no. 1 (Winter, 1995): 30-48, https://
www.jstor.org/stable/2634282.
of being employed in the formal sector is positively 
correlated with their father’s participation in the labor 
force.163
C. Becker’s Theory
Researchers have also applied Becker’s theory to the 
maquiladora sector. Cunningham, et al. found support 
for Becker’s hypothesis that increased competition 
and lowered excess rents, necessitated by lower trade 
barriers, resulted in decreased wage discrimination of 
female employees.164 Furthermore, research shows that 
the gender wage gap was less pronounced in maqui-
ladoras than in non-maquiladoras. In the non-maqui-
ladora sector, a female worker earns 27.7 percent less 
on average than a comparable male worker. In con-
trast, female workers in the maquiladora sector earn 
only 12.2 percent less on average than a comparable 
male worker.165 Additionally, the gender wage ratio is 
higher in the maquiladora sector than in the manufac-
turing sector overall (87 and 75 percent, respectively, 
for 2005).166 Between 1994 to 2005, average real wag-
es decreased 1.9 percent annually in the non-maqui-
ladora sector, yet increased by 1.2 percent annually 
in the maquiladora sector.167 These results provide ev-
idence in support of the theory that trade plays a role 
in reducing the gender gap in sectors subject to inter-
national competition. 
163  Rafael E. De Hoyos, “Chapter 3: Female Labor Par-
ticipation and Occupation Decisions in Post-NAFTA Mexi-
co,” in Research in Labor Economics, edited by Solomon W. 
Polachek, Konstantinos Tatsiramos, (Emerald Group Pub-
lishing Limited, 2011), https://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/
abs/10.1108/S0147-9121(2011)0000033006.
164  Cunningham and Artecona, Effects of Trade Liberaliza-
tion.
165  Gautam Hazarika and Rafael Otero, “Foreign Trade and 
the Gender Earnings Differential in Urban Mexico,” Journal of 
Economic Integration 19, no. 2, (June 2004): 353-373, https://
www.jstor.org/stable/23000785.
166  Lilia Domínguez-Villalobos and Flor Brown-Grossman, 
“Trade Liberalization and Gender Wage Inequality in Mexico,” 
Feminist Economics 16, no. 4 (October 2010): 53-79, https://
doi.org/10.1080/13545701.2010.530582.
167  Domínguez-Villalobos and Brown-Grossman, “Trade 
Liberalization and Gender Wage Inequality in Mexico,”
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There is also evidence to the contrary which has 
found that women in the maquiladora sector did not 
benefit from trade. Between 1987 and 1999, the fe-
male-male earnings ratio increased by 4.40 percent in 
the non-maquiladora sector yet decreased by 11.31 
percent in the maquiladora sector.168 Furthermore, not 
only are women discriminated into lower-paying jobs, 
but an interindustry wage gap exists among maquila-
dora industries which specifically affects women be-
cause they tend to be concentrated in the lower-paying 
industries (e.g. food and apparel).169
D. Effect on Women
The empirical evidence provided above demonstrates 
that the effects of trade on the female labor force re-
main ambiguous. The aforementioned liberalization 
policy created the opportunity for women in Mexico 
to accelerate their participation in the formal labor 
force: in the period from 1990 to 2005, women in-
creased their participation in the labor force by an esti-
mated 146 percent.170 Maquiladoras, in particular, hold 
a place of importance for female laborers. For over 
30 years, they employed an overwhelming majority of 
women (about 85 percent of total maquiladora labor 
force).171 Trade liberalization contributed to this pos-
itive result of increased participation in a sector that 
affords higher wages relative to the non-maquiladora 
sector, as described above. However, there are docu-
mented negative effects of trade liberalization specific 
to this sector. These include its volatility and the weak 
organizing capacity permitted to women, which make 
168  Hazarika and Otero, “Foreign Trade and the Gender 
Earnings Differential in Urban Mexico.”
169  Susan Fleck, ”A Gender Perspective on Maquila Em-
ployment and Wages in Mexico,” in The Economics of Gender 
in Mexico: Work, Family, State, and Market, ed. Elizabeth G. 
Katz and Maria C. Correia, (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 
April 2001), 133-173. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/
en/288701468121498166/The-economics-of-gender-in-Mexico-
work-family-state-and-market.
170  Aurelie Charles, “Fairness and Wages in Mexico’s Ma-
quiladora Industry: An Empirical Analysis of Labor Demand 
and the Gender Wage Gap,” Review of Social Economy 69, vol. 
1 (March 2011): 1-28, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41288425.
171  Patricia Fernández-Kelly, “Gender and Economic 
Change in the United States and Mexico, 1900-2000,” Ameri-
can Behavioral Scientist 52, no.3 (November 2008): 377:404, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764208323512.
it difficult to argue that trade liberalization was overall 
welfare-improving for women.  
The first negative effect is the high worker turnover 
and the lack of job security which characterize this 
industry. Though the maquiladora program was de-
signed to absorb the unemployed men after the ter-
mination of the bracero program, maquiladora em-
ployers targeted young and single women as they 
were easily replaceable and accepted lower wages 
than men.172 A telling testimonial of this preference for 
women is from supervisors of auto-part maquiladoras 
who stated that “whereas men and women were com-
parable in productivity, women made fewer claims 
than men before the Junta Local de Conciliación y 
Arbitraje concerning the violation of their legal rights 
as workers.”173 Women’s economic participation in the 
northern states provides a second piece of evidence 
for this preference for women. In 2010, the north-
ern states, where maquiladoras are most prevalent, 
boasted the second highest rate of women’s economic 
participation after Mexico City.174 The exploitation of 
these ingrained cultural norms contributes to the lack 
of job security and high worker turnover because em-
ployers routinely employ women on temporary con-
tracts, which provide access only to a limited range 
of the non-wage benefits designated under Mexican 
legislation.175 Additionally, studies have shown that 
employment in the maquiladora sector in particu-
lar is volatile. Bergin et al. studied the difference in 
volatility in terms of the number of plants operating 
on a monthly basis in Mexico’s maquiladora sector 
and comparable industries in the United States. They 
showed that the industries in Mexico are twice as vol-
atile, considerably robust even when controlling for 
the volatility in the Mexican economy and the smaller 
172  Fernández-Kelly, “Gender and Economic Change.” 
173  Kathryn Kopinak, “Gender as a Vehicle for the Subor-
dination of Women Maquiladora Workers in Mexico,” Latin 
American Perspectives 22, no.1 (Winter, 1995): 30-48, https://
www.jstor.org/stable/2634282.
174  Rafael Garduño-Rivera, “Factors That Influence Wom-
en’s Economic Participation in Mexico,” Economía Mexicana. 
Nueva Época Cierre de Época, no. 2 (September 2013): 547-8, 
http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=32329695007. *Note: 
author’s calculations using Inegi’s XI Censo General de pobla-
ción y Vivienda data, 1990 and 2010. 
175  Domínguez-Villalobos and Brown-Grossman, “Trade 
Liberalization and Gender Wage Inequality in Mexico.”
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firm size in Mexico.176 This vulnerability threatens job 
security for all workers in the sector; however, it is 
most problematic for women due to their overrepre-
sentation, as previously mentioned.
There is widespread agreement that the expansion 
of trade did not provide women additional channels 
through which to organize. Women in the maquilado-
ra sector have attempted to unionize; however, there 
have been difficulties in generating significant bar-
gaining power due to tight controls on the labor force, 
the fact that most ‘official’ unions have close politi-
cal ties (and are thus supportive of NAFTA), and the 
weight of the informal sector.177 Additionally, despite 
numerous international protections and changes to 
Mexican labor law, women continue to be left out of 
unions both in terms of participation and leadership.178 
Finally, the gender  wage gap has compounded these 
negative effects. The existence of this wage gap places 
women in a position of heightened vulnerability be-
cause real wages in Mexico have generally declined 
since 1982. The minimum wage has been maintained 
at a rate below inflation, halving in real dollar value 
between 1980 and 1998.179 Thus, the existence of a 
gender wage gap in an economy where wages do not 
176  Bergin, Feenstra, and Hanson, ”Offshoring and Volatili-
ty”. 
177  C. Gabriel and Laura Catharine Macdonald, “NAFTA, 
Women and Organising in Canada and Mexico: Forging a 
‘Feminist Internationality’,” Millennium Journal of Interna-
tional Studies 13, vol. 3 (March 1994): 535-562, https://www.
researchgate.net/publication/249837460_NAFTA_Women_and_
Organising_in_Canada_and_Mexico_Forging_a_’Feminist_In-
ternationality’; Aurelie Charles, “Fairness and Wages in Mexi-
co’s Maquiladora Industry,” Review of Social Economy 69, no. 
1 (March 2011): 1-28, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41288425.  
178 https://vanguardia.com.mx/articulo/pena-gasto-menos-en-
la-lucha-por-la-igualdad-de-la-mujer-que-en-prensa.
 Chris Mendoza (Coordinator of the Program on Gender and 
Economic, Cultural, and Social Rights, Simone de Beauvoir), in 
discussion with the authors, January 2019.
179  Susan E. Fleck, “A Gender Perspective on Maquila Em-
ployment and Wages in Mexico” in The Economics of Gender 
in Mexico: Work, Family, State, and Market, ed. Elizabeth G. 
Katz and Maria C. Correia (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 
April 2001); Domínguez-Villalobos and Brown-Grossman, 
“Trade Liberalization and Gender Wage Inequality in Mexico.”
keep up with inflation only heightens the precarization 
of women working in this sector. 
This section has reviewed some of the empirics about 
the nexus between trade and women’s participation 
and examined the welfare effects using economic 
measures. It showed that trade enabled female par-
ticipation in the labor force and provided access to a 
formal channel through which they could earn money; 
however, creating judgments about overall welfare 
effects requires a multi-faceted analysis. Therefore, 
the report will continue by examining other important 
factors that are not economic in nature but are equal-
ly important for evaluating overall welfare, such as 
labor conditions, security in the workplace, and gen-
der-based violence.   
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Despite existing guarantees in trade agreements 
and national legislation, protection gaps result 
from the Mexican government’s endemic cor-
ruption as well as the lack of capacity and will-




Protection Gaps in Mexico
This section will outline the protection gaps in workers’ rights despite existing 
guarantees in trade agreements and national legislation. These gaps result from 
the Mexican gove
ment’s endemic corruption as well as the lack of capacity and willingness to 
enforce labor provisions. Finally, while some multinational corporations operat-
ing within Mexico attempt to ameliorate the protection of workers’ rights, their 
mechanisms are ultimately too limited to offer a sustainable solution to the state’s 
failure to adequately enforce labor protections across the formal economy.
While NAFTA included basic labor protection provisions, there is no evidence 
that domestic legislative reforms were implemented that specifically aligned do-
mestic labor protection to NAFTA standards. By contrast, as discussed in Part I, 
the Mexican government is currently taking steps to reform domestic labor provi-
sions in preparation for the USMCA.180 However, there are several structural con-
straints to law enforcement within the country that present formidable challenges 
to the realization of such provisions across the economy. 
180  Rafael Bernal, “Mexico seeks to put to rest concerns over new trade deal,” The Hill, February 26, 2019, 
https://thehill.com/latino/431703-mexico-seeks-to-put-to-rest-labor-concerns-over-new-trade-deal.
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A. Rule of Law
By many metrics, Mexico is a dangerous country with 
a low level of rule of law. In 2018, Mexico was ranked 
second to last within the Latin American and Caribbe-
an region on the absence of corruption on the World 
Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index.181 In another rank-
ing compiled by the Wilson Center, Mexico ranked 
99 out of 126 countries in rule of law.182 These rule of 
law issues include cartel violence, systematic and en-
demic corruption, and lack of state capacity and will 
to enforce its own laws, all of which have broad con-
sequences for the ability of women workers in Mexico 
to exercise their rights as enshrined in Mexican law. In 
particular, the endemic corruption in much of Mexican 
governance operates as a constraint on the enforce-
181  WJP Rule of Law Index 2018, “Mexico,” Accessed Feb-
ruary 15, 2019, http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/. 
182  Verónica Ortiz-Ortega, “Mexico’s Battered Rule of Law,” 
The Wilson Center, March 13, 2019, https://www.wilsoncenter.
org/article/mexicos-battered-rule-law.
ment of labor protections and the general security en-
vironment. 
a. Security
In 2018, Mexico experienced a record-breaking 33,341 
murders —a 15 percent increase since 2017—most 
of which were linked to cartels.183 While these cartels 
participate in many types of criminal activity, includ-
ing kidnappings, extortion, and oil theft, their primary 
activity is drug trafficking.184 Less than 10 percent of 
homicides in Mexico are solved; between 2010 and 
2018, the Mexican General Attorney’s office inves-
tigated over 600 murders related to organized crime, 
183  Christina Maxouris and Natalie Gallón, “Mexico Sets 
Record with more than 33,000 homicides in 2018,” CNN, Janu-
ary 22, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/22/americas/mexi-
co-murder-rate-2018/index.html.
184  June S. Beittel, “Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug 
Trafficking Organizations,” Congressional Research Service, 
July 3, 2018, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf. 
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and won a guilty verdict in only two of those cases.185 
Corruption within law enforcement further contributes 
to this violence, as police take bribes from cartels in 
exchange for allowing the gangs to carry out their ac-
tivities without consequence.186 For instance, in a con-
troversial 2014 case, corrupt local police officers in Ig-
uala were engaged in a transactional relationship with 
a particular drug gang. In return for payment, the offi-
cers handed 43 college students, who were incorrectly 
believed to belong to a rival gang, over to the cartel. 
The gang is believed to have then killed all 43 of the 
students.187 Cartel-related activity is thus an important 
issue affecting workers in Mexico, as cartel violence 
regularly goes beyond the bounds of the cartels them-
selves and affects the general population.
Cartel violence in some regions of the country often 
makes it difficult for both male and female workers to 
even travel to work. Many factories in northern Mexi-
co are located in rural areas outside of main cities, and 
traveling to these areas for work is often dangerous for 
both men and women.188 The dangers in the workers’ 
commutes are illustrated in the previously discussed 
IACtHR case González et al. (“Campo Algodonero”) 
v. México, known as the “Cotton Field Case.” In this 
case, the bodies of three young women who had dis-
appeared on their journeys to or from work were dis-
covered in a cotton field near Ciudad Juárez, and all of 
the bodies showed signs of torture and sexual abuse.189 
This case highlights the dangers of long commutes in 
Mexico, particularly for women who are already in a 
vulnerable position. 
As will be explained in a subsequent section, there are 
185  David Luhnov, ”Latin America is the Murder Capital 
of the World,” The Wall Street Journal, September 20, 2018, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/400-murders-a-day-the-crisis-of-
latin-america-1537455390.
186  David Luhnov, ”Latin America Is the Murder Capital of 
the World”
187  David Luhnov, ”Latin America Is the Murder Capital of 
the World”
188  A coordinator of research at ProDESC, in discussion with 
the authors, January 2019.
189  London School of Economics Centre for Women, Peace, 
and Security, “Gonzalez, Monreal and Monarrez (“Cotton 
Field”) v. Mexico,” Accessed: March 20, 2019, https://blogs.lse.
ac.uk/vaw/landmark-cases/a-z-of-cases/gonzalez-et-al-v-mexi-
co/. 
strong gender norms in Mexican society that establish 
domestic work as the responsibility of women, mak-
ing the decision to work outside the home a risky one. 
Dangerous commutes, then, are an additional barrier 
for Mexican women who wish to work outside of the 
home. This added barrier may lead women to decide 
to stay home and pursue the traditional roles of house-
wife and mother. Unfortunately, the fact that traveling 
to work can be such a danger is a factor that relatively 
few private-sector employers have addressed to ensure 
the protection of their workers. 
b. Systemic Corruption
Collective bargaining and unionization rights present 
a prime area in which corruption has directly under-
mined the enforcement of codified labor protections. 
As mentioned previously, the right to collective bar-
gaining and unionization is enshrined in the Mexican 
Constitution.  However, in practice, the unions estab-
lished in accordance with this constitutional provision 
have more often been used to advance the company’s 
interests rather than those of the employees. To comply 
with the right to workers’ collective action, companies 
have themselves established “ghost” worker unions 
that heavily favor the employer’s interests and actively 
undermine the formation of a true workers’ union.190 In 
many cases, these unions are formed before a factory is 
even operational through employer-led protection con-
tracts, which effectively bar the establishment of other 
unions at that work location.191 Additionally, as a coor-
dinator of research at ProDESC explained, workers are 
often unaware of either the existence of these unions or 
the identity of their representative. When attempting to 
organize an actual union, workers can face threats of 
firing, forced disappearance, or death – all of which are 
illegal under Mexican law.192 Moreover, when workers 
190  John Otis, “How Mexico’s pro-industry unions undermine 
workers’ rights,” GlobalPost, March 21, 2012, https://www.pri.
org/stories/2012-03-21/how-mexicos-pro-industry-unions-under-
mine-workers-rights.
191  Allen Smith, “Mexican Congress Seeks to Reform Em-
ployer-Friendly ’White’ Unions,” Society for Human Resource 
Management, March 7, 2019, https://www.shrm.org/resource-
sandtools/legal-and-compliance/employment-law/pages/glob-
al-mexico-white-union-reform.aspx.
192  A coordinator of research at ProDESC, in discussion with 
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do attempt to elect union representation per the law, 
their elections are often interrupted by agitators hired 
by the employer. This results in the elections being re-
scheduled by the Conciliation and Arbitration Boards 
(CABs) for several years later.193 Finally, the registra-
tion of some trade unions has been thwarted by CABs 
outright. In a 2018 review, the ILO noted that several 
workers’ associations report refusals from local au-
thorities to register independent trade unions and high-
lighted one case of a trade union in the oil industry for 
which an application has been pending since 2014.194
Beyond collective bargaining, corruption has played a 
hand in undermining the legal protections of human 
rights defenders from private sector organizations. 
There have been reported instances of female human 
rights defenders being murdered. These events are sit-
uated within a broader context of persecution against 
human rights defenders in Mexico. Oftentimes, those 
who commit the transgressions are granted impunity.195 
In at least one instance, a company hired a gunman 
to murder a female labor activist, but the murder was 
covered up and not investigated by police.196 
In apparent recognition of the country’s ongoing is-
sues with union action, the Mexican government rati-
fied ILO Convention 98, which guarantees a worker’s 
right to form unions and bargain collectively without 
the interference of their employer.197 As mentioned ear-
lier, this convention will not come into force in Mexico 
the authors, January 2019.
193  A coordinator of research at ProDESC, in discussion with 
the authors, January 2019.
194  International Labor Organization, Freedom of Association 
and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 
87) – Mexico (Ratification: 1950), Accessed: March 24, 2019, 
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:131
00:P13100_COMMENT_ID:3962314:NO.
195  “Mexico/Rights defenders: ‘The best way to protect them 
is fighting impunity’ – UN expert,” United Nations Human 
Rights Office of the High Commissioner, January 25, 2017, 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.
aspx?NewsID=21117&LangID=E.
196  A coordinator of research at ProDESC, in discussion with 
the authors, January 2019.
197  Monica Schiaffino and Rogelio Alanis. “Mexican Senate 
Approves the Ratification of Measure Impacting Labor-Manage-
ment Relations,” Littler, 27 September 2018, https://www.littler.
com/publication-press/publication/mexican-senate-approves-rati-
fication-measure-impacting-labor.
until November 2019. As such, this report cannot as-
sess its impact, but several civil society representatives 
questioned whether or not this convention – or the re-
cent constitutional amendment – would truly change 
the undermining of collective action in the country. 
Additionally, while a representative of an approved so-
cial compliance firm was optimistic about the change, 
they expressed that even these new laws are “far from 
what we need [them] to be.”198
c. Lack of State Capacity
In concert with the endemic corruption, the Mexican 
state has a distinct lack of capacity to enforce labor pro-
tections. Notably, Mexico has not ratified ILO Conven-
tion No. 81, the 1947 Labor Inspection Convention.199 
Although the Mexican Ministry of Labor has a staff of 
inspectors to enforce the country’s labor laws, Mexico 
only has 10 percent of the ILO recommended number 
of labor inspectors nationally.200 The ILO requires that 
a country staff a number of labor inspectors sufficient 
for effective monitoring based on the “number, na-
ture, size, and situation of workplaces, the number of 
workers employed, and the number and complexity of 
the legal provisions to be enforced.”201  However, the 
federal government only employs 521 labor inspectors 
nationally, 56 of which are located in Mexico City.202 
While Mexico City’s Secretary of Labor employs an 
additional 16 labor inspectors, this means that there is 
a total of only 72 labor inspectors working in Mexico 
City, a city of 8.8 million people and location of many 
of the country’s large factories. While Mexico plans 
to increase the number of employed labor inspectors 
to 50 percent of the ILO recommended number, there 
is no reported timeline for when this threshold will be 
198  Representative from approved social compliance firm, in 
discussion with the authors, January 2019.
199  International Labour Organization, Ratifications of CO81 
- Labour Inspector Convention, 1947 (No. 81), Accessed: March 
24, 2019, https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11300:0
::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312226.
200  Dr. Kimberly A. Nolan Garcia (Professor, Facultad 
Americana de Ciencias Socials, FLACSO) in discussion with the 
authors, February 2019.
201  International Labor Organization, Labour Inspection: 
what it is and what it does. A guide for workers, Accessed: 
April 11, 2019, https://www.ilo.org/labadmin/info/inst/
WCMS_141403/lang--en/index.htm.
202  Data from the Secretaría Trabajo y Previsíon Social—
STPS from interview with Tomas Damerau, Secretariá del 
Trabajo y Fomento al Empleo de la Ciudad de Mexico.
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met.203
Further, the labor inspections themselves are limited 
in scope. Audits are only conducted in organizations 
within the formal economy, effectively excluding 57 
percent of the overall economy from social compliance 
oversight.204 Additionally, audits are not conducted with 
third-party recruitment agencies, which are often used 
to recruit female labor for maquiladoras. These re-
cruitment agencies have been alleged to have commit-
ted numerous labor rights violations and technically 
fall under Mexican jurisdiction, but there is no state 
auditing body monitoring their activities.205 Finally, au-
dits are not conducted in areas of the country deemed 
physically unsafe, which has led to the absence of au-
dit oversight of many large suppliers of internation-
al brands located in the northern states bordering the 
United States.206 
Unfortunately, the aforementioned restrictions mean 
that the factories and employers not audited by the 
labor inspectorate often have ongoing issues with la-
bor conditions.207 As a result of the restrictions on au-
dit conditions and the small number of auditors, only 
approximately 360 audit inspections were completed 
in 2018.208 As there are a vast number of labor sites in 
Mexico, the meager number of audit inspections com-
pleted indicates a significant likelihood that the Labor 
Inspectorate is unable to fulfill its mandate to ensure 
labor compliance across the formal economy.
Further, it has been alleged by multiple civil society 
organizations that these audits themselves are conduct-
ed corruptly or carelessly, rendering them mostly in-
effective at combatting labor rights violations. There 
203  Tomas Damerau, data from the Secretaría de Trabajo y 
Fomento al Empleo de la Ciudad de Mexíco.; Dr. Kimberly A. 
Nolan Garcia (Professor, Facultad Americana de Ciencias So-
cials, FLACSO) in discussion with the authors, February 2019.
204  U.S. embassy official in discussion with the authors, Janu-
ary 2019.
205  A coordinator of research at ProDESC, in discussion with 
the authors, January 2019.
206  U.S. embassy official in discussion with the authors, Janu-
ary 2019.
207  Representative from approved social compliance firm, in 
discussion with the authors, January 2019.
208  Danil Cerdas, Victor Martinez, Ricardo Irra and Tomas 
Damerau, Ministry of Labor, in discussion with authors, 24 
January 2019.
are several cases of factories passing audits even when 
state auditors noted several violations that should typ-
ically be disqualifying.209 Additionally, facilities that 
have failed state audits have been reported to have re-
sumed operations in a new location, under a new name, 
even though ownership remained the same, virtually 
guaranteeing that labor rights will continue to be vio-
lated in defiance of an audit finding.210 A representative 
of the Maquila Solidarity Center stated that the orga-
nization had witnessed or known of audits that did not 
catch major violations and some of these audits later 
had to be redone.211 
The complicated combination of factories passing au-
dits despite disqualifying violations, the movement of 
factories in response to failed audits, and the redone 
audits indicate that there is no single observed—and 
effective—method of remediation for labor violations 
which draws the efficacy of the current state audit sys-
tem further into question.
d. Lack of State Will 
Beyond the challenges presented by corruption and 
lack of capacity, the Mexican state’s enforcement abil-
ity is further constrained by the government’s seeming 
lack of will to carry out any activities contrary to the 
interests of private sector corporations. According to 
trade theory, the shortage of labor in the northern state 
maquiladoras, in concert with the recently passed min-
imum wage legislation, should be generating upward 
pressure on wages in the country.212 However, maqui-
ladoras in the northern states have reportedly begun 
using migrant labor to keep wages low despite a re-
ported labor shortage within the industry, as wages are 
209  Representative from approved social compliance firm, in 
discussion with the authors, January 2019.
210  Coordinator of research at ProDESC, in discussion with 
the authors, January 2019.
211  Representative from Maquila Solidarity Network (MSN), 
in discussion with the authors, January 2019.
212  Gladys Cisneros (Representative from Solidarity Center) 
in discussion with the authors, January 2019.; Steve Taylor, 
“Border maquilas are short 65,000 workers,” Rio Grande Guard-
ian, November, 2, 2018, https://riograndeguardian.com/border-
maquilas-are-short-65000-workers/.
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their primary cost driver.213 However, the government 
has thus far failed to enforce the new wage legislation, 
ostensibly to enable Mexican industry to maintain its 
competitive advantage in labor costs. Additionally, the 
“corporatist” Mexican government has historically 
failed to prosecute companies that have acted illegally 
to oppress or assault labor activists and has, in fact, 
repressed labor activists through government action as 
well.214 Finally, the ghost unions throughout the country 
require approval from a state government, indicating 
the government’s active support of companies against 
its legislation or, at the very least, an indifference to 
these violations.
B. Private Sector Band-Aids
Given the weak landscape of state labor enforcement 
in Mexico, some private sector corporations have con-
tracted private social compliance auditing firms in an 
attempt to monitor the performance of their suppliers 
within the country. These firms are pursued selective-
ly by Mexican factories, which are mandated by their 
U.S. multinational buyers to pursue labor standards. 
Oftentimes, these standards are more progressive than 
those enshrined in Mexican law.215 A U.S. embassy offi-
cial acknowledged that these private social compliance 
firms have performed comparatively well in correctly 
enforcing labor protections.216 One such firm conduct-
ed 2,400 audits in 2018, a massive accomplishment 
in comparison to the number of state audits conduct-
ed over the same period.217 Further, these social com-
pliance firms often employ a stricter interpretation of 
Mexico’s labor regulations than the state inspectorate 
due to higher standards demanded by some interna-
tional buyers.218 In some cases, these private audits 
have caught labor violations, particularly excessive 
213  Gladys Cisneros (Representative from Solidarity Center) 
in discussion with the authors, January 2019.
214  Gladys Cisneros (Representative from Solidarity Center) 
in discussion with the authors, January 2019.
215  Representative from approved social compliance firm, in 
discussion with the authors, January 2019.
216  U.S. embassy official in discussion with the authors, Janu-
ary 2019.
217  Representative from approved social compliance firm, in 
discussion with the authors, January 2019.
218  Representative from approved social compliance firm, in 
discussion with the authors, January 2019.
overtime hours in factories that had recently passed a 
state audit.219 
However, the selective use of these social compliance 
firms means that these audits alone cannot offer a real 
solution to the broader enforcement gaps in Mexico. 
As these firms are contracted to audit Mexican facto-
ries that supply U.S. brands, they rarely, if ever, au-
dit factories that solely supply the domestic Mexican 
market.220 Unfortunately, this often means that domes-
tic-supplying factories face much less accountability 
as they have not had the same experience with a cus-
tomer base demanding their independent improvement 
on labor, health, and safety standards as have some 
international brands.221 As a result of both this and the 
overall state of public auditing, labor violations are al-
leged to be much worse at these factories than at those 
supplying international brands by civil society organi-
zations.222  
Furthermore, the multinational brands that mandate 
the use of these social compliance firms often lack suf-
ficient influence to demand behavior change in most 
individual suppliers. Factories often supply multiple 
brands, so their business does not usually depend too 
heavily on one specific brand, and the power of an in-
dividual brand is diluted. Additionally, factories often 
supply brands with differing labor standards so they 
arguably do not stand to lose too many brand custom-
ers by failing to meet some standards.223 For example, 
a given factory may supply two multinationals. While 
one multinational may push the factory to adhere to 
high labor and health standards for its workers, the oth-
er multinational is relatively weaker in its standards. 
Therefore, the factory would not risk losing too much 
business by failing to meet the higher social compli-
ance standards.
219  Representative from approved social compliance firm, in 
discussion with the authors, January 2019.
220  Representative from approved social compliance firm, in 
discussion with the authors, January 2019.
221  Representative from Maquila Solidarity Network (MSN), 
in discussion with the authors, January 2019.
222  A representative from Maquila Solidarity Network 
(MSN), in discussion with the authors, January 2019; A coor-
dinator of research at ProDESC, in discussion with the authors, 
January 2019.
223  A coordinator of research at ProDESC, in discussion with 
the authors, January 2019.
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The deep-rooted cultural dynamics which dictate 
gender norms in Mexico contextualize the perva-




Barriers to Realizing the 
Rights of Working Women
As this report examines the intersection of international trade, human rights, and 
working women in Mexico, it is necessary to understand each of these contexts 
on an individual level before undertaking an analysis of their interaction. Con-
sidering that the previous sections addressed Mexico’s economic and political 
history, the government’s inability and unwillingness to implement legal protec-
tions for working women, and its legal landscape, the following section offers 
a nuanced look at the endemic gender discrimination which creates barriers for 
women throughout the country.
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virile characteristics.224 As a multifaceted social con-
struct, machismo culture acts as a barrier to the prog-
ress of women in Mexico in every aspect of their lives. 
It is a major cause of the lack of female participation 
in the workforce. In traditional Mexican culture, men 
are expected to be the breadwinners and take charge 
of the family’s income, while women are relegated to 
taking care of the household. Patricia Hernandez, an 
expert in international law, writes, “interestingly, it is 
difficult to find a definition of machismo that does not 
aim to define males by their treatment of females. Ma-
chismo seems to entail what is socially and culturally 
to be male, but it also defines what it is to be female.”225 
Thus, the perpetuation of machismo culture is inter-
twined with the notion that women must be treated as 
224  Eloisa G. Tamez, “Familism, Machismo and Child Rear-
ing Practices among Mexican Americans,” Journal of Psychoso-
cial Nursing and Mental Health Services 19, no. 9 (September 
1981): 21–25.
225  Patricia M. Hernandez, “The Myth of Machismo: An 
A. Cultural Context
The deep-rooted cultural dynamics which dictate 
gender norms in Mexico contextualize the pervasive 
gender discrimination in the country. The widespread 
effects of machismo culture are entrenched through-
out the everyday lives of men and women in Mexico, 
revealing themselves in the social, political, and eco-
nomic aspects of the country. Only with a comprehen-
sive understanding of the hypermasculine culture that 
pervades Mexican society can one begin to understand 
the issues facing women in the workforce. 
It is difficult to settle on a concise, accurate definition 
of machismo, as it varies from country to country in 
Latin America. The word “machismo” is of Spanish 
origin and stems from the word macho. It can have a 
negative or positive connotation. In a general sense, it 
implies that men are the dominant figures in the family 
and calls to mind masculine, aggressive, and sexually 
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lesser. 
One popular theory suggests that the root of machismo 
in Mexican culture can be traced back to the Spanish 
conquest – that the machismo attitude is a response to 
the subjugation of indigenous men by the Spanish.226 
During the Spanish Conquest, native men were sub-
jected to sexual humiliation, often suffering from gen-
ital mutilation as a form of de-masculinization. The 
women were systematically raped and enslaved by 
the Spanish. Therefore, the degree to which sexuality 
was intertwined in the Spanish conquest can help ex-
plain the nature of machismo. It comes as a response to 
these degrading acts. “Pre-Conquest masculinities…
were sublimated, repressed, and modified in the years 
following the arrival of the Spanish.”227 Furthermore, 
as the ratio of women to men became relatively small-
er with the arrival of the Spanish, it is believed that 
men had to display masculine traits to attract a suitable 
mate. Thus, machismo represents a lingering but in-
grained societal belief that the bravest and most virile 
men make the best partners.228 The pervasiveness of this 
ingrained cultural notion, and its role in explaining the 
pandemic gender bias in Mexico, are important to keep 
in mind as this report attempts to further explore gen-
der discrimination in the country.
B. Structural and Systemic Gender Dis-
crimination 
Structural and systemic gender discrimination is an 
endemic cultural issue in Mexico. However, this en-
trenched nature does not mean that Mexico is exempt 
from its responsibility to combat these problems. In a 
sense, the government replicates the issue by engaging 
in policies that lack a gender focus, resulting in wom-
en being made invisible by the discourse. In Mexico, 
this is a structural problem. The following section will 
provide an overview of the structural and systematic 
dynamics that affect the lives of women in Mexico, 
Everyday Reality for Latin American Women,” St. Thomas Law 
Review 15, no. 4 (2003): 859–82.
226  Michael Hardin, “Altering Masculinities: The Spanish 
Conquest and the Evolution of the Latin American Machis-
mo.” International Journal of Sexuality and Gender Studies7, 
no. 1 (January 2002): 1–22.
227  Michael Hardin, “Altering Masculinities,” 10.
228  Michael Hardin, “Altering Masculinities,” 18.
including politics, security, education, employment, 
wages, and work-life balance. 
a. Politics and Women in Mexico
There is strong evidence indicating that the more wom-
en involved in politics, the better a government will 
be about ending gender discrimination practices and 
promoting equality.229 Thus, it is crucial that women 
participate in the political process and serve as elected 
officials in Mexico if gender issues are to be properly 
addressed.
However, the machismo culture acts as a barrier to 
the engagement of women in politics. In recent years, 
Mexico has made active progress in diversifying its 
political representation to include women, as well as 
increasing their participation in public decision-mak-
ing. Women who run for office in Mexico, continue 
to experience political harassment, violence, and neg-
ative attitudes. 
According to the OECD, stereotypes and ingrained 
patriarchal notions drive these difficulties plaguing fe-
male political hopefuls and those in office, especially at 
state and municipal levels of the government. Female 
politicians often cite a lack of cooperation from male 
subordinates, who refuse to follow orders.230 Further-
more, there are documented cases of female candidates 
being slandered or subjected to sexist comments. For 
example, in 2015, derogatory banners were displayed 
that implied a female gubernatorial candidate should be 
“pregnant and in a corner,” instead of in the governor’s 
mansion. In 2007, the municipal president of Oaxaca 
openly destroyed ballots that verified the victory of his 
successor, Eufronsina Cruz, stating that “women do 
229  “Facts and Figures: Leadership and Political Participa-
tion,” UN Women, Accessed: January 2019, http://www.unwom-
en.org/en/what-we-do/leadership-and-political-participation/
facts-and-figures.
230  Dalia Barrera-Bassols, ”Acoso y Violencia Politica: 
Testimonios de Sindicas y Regidoras Veracruzans”, Argicultura, 
Sociedad y Desarrollo 1, no. 3 (2014): 249 – 270. http://www.
scielo.org.mx/pdf/asd/v11n3/v11n3a1.pdf.
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cies in Mexico is a quota system that requires politi-
cal parties to nominate an equal number of both men 
and women as candidates. OECD studies have found 
that gender diversity in public decision-making cre-
ates an environment for more inclusive policies and 
increases confidence in public institutions.236 In 2014, 
Decree 135 of Article 41 of the Mexican Constitution 
raised gender parity to the constitutional level in the 
electoral arena for candidatures to the federal and local 
legislatures. Political parties are mandated to follow a 
50 percent quota requirement for all candidates who 
stand for election.237 The National Electoral Institute 
(INE) has agreed to monitor this requirement and to 
“ensure that women are not exclusively assigned to” 
losing districts.238 This initiative can give way to more 
reforms aimed at fostering a more inclusive society, 
with a greater emphasis on gender equality. While ac-
knowledging that this represents an important change 
to Mexico’s Constitution and political culture, the as-
sumption that the INE can ensure every political party 
is compliant for every candidature throughout Mexico 
is problematic due to capacity issues previously dis-
cussed.
In 2018, the number of women in the lower House and 
Senate increased to 49 percent and 51 percent, respec-
tively.239 This success demonstrates the effectiveness of 
these types of reforms. However, there is disparity be-
tween government efforts and reality; political harass-
ment and violence are still barriers to women entering 
public office, as many are deterred from seeking elec-
tion for fear of gender-based violence.
Although gender parity has been achieved in the na-
236  OECD, Women, Government and Policy Mak-
ing in OECD Countries: Fostering Diversity for Inclusive 
Growth (Paris: OECD publishing, 2014), http://dx.doi.
org/10.1787/9789264210745-en.
237  Amy Glover, “Mexico Seeks to Empower Women in 
Politics,” Mexico Institute, Wilson Center, July 10, 2014, https://
www.wilsoncenter.org/article/mexico-seeks-to-empower-wom-
en-politics. 
238  Glover, “Mexico Seeks to Empower Women in Politics.”
239  Magda Hinojosa and Jennifer Piscopo, “Women won big 
in Mexico’s elections—taking nearly half the legislature seats. 




not exist here.”231 Thus, there are deep-rooted gender 
stereotypes that must be addressed if more women are 
to run for office, especially considering how women’s 
political participation can be inhibited due to the high 
personal, professional, and emotional costs that arise 
from being politically active.
A survey conducted by INMUJERES, the National In-
stitute for Women, found that among women in civil 
service, 77 percent believe that female civil servants 
experienced a quid pro quo scenario, in which wom-
en are approached with sexual offers in return for the 
promise of a better job.232 To make matters worse, these 
women reported that their male counterparts often 
have impunity when it comes to this form of sexual ha-
rassment toward their female colleagues.233 To combat 
this issue, Mexico has instituted new reforms aimed at 
protecting women including the Protocol on Political 
Violence Against Women (designed to protect wom-
en running and holding political office) and the Proto-
col for the Prevention, Treatment, and Punishment of 
Bullying and Sexual Harassment in federal public ad-
ministration.234 The former assists Mexico in comply-
ing with international obligations and offers guidance, 
while the latter implements institutional accountability 
mechanisms.235
b. Gender Quota System 
Arguably one of the most notable gender parity poli-
231  Mona Lena Krook and Juliana Restrepo Sanín, “Género y 
Violencia Política En América Latina,” Política y Gobierno 23, 
no. 1 (2016): 125–57, http://mlkrook.org/pdf/pyg_2016.pdf.
232  Encuesta de Clima y Cultura Organizacional, INMU-
JERES, Mexico City, Mexico. 2015, accessed in OECD, Build-
ing an Inclusive Mexico: Policies and Good Governance for 
Gender Equality (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2017), 182, https://
dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264265493-en.
 
233  Encuesta de Clima y Cultura Organizacional in Building 
an Inclusive Mexico (OECD), 182.
234  Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federacion 
(TEPJF), “Protocolo para Atender la Violencia Política Contra 
las Mujeres” https://www.te.gob.mx/protocolo_mujeres/media/
files/7db6bf44797e749.pdf; Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres 
(INMUJERES) “Protocolo de intervención para casos de hosti-
gamiento y acoso sexual,” https://www.inah.gob.mx/images/
stories/Transparencia/2011/protocolo_vs_abuso_sexual.pdf.
235  OECD, Building an Inclusive Mexico, 192. 
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tional legislature, many women in other political posi-
tions, still lack the same power and level of influence of 
their male counterparts.240 Additionally, only 12 percent 
of all state municipalities have female mayors and only 
20 percent of the judicial branch is composed of wom-
en. Moreover, there is little enforcement for non-com-
pliance.241 Overall, Mexico has made progress towards 
gender parity with their implementation of gender 
quotas in political parties. Even with its weak enforce-
ment, gender quotas are enabling women to access the 
top echelons of power and increase gender-sensitivity 
in policymaking. Yet, there is still progress to be made.
Mexico should be applauded for its female representa-
tion in its legislature, ranking within the top five coun-
tries for female representation in politics.242 However, 
high rates of female representation in the government 
is not necessarily the equivalent of gender equality. 
The policies that the government implemented have 
not yet trickled down into society, a trend that should 
alarm the Mexican government and populace. In terms 
of global gender equality indicators, Mexico still falls 
in the bottom half of 144 countries measured by the 
World Economic Forum (WEF).243 Notably, Mexico’s 
government has spent more money advertising its gen-
der equality projects than on actual gender equality 
projects.244
c. Structural Employment and Wage Issues
Despite the substantial improvement in gender equali-
ty in education in Mexico, the gender gap in labor mar-
240  Sonia Corona, “Mexican women in politics: no glittering 
careers and no real power.” El Pais. 7 March 2018. https://elpais.
com/elpais/2018/03/07/inenglish/1520434930_190837.html.
241  Corona, “Mexican women in politics.” 
242  Juliette Bonnafé (Program Specialist, UN Women Mexi-
co) in discussion with the authors January 2019.
243  Shannon K. O’Neil, “Mexico’s Female Legislators are No 
Silver Bullet for Gender Inequality,” Council on Foreign Rela-
tions, September 4, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/blog/mexicos-fe-
male-legislators-are-no-silver-bullet-gender-inequality. 
244  Daniela Barragán, “Peña gastó menos en la lucha por 
la igualdad de la mujer que en prensa,” Vanguardia. March 8, 
2018, https://vanguardia.com.mx/articulo/pena-gasto-menos-en-
la-lucha-por-la-igualdad-de-la-mujer-que-en-prensa
ket participation is still large, thus presenting a major 
issue. Furthermore, when women do manage to gain 
employment, the wage gap is significant. It is import-
ant to recall that the Mexican Constitution stipulates 
that “equal wages shall be paid for equal work.”245 
Thus, a legal framework exists stipulating that women 
and men are to be paid equally; however, enforcement 
of this right is clearly an issue as a wage gap persists. 
According to data from the OECD, Mexican female 
workers are still paid much less than male workers rel-
ative to other OECD countries. According to this data, 
the average monthly gender pay gap is 16.7 percent for 
full-time employees.246
During interviews with academics and government 
agencies in Mexico City, machismo culture was cited 
as the root cause for the discrepancies between men 
and women in the work force. Dr. Eva Arceo Gomez, 
a professor of economics at Centro de Investigación 
y Docencia Económicas in Mexico City, studies the 
cross-section of gender, development, and labor eco-
nomics. She noted that these gender norms are in-
grained and are difficult to change. To do so, the gov-
ernment and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
must implement far-reaching programs, including 
mass media campaigns and other efforts aimed at en-
gendering a cultural shift.247 Experts at the Comisión 
Nacional de los Derechos Humanos (CNDH) empha-
sized that these gender norms are internalized and often 
promoted by women themselves, with many not un-
derstanding the sexism they face.248 These internalized 
perceptions can make it even more difficult to combat 
the effects of machismo culture. Finally, experts at IN-
MUJERES, noted that women are generally employed 
in service and commerce sectors where they face more 
245  Mexican Constitution of 1917, art.123. (g).
246  OECD Employment Database 2016, accessed 10 May 
2019,  https://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/employmentdata-
base-earningsandwages.htm.
247  Dr. Eva O. Arceo-Gomez (Professor, Centro de Inves-
tigación y Docencia Económicas A.C.) in discussion with the 
authors, January 2019
248  Representatives from CNDH (National Human Right 
Commission), in discussion with authors, January 2019.
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salary discrimination.249
Furthermore, it is not uncommon for women to need 
permission from their husbands to work. Many men 
do not allow their wives to work, as there is a stigma 
around working women, particularly in rural areas. In 
2013, researchers spoke with husbands and wives in 
Tehuacán, Mexico about their views regarding the par-
ticipation of married women in the workforce. They 
derived three “moral” reasons internalized by the par-
ticipants, which all act as barriers to women joining 
the workforce. These were: 1) the wives’ role as a 
homemaker and her reproductive responsibilities; 2) 
the husbands’ responsibility as the household’s main 
earner; and 3) the notion that women who work in ma-
quiladoras may be unfaithful to their husbands. Some 
of the participants used the derogatory term mandilon, 
which essentially translates into ‘apron-wearer,’ to de-
scribe husbands who allow their wives to work or who 
take on domestic duties. In their eyes, these husbands 
are shirking their responsibilities to their wives and 
their families. This sentiment was echoed by some of 
the women interviewed in that study as well.250
This issue persists, though not to the same degree, for 
women in Mexican white-collar positions. In a report 
that focused on the career development of Mexican 
women, a female manager in Mexico said, “In a coun-
try in which machismo is important, if your husband 
doesn’t want you to have success, you won’t have it…
or, you have to choose between professional success 
or your marriage.”251 The report also notes that Mex-
ican female managers often actively search for part-
ners who pose less threat to their career prospects, in 
that they are less traditionally machistas or are from a 
non-Mexican background.
249  Representatives from the National Institute for Women 
(INMUJERES), in discussion with the authors, January 2019.
250  Arlette Covarrubias, “Social Norms and Womens Par-
ticipation in Salaried Employment: The Case of the Tehuacán 
Region of Mexico,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 32, no. 
1 (2012): 17–31.
251  Pamela Lirio et. al, “Exploring Career-Life Success and 
Family Social Support of Successful Women in Canada, Argen-
tina and Mexico,” Career Development International 12, no. 1 
(2007): 28–50.
C. The Second Shift
One of the most tangible consequences of economic 
liberalization in the lives of Mexican women was the 
spread of the doble jornada, known in English as the 
second shift or the double burden. This concept refers 
to individuals, usually, women, who have the responsi-
bility of both, a paid job as well as a “second shift” at 
home—taking care of the children, cooking, and clean-
ing for example.252
This imbalance in unpaid labor not only represents a 
huge personal drain on women, but also a subsidy on 
the economy. If unpaid labor done by women and girls 
across the world were remunerated, it would amount 
to $10 billion.253 In this regard, the second shift has tan-
gible consequences on the finances and productive ca-
pacities of countries. This illustrates that both human 
rights and economic arguments can be used to make 
a case for public policies that help women overcome 
this hurdle. The double burden is not only an issue of 
gender equality and of sharing a burden that is unfairly 
placed on women due to socially constructed gender 
norms, but also of ensuring that women have the time 
and preparation to participate in their economies at full 
capacity. It is important to recall that women have the 
right to “enjoy a real opportunity to exercise the right 
to work” under the Protocol of San Salvador.254  As a 
signatory to this Protocol, Mexico has an obligation to 
ensure this right for women.
A state’s economic policies, both at a macro and mi-
cro level, have direct and distinct consequences on the 
lives of men and women. In most cases, economic pol-
icies further widen the divide that exists between gen-
der due to preexisting sexist attitudes engrained in so-
ciety, which unfairly overburden women. When public 
services or welfare policies are cut, for example, it is 
women who traditionally have to make up for these de-
ficiencies by engaging in unpaid domestic work. This 
252  Arlie Hochschild and Anne Machung, The Second Shift: 
Working Families and the Revolution at Home, rev. ed. (New 
York: Penguin Books) 2012.
253  Max Lawson et. al, Bienestar Público o Beneficio Priva-
do, Oxford: OXFAM, 2019, https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.
com/bitstream/handle/10546/620599/bp-public-good-or-private-
wealth-210119-es.pdf.
254  OAS, “Protocol of San Salvador,” art.6.  
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phenomenon is certainly not limited to Mexico and can 
be seen replicated on a global level.255
Although the issue of the doble jornada occurs 
throughout the world, the problem is especially prev-
alent in Mexico. Mexican women spend an average of 
373.3 minutes per day doing unpaid work, the highest 
of any OECD country and more than 2.8 times what 
men spend.256 This section will attempt to understand 
the root of the doble jornada in Mexico and how it 
affects women, families, and the economy as a whole.
a. A Brief History of the Second Shift in 
Mexico
Before trade liberalization, most women in Mexico did 
not work outside the house. This began to change as 
Mexico embraced an export-oriented model of indus-
trialization. As mentioned previously, the expansion of 
the maquiladora sector in the 1960s and 1970s result-
ed in a large demand for labor and, thus, allowed wom-
en to join the workforce in large numbers for the first 
time. As a result, nearly 80 percent of maquiladora 
workers were women.257 These expanded employment 
opportunities resulted in a larger degree of econom-
ic freedom that had previously been unattainable for 
women. Because of trends in industrialized societies, 
researchers believed that women would have more ac-
cess to resources, and thus more household power.258 
However, the increased employment of women did not 
lead to their complete autonomy.259 Elizabeth Fussel re-
fers to this change as a double-edged sword—although 
255   Lawson, et al., Bienestar Público o Beneficio Privado, 
39.
256  OECD, Building an Inclusive Mexico, 151.
257  Elizabeth Fussell, “Making Labor Flexible: The Re-
composition of Tijuana’s Maquiladora Female Labor Force,” 
Feminist Economics 6, no. 3 (2000): 62, http://dx.doi.
org/10.1080/135457000750020137.
258  Leslie C. Gates, ”The Strategic Uses of Gender in 
Household Negotiations: Women Workers on Mexico’s Northern 
Border,” Bulletin of Latin American Research21, no. 4 (2002): 
507–26.
259  Patricia María Fernández-Kelly, For We Are Sold, I and 
My People: Women and Industry in Mexico’s Frontier. Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1983.
new jobs brought some economic autonomy, they did 
not fully offer the opportunity for professional or eco-
nomic advancement.260 
The subsequent expansion of the maquiladora sector 
in the 1980s again changed the labor composition, this 
time shifting away from educated, single women to 
married women.261 These women—typically working 
mothers—became the “ideal labor force” due to their 
vulnerable socioeconomic position.262 Their condition 
as working mothers or heads of households meant that 
they depended on that income for the survival of their 
families, making them less likely to risk losing their 
jobs.263 
Mexico’s economic liberalization paired with austerity 
measures in the 1990s (meant to address the Mexican 
Peso Crisis), further deteriorated female labor con-
ditions.264 Women from low-income households were 
forced to take precarious jobs in order to be able to 
financially contribute to their household while simul-
taneously continuing to shoulder the brunt of domestic 
labor.265
This restructuring of women’s employment created a 
new vulnerability for women, one which was not ac-
companied by a restructuring of societal protections. 
In Mexico, these new vulnerabilities are exemplified 
by the fact that women joining the formal workforce 
did not alter gender norms or expectations, beginning 
the problem of the doble jornada. Women in Mexico 
must now shoulder two burdens: domestic and profes-
sional work.
260  Fussell, “Making Labor Flexible: The Recomposition of 
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b. Invisible Labor
Gender-based discrimination at home is most appar-
ent when reviewing hours spent on unpaid housework. 
More than 90 percent of all Mexican women perform 
unremunerated domestic work.266 Many arguments 
stemming from the embedded societal gender norms 
are espoused to explain this phenomenon. Some be-
lieve that because of these ingrained stereotypes, 
women underestimate the importance of domestic 
work and internalize it as their duty; others argue that 
these gender norms allow men and women to discount 
the importance of domestic work and that many per-
ceive the income from work outside the home as more 
valuable.267 
Two factors come into play in determining the severity 
of the doble jornada—societal norms that see domestic 
work as female labor and the lack of institutional re-
sources available for working women (e.g., affordable 
child care, elderly care facilities, and access to social 
security).268 Overall, neither the government nor the 
private sector promotes policies that accurately reflect 
the work-life balance realities of working women in 
Mexico.269 As mentioned previously, the pervasiveness 
of machismo culture means that gender norms are in-
grained in all levels of Mexican society, to the extent 
that the notion of “being a woman” is deeply entwined 
to the practice of the doble jornada.
In Mexico, the overwhelming majority of responsi-
bilities in the home fall onto the woman. For exam-
ple, women spend 36.5 hours per week dedicated to 
domestic activities, whereas men spend 12.2 hours.270 
Similarly, women complete 75.2 percent of the unpaid 
266  Juliette Bonnafé (Program Specialist, UN Women Mexi-
co) in discussion with the authors January 2019.
267  Gates, “The Strategic Uses of Gender in Household Ne-
gotiations,” 508.
268  Representatives from the Mexican Human Rights Com-
mission, in discussion with the authors, January 2019.
269  Representatives from the Mexican Human Rights Com-
mission, in discussion with the authors, January 2019.
270  Sistema de Indicadores de Género, “Encuesta Nacional 
Sobre el Uso de Tiempo 2014,” INEGI-INMUJERES, http://
estadistica.inmujeres.gob.mx/formas/panorama_general.
php?menu1=9&IDTema=9&pag=1.
care and domestic work in the home.271 Thus, Mexican 
women, whether they are mothers or not, bear a dispro-
portionate responsibility for unpaid domestic labor.272 
The second shift means that working women in Mexi-
co often work long hours, and then come home to their 
“invisible jobs”—cooking, cleaning, and taking care of 
the house.273 This gender disparity in unpaid work at 
home translates to inequality in paid work as well.274 If 
women were able to divert this unpaid household and 
child care time into remunerated work, they could sig-
nificantly increase their income. What is clear is that 
this extra burden of the double shift is rooted in gender 
norms. While many women may want to work outside 
of the home, they are expected to conform and com-
plete domestic work.
Additionally, rural women spend even more hours on 
unpaid work than women who live in urban areas, re-
flecting inadequate access to social services.275 Unpaid 
labor for rural women goes beyond taking care of the 
children, as they often take some part in the agriculture 
process—cooking meals for the men, helping with the 
harvest, or plowing the fields—without being paid to 
do so.276 The most common household work arrange-
ment for Mexican couples with children is the male 
partner working paid hours full-time while the female 
partner works “zero paid hours per week.”277
The gap between gender in terms of workforce partic-
ipation becomes even more pronounced when women 
become mothers with the addition of the “motherhood 
penalty.”278 The motherhood penalty is a phenomenon 
whereby perceptions affect how mothers are treated 
271   Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografia (INEGI), 
“Cuenta Satélite del Trabajo No Remunerado de los Hogares en 
México, 2017” News Release, December 11, 2018, https://www.
inegi.org.mx/contenidos/saladeprensa/boletines/2018/StmaCn-
taNal/CSTNRH2017.pdf.
272  OECD, Building an Inclusive Mexico, 99.
273   Julia Quiñonez (Coordinator, Comité Fronterizo de Obre-
r@s, CFO), in discussion with the authors, January 2019.
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in the workplace. These generalized perceptions that 
mothers have lower competence and commitment, for 
example, result in being held to higher punctuality stan-
dards, in a decreased likelihood being hired or promot-
ed, as well as in lower wages.279 Thus, the burden of the 
doble jornada is compounded by that fact that moth-
ers tend to receive lower wages than women who do 
not have children, and lower wages than men, whether 
they have children or not.280 Although the motherhood 
penalty is a worldwide phenomenon, Mexican mothers 
are much less likely to engage in paid work that moth-
ers in other OECD countries.281 
c. Effects on the Lives of Women
The doble jornada dynamic engenders a lack of work-
life balance that negatively affects women’s possibil-
ity for upward social and economic mobility, a right 
stipulated in Article 7 of the ICESCR, and one that 
Mexico is bound to protect and promote. These wom-
en who devote significantly more time to unpaid work 
are more likely to reduce their paid work or drop out of 
the workforce entirely. Furthermore, it takes a toll on 
the physical and psychological quality of the lives of 
women.282 There are certain challenges that contribute 
to the self-perpetuating nature of the doble jornada—
women either do not have access to professional care 
for their children or do not trust it; caring for the elder-
ly becomes an issue as the population ages; women of-
ten do not have the education or skills needed to access 
jobs in the labor market (sometimes because of their 
added responsibilities in the home); and, often, women 
are not allowed to work by their families or husbands.283 
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sidad Autonoma Metropolitana) in discussion with the authors, 
January 2019.
283  Dr. Eva Arceo Gomez (Professor, Centro de Investigación 
y Docencia Económicas A.C.), in discussion with the authors, 
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Thus, one of the largest issues that women in Mexi-
co face today is that the doble jornada poses a barrier 
to gender equality—both socially and economically.284 
First, the dynamic reinforces the stereotypical image 
of the woman in the home. It is a self-perpetuating sit-
uation, where both men and women see domestic labor 
as a female field.285 Second, it reinforces the image of 
the woman as the subservient gender.286 
The fact that the burden of unpaid domestic work falls 
on women means that more women than men work in 
the informal sector, which provides more flexibility 
but also higher economic risk and no social welfare 
protections or benefits.287 Additionally, the physical and 
psychological toll of the doble jornada severely di-
minishes the productivity of women. Not only do they 
have less time to dedicate to paid labor, but they have 
less energy for it as well. 
Low salaries and harsh working conditions mean that 
women often have to resort to different avenues to 
make ends meet. Often the salaries of the maquilado-
ras, for example, are not enough to buy a household’s 
basic basket of goods, which forces women to find side 
jobs so that they can meet their domestic costs.288 Wom-
en who work in northern border towns often cross the 
border to buy cheap goods and then resell the items in 
Mexico, others may sell their blood or plasma in U.S. 
centers that target Mexicans across the border.289 
Additionally, the physical and psychological toll of the 
second shift severely diminishes both the productivity 
and the quality of life of women. Not only do they have 
less time to dedicate to paid labor, but they have less 
energy for it as well. Women who are overburdened 
284  Representatives from the National Institute for Women 
(INMUJERES), in discussion with the authors, January 2019.
285  Representatives from CNDH (National Human Rights 
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286  Representatives from the Mexican Human Rights Com-
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r@s, CFO), in discussion with the authors, January 2019.
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by the doble jornada do not have much time for rest, 
leisure, or personal care, a trend that OECD refers to 
as “time poverty.”290 Although time poverty affects both 
men and women, in Mexico, 28.5 percent of women 
with children experience time poverty, versus 21.5 per-
cent of men.291
The takeaway of the doble jornada is that it severely 
cuts into women’s time, productivity, and quality of 
life. Moreover, it limits the time that women have to 
engage in educational and vocational training, mean-
ing that they are often stuck in lower-level jobs without 
hope of improvement. The combination of these fac-
tors directly limits the possibility for women to com-
pete in the job market on a level playing field, and thus 
limits female upward economic mobility. 
d. The Second Shift and GDP
The economic effects of women’s invisible labor and 
the doble jornada goes beyond the personal. With 
women spending so much time on unpaid labor, there 
is less time to dedicate to paid work thus reducing both 
their and their country’s productivity.
To put it into perspective, the value of unpaid domestic 
work represents 23.3 percent of Mexico’s total GDP.292 
If this type of labor were paid and quantified, it would 
account for the largest portion of economic activity in 
the country.293 This demonstrates that unpaid labor is 
not only a drag on women’s economic opportunities, 
but also the country’s productivity and competitive-
ness. The pervasiveness of unpaid domestic and care 
work means that Mexico is losing a significant portion 
of productive capacity and that women are unequally 
bearing this burden.
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edu/10.1787/9789264201392-en.
291  OECD (2013), How’s Life? 2013, 4. 
292  Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografia (INEGI), 
“Cuenta Satélite del Trabajo No Remunerado de los Hogares en 
México, 2017” News Release, December 11, 2018, 
293  INEGI, “Cuenta Satélite del Trabajo No Remunerado de 
los Hogares en México, 2017.”
D. Gender-based Discrimination and 
Violence in the Home
While Mexico has been making concerted efforts to 
reduce gender discrimination, there is still much prog-
ress to be made. The following section will outline 
structural gender discrimination, gender-based vio-
lence (both at home and in the workplace), and issues 
around upward mobility. 
a. Household Income
Gender-based discrimination and violence at home 
comes in many forms. As with many countries, two in-
comes are needed for stability in Mexican households, 
and so women’s labor force participation has become 
essential to a household’s economic viability. The ris-
ing number of single-mother households in Mexico 
has created an additional burden for many female la-
borers, and this change in family structure is affecting 
women’s abilities to work and undertake specific jobs. 
Indeed, the OECD found that female-headed house-
holds in Mexico are more likely to experience finan-
cial precarity and are at a greater risk for poverty, as 
the woman is often the sole source of the family’s in-
come.294 Twenty-nine percent of households were head-
ed by women in 2014, with the majority of these wom-
en being single mothers.295 Any disruption of income 
streams for these women can send the household into 
dangerous cycles of poverty and instability. 
In households where there is both male and female la-
bor participation and dual incomes are earned, a wom-
an’s participation in the labor force can affect house-
hold resource distribution. When women are in control 
of a larger share of household resources, it has been 
consistently proven that they are more likely to invest 
resources into their children.296 The earned income of 
women is often considered secondary to their hus-
bands’ money. In one study, working Mexican women 
294  OECD, Building an Inclusive Mexico, 27.
295  Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografia (INEGI). 
“Estadísticas a Propósito del Día Internacional de la Elimi-
nación de la Violencia Contra la Mujer” Government of Mex-
ico. México. 2015. http://www.inegi.org.mx/saladeprensa/
aproposito/2015/violencia0.pdf.
296  OECD, Building an Inclusive Mexico, 116.
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noted that their incomes were used to buy supplemen-
tal, non-necessary items, while their husbands’ money 
went toward food, housing, and electricity.297
The Mexican government has begun to understand this 
phenomenon, and developed cash transfer programs to 
promote woman-led households. Today, Mexico is a 
leader in its policy of cash transfer programs target-
ed at combating poverty. One of the most prominent 
programs is Prospera (formerly Progresa), which, al-
though not exclusively targeted at women, overwhelm-
ingly provides conditional cash transfers to mothers of 
low-income families.298 
b. Gender-Based Violence (GBV)
Gender-based violence against women—including fe-
micide, assault, kidnapping, and sexual violence—is a 
major issue found commonly throughout Mexico. Ac-
cording to UN Women, nine women are murdered in 
Mexico every day, and seven out of ten women have 
suffered from some form of violence.299 Often, the prin-
cipal aggressors are the spouses or partners of these 
women.300 Moreover, the majority of these cases go un-
reported.301 While there are many legal protections for 
women, such as the General Law on Women’s Access 
to a Life Free of Violence, they are not consistently ap-
plied. Additionally, there is a general mistrust and lack 
of faith in the Mexican judicial system.302 
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ed. Eric L. Olson, David A. Shirk, and Andrew Selee (San 
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To respond to the gender-based violence in Mexico, 
the government developed a Gender Violence Alert 
System. Under the system, states declare alert status 
and implement programs to combat violence against 
women. Programs include increasing policing efforts, 
creating special gender-focused police branches, re-
sponding to complaints, enacting education programs, 
and developing street light projects.303 The alert sys-
tem was created to bring to light the pressing problem 
of femicide and to visualize the violence that exists 
throughout the country.304 Currently, 18 of 32 federal 
entities in Mexico are under alert.305
While this shows a valiant effort on behalf of Mex-
ico, sometimes these well-intended programs further 
gender stereotypes. For example, the gender units of 
some police branches have pink uniforms.306 This form 
of stereotyping perpetuates ingrained gender norms. 
Additionally, some of the policemen tasked with the 
protection of women engage in gender-based violence 
in their personal lives.307 Other times local governments 
enact change, but they lack a gender perspective, so 
it ultimately fails to achieve the intended impact. 
While states have been attempting to address the gen-
der-based violence, the ones mentioned above fail to 
address roots of the issue adequately. Evidence sug-
gests that gender-based violence “not only negatively 
affects women’s participation in economic and public 
life, but also imposes an economic price and produc-
tivity loss.”308 Many of these gender-based violence 
issues are a result of societal gender stereotypes and 
attitudes at home, school, and work.
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This general state of violence that exists in some parts 
of Mexico has further negative impacts on women be-
cause it makes it far more difficult for them to demand 
their rights. Although there are domestic legal protec-
tions for women, they are not applied consistently.309
c. Intimate Partner Violence (IPV)
Women earning income in a dual-income household 
can also face other forms of gender discrimination, 
such as intimate partner violence (IPV). In Mexico, 
one study found that in general, due to the machismo 
culture, men often believe they have to be the bread-
winners in the family, as that is the trademark of mas-
culinity.310 If this role is not fulfilled, they feel threat-
ened, as it brings into question their “masculinity” and 
their culturally-prescribed dominant position in the 
household.311 Oftentimes, if a woman is paid more than 
her male partner, the income grants her economic free-
dom. However, a study found that sometimes, because 
of this economic freedom, men fear that women might 
“rebel” against cultural norms. Thus, these men feel 
the need to exert control over their female partners in 
the form of IPV.312 Therefore, earning extra income can 
sometimes prove dangerous for women due, in large 
part, to cultural considerations. 
Another study found that economically empowering 
women can significantly decrease the incidence of IPV, 
but only if wages were still lower than her partner’s 
wages. This is because the extra income reduced stress 
on the previously limited household income.313 The 
309  Representatives from the National Human Rights Com-
mission (CNDH), in discussion with the authors, January 2019.
310  Ignacio Maldonado, Maribel Nájera, and Adriána Sego-
via, “Efectos del programa oportunidades en las relaciones de 
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desde el género ed. Maria de La Paz Lopez and Vania Salles  
(Mexico City: Colegio de Mexico, 2006), 99. https://ogp.colmex.
mx/libreria/OportunidadesOGP.pdf. 
311  I. Maldonado, M. Nájera, and A. Segovia, “Efectos del 
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313  Aixa Garcia-Ramos, “Women’s relative wage and 
same study determined that once the woman’s income 
equaled or exceeded that of her male partner’s, it in-
creased her bargaining power and thus was perceived 
as a threat by her partner. Once this occurred, the male 
partner was more likely to turn to the use of IPV to 
reassert dominance.314 While dual incomes can have 
some positive effects, it also can bring about more gen-
der violence and discrimination in the household.
This is particularly related to the issue of free trade 
and women’s rights considering the increase of female 
labor participation engendered Mexico’s economic lib-
eralization. This follows the theme of a double-edged 
sword—with more and more women joining the labor 
force and gaining access to economic resources, there 
may be a rise of tensions inside the home that leaves 
them vulnerable to domestic violence or IPV.
d. Long Commutes
 
Not only do women workers encounter sexual harass-
ment in the workplace, but they also face this form 
of violence during their long commutes to and from 
work. Over 48 percent of female public transit users 
in Mexico City have reported instances of sexually ha-
rassment in transit, with 60 percent of those includ-
ing physical approaches.315 Further, over 70 percent of 
women who used public transit said they felt insecure 
while using the service.316 To combat these issues, some 
metros include “women-only” cars, but these cars are 
often overfilled.
To ensure their safety, some women resort to traveling 
with other colleagues to and from work or pay for driv-
ers to transport them to their workplaces.317 When asked 
why they continue to work under such undesirable 
conditions, they often say it is due to financial strain. If 
intimate partner violence in Mexico: A non-monotonic relation-
ship,” December 9, 2016, https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/
conference/download.cgi?db_name=SAEe2016&paper_id=112, 
4.
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317  A coordinator of research at ProDESC, in discussion with 
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public transit was considered “safer” from gender dis-
crimination, it is likely that more women would look 
for employment opportunities, or look for employment 
options farther from their home which may offer better 
benefits and pay.
Furthermore, due to inadequate urban development 
planning and poor public transportation services, Mex-
ican workers must endure some of the longest com-
mutes to work when compared to other OECD coun-
tries.318 Long commutes make for long days, contribute 
negatively to the work-life balance, and reduce overall 
quality of life, especially for women. These poor trans-
portation options also limit women workers’ ability to 
participate in the labor market and increase their expo-
sure to GBV. Thus, this acts as a compounding factor 
that increases the likelihood of women being exposed 
to violence during their commutes.
E. Gender-Based Discrimination – Lack 
of Upward Mobility
There is no doubt that the lack of upward mobility 
plagues women in Mexico. One study by UNDP re-
vealed that only 5 percent of companies have female 
board members.319 While these statistics may be shock-
ing, there are a few primary reasons for this lack of 
upward mobility which include: lack of training pro-
grams or access to them, a culture of long work hours, 
high teenage pregnancy rates, limited access to quality 
child and elderly care, deficient maternity and paterni-
ty leave policies, and differences regarding access to 
loans and retirement options.
a. Long Work Hours
Mexico’s work culture is characterized by long hours 
and often lacks the option for telework or part-time 
318  OECD, Building an Inclusive Mexico, 141.
319  United Nations Development Programme, Gender 
Equality and Women’s Empowerment in Public Administration: 
Mexico Case Study, (Washington DC UNDP, 2012), accessed on 
https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/demo-
cratic-governance/public_administration/gepa2.html. 
work.320 In the maquiladora sector, the work week is 
long, with employees often working 48 hours a week.321 
Mexicans are overworked and have one of the longest 
average work weeks when compared to all OECD 
countries.322 As previously discussed, long hours place 
an unfair burden on women workers, as they are often 
also expected to perform unpaid housework after re-
turning from work in the maquiladoras. The result is 
essentially a double workday for women.
For women in senior positions, the situation is worse. 
These women encounter even longer work days of 
more than 10 hours, as time spent in the office is val-
ued more than efficiency.323 If women are expected to 
work 10+ hours per day to maintain senior positions, 
their time with their families is limited, thus hindering 
their ability to maintain a work-life balance.  Women 
often feel guilty or dissatisfied if they are unable to 
spend enough time with their children, often due to so-
cietal pressures.324 Men, on the other hand, can afford 
to work long hours because they are not bound by the 
same cultural expectations. 
The burden is amplified if the mother is the single head 
of the home and has limited access to quality child 
care, as she must choose between her personal and 
work life. Women who plan to have a family can be 
impeded by this cultural mentality of long work days, 
and often must consider if they can remain in the work-
force or aim for senior positions as they reconcile work 
and personal life demands. 
b. Adolescent Pregnancy
 
Another aspect inhibiting women’s upward mobility in 
Mexico is the high indices of teenage pregnancy. Cur-
rently, Mexico has the highest adolescent pregnancy 
320  OECD, Building an Inclusive Mexico, 37.
321  U.S. embassy official in discussion with the authors, Janu-
ary 2019.
322  OECD, Building an Inclusive Mexico, 141.
323  UNDP, Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in 
Public Administration: Mexico Case Study, 23.
324  UNDP, Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in 
Public Administration: Mexico Case Study, 24.
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rate out of all OECD countries.325 Often, these young 
mothers are forced to drop out of school and work 
to care for their children. Later in life, even if these 
women enter the labor market, they are often trapped 
in low-paid and low-skilled jobs. As a result, they are 
disadvantaged economically (low wages) and they are 
limited in their upward mobility as they lack schooling 
and experience to move into better paid or more skilled 
positions. 
When it comes to youth between the ages of 15 to 29, 
there is a high rate of young women who are neither 
employed, educated nor in training (NEETs). Current-
ly, Mexico has the second highest rate of female NEETs 
in all OECD countries, with 35 percent of young wom-
en being NEETs, compared to an OECD average of 14 
percent.326 Meanwhile, only 10 percent of young men 
in Mexico are NEETs. Of the female NEETs, approx-
imately two-thirds are mothers and they spend a sig-
nificant amount of time providing unpaid household 
work.327 Since these young women are removed from 
the labor market early on, they encounter many barriers 
when entering the workforce later in life. Studies show 
that the first ten years in the labor market are crucial 
for an individual’s career. Therefore, these women are 
disadvantaged as they often are unable to participate in 
the labor market during these critical years.328 The fact 
that many women classified as NEETs are also mothers 
is especially concerning given Mexico’s high rate of 
teen pregnancy, as it indicates more women in Mexico 
will be relegated to low-skilled jobs.
c. Lack of Adequate Child Care
The lack of quality and affordable child care con-
strains women from both participating more in paid 
work and moving up in their careers. As part of En-
couraging Quality in Early Childhood Education and 
Care (ECEC), under Mexican law, women workers in 
the formal sector are entitled to institutional child care 
for children aged 43 days until 4 years of age.329 This 
daycare is offered by the Mexican Institute for So-
325  OECD, Building an Inclusive Mexico, 3.
326  OECD, Building an Inclusive Mexico, 24.
327  OECD, Building an Inclusive Mexico. 32
328  OECD, Building an Inclusive Mexico, 24.
329  OECD, Building an Inclusive Mexico, 109.
cial Security (IMSS) to working parents provided that 
they are enrolled in the social security system. These 
daycares can be contracted out to private providers or 
directly provided by the IMSS. This is still a barrier 
to many working mothers if they were not enrolled in 
social security by their employers. Subsidized child-
care for children of low-incoming working mothers 
and single fathers is also provided by the Secretariat of 
Social Development (SEDESOL).330 However, daycare 
administered by the IMSS is considered higher quality 
due to the IMSS’ regulations. Neither, however, offers 
quality care—or any care—to children with disabili-
ties.
Mexico has made efforts to increase the availability 
of child care for women working in low-income jobs 
with the Programa de Estancias Infantiles para Apo-
yar a Madres Trabajadoras. Despite this effort, child 
care capacity and quality are insufficient to meet de-
mand.331 While child care may be accessible, there are 
low educational requirements for child care providers, 
high child-to-teacher ratios, and a lack of resources.332 
Since low-income households can only afford to place 
their children in these poor child care facilities, there 
is public concern over social and cognitive develop-
ment of these young children given that it is during a 
critical time of development, and that disadvantages at 
a young age ultimately limit future upward mobility. 
Additionally, only 30 percent of women in the maqui-
ladora sector have access to child care at their work-
place.333 Even if child care is offered, many are hesitant 
to use these programs as there have been many issues 
around the quality of care and the insufficient capacity 
to meet demand.334 Therefore, these workers are wary 
about relying on this form of care.  Without access to 
quality child care, women are more likely to leave the 
labor force after giving birth. Providing public work-
ing benefits regardless of gender is imperative to wom-
en’s economic empowerment in Mexico.
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Despite government progress in expanding mandato-
ry early childhood education, certain factors including 
limited capacity, lack of geographic coverage, and af-
fordability still hinder greater maternal participation in 
the labor force. Lack of child care may ultimately force 
women to pursue illicit jobs. For example, women are 
attracted to positions selling drugs with cartels because 
it is a convenient way to make an income while still 
being able to take care of their children.335 Notably, fe-
male participation in drug cartels has increased in the 
last several years.336 From the perspective of cartels, 
women are desirable as low-level foot soldiers because 
they are less likely to arouse the suspicion of police.337 
While a job in a maquiladora would mean prescribed 
work hours that might take a woman away from her 
children during the day, selling drugs allows that same 
woman the flexibility to choose when she works, and 
even allows her to keep her children with her as she 
sells drugs. 
However, these low-level foot soldiers are more of-
ten arrested and imprisoned than higher-ranking car-
tel members in Mexico’s war on drug trafficking. As 
a result, the number of women in Mexico’s prisons 
increased by 103.3 percent between 2014 and 2016.338 
This puts these women at risk for abuse in Mexican 
prisons; international NGOs, including Amnesty Inter-
national and Human Rights Watch, have documented 
cases of Mexican police raping and beating women to 
extract confessions from them.339 Until a law change 
in 2017, children under the age of six could live with 
their mothers in prison; at the present time, children 
under the age of three can live with their jailed moth-
335  Jasmine Garsd, “Women filling Mexico’s prisons are the 
‘lowest rung of the drug trade,’” Public Radio International, 
April 3, 2018, https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-04-03/women-
filling-mexicos-prisons-are-lowest-rungs-drug-trade.
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ers, while children older than three are sent to live with 
other family members, or are put in the care of social 
services or shelters.340
d. Maternity Leave
Another area inhibiting women’s upward mobility 
is Mexico’s laws on maternity and paternity leave. 
Mexico has the second shortest leave entitlement for 
mothers in all OECD countries (just after the U.S.). 
An important caveat is that only women workers in the 
formal sector are entitled to the 12 weeks of materni-
ty leave as stipulated in the Constitution, which is ap-
proximately one-third of the population. Six weeks of 
paid maternity leave also applies to women who have 
recently adopted a child.
Additionally, eligibility for Instituto de Seguridad So-
cial (government) maternity leave is contingent on 
women having met the minimum contribution period, 
which is at least 30 weeks of work during the 12 months 
preceding the date when payment is due to begin. If 
this condition is not met, the employer is responsible 
for covering 100 percent of the cost. Unfortunately, 
this means that employers are more likely to engage 
in discriminatory hiring practices toward women of 
childbearing age, as they do not want to risk incurring 
these costs.341 
Mexico’s setup for maternity and paternity leave en-
courages gender discrimination. The fact that paid pa-
ternity leave is relatively shorter than maternity leave 
discourages men from taking an active role in the early 
stages of child-rearing. Instead, this places the initial 
parenting burden on women, thus reinforcing stereo-
typical gender norms. Extending the length of paternal 
leave in Mexico would help alleviate the traditional 
role of women as caregivers, leading to an increase 
in women’s working hours and labor force participa-
tion.342 Overall, this relative imbalance in the duration 
340  Jasmine Garsd, ”As more women are being incarcer-
ated in Mexico, so are their babies,” Public Radio Interna-
tional, April 5, 2018. https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-04-05/
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of maternity and paternity leave creates disparities in 
the hiring process, as employers are much less inclined 
to hire and invest in women employees. If both men 
and women were entitled to the same amount of leave 
for the birth of a child, it may decrease employer dis-
crimination against hiring women of childbearing-age, 
as men would represent an equal risk or potential cost 
in the event of a pregnancy.
e. Barriers to Education and Training
Education is a key factor for training workers in the 
formal labor force, improving productivity, fostering 
inclusive economic growth, and promoting upward 
mobility. The education levels of the population are 
increasing in Mexico, and gender disparity in the Mex-
ican education system has decreased substantially in 
the last few years. According to education and gender 
data from UNESCO, primary educational attainment 
(or higher) of women ages 25 or older increased from 
62.24 percent of the total female population in 2000 to 
79.16 percent in 2016.343 In 2000, the gender gap was 
about 5 percent. In 2016, it decreased to approximate-
ly two percent.344 Thus, the decrease in the gender gap 
demonstrates that more women are being educated and 
prepared to continue their studies and join the labor 
force. 
Upper secondary educational attainment also im-
proved for women ages 25 and older relative to men 
Effects of Parental Leave. A European Perspective”, Utrecht 
School of Economics, Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute, 
Discussion Paper Series, April 2011; OECD, Closing the Gender 
Gap: Act Now: OECD Publishing, 2012, https://www.oecd.
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leave influence the gender division of labour? Recent empirical 
findings from Europe”, Vienna University of Economics and 
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March 2015.
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of the same ages. Between 2000 and 2016, statistics 
for women who at least completed upper secondary 
education increased from 15.17 percent to 32.3 per-
cent.345 Gender disparity for upper secondary education 
decreased from 7 percent to approximately 2 percent 
during the same period.346 Tertiary educational attain-
ment has also reached gender parity in Mexico.347
Despite this educational progress in Mexico, women 
still face ingrained structural barriers. Women in Mex-
ico are still facing obstacles to enter certain fields, such 
as science, technology, education, and math (STEM). 
Additionally, upper-secondary dropout rates in Mexi-
co are the highest out of OECD countries.348 The most 
common reasons for dropping out of school are lack of 
financial resources to cover tuition, lack of interest, or 
pregnancy.349
Moreover, wage discrimination still persists for highly 
educated women. Women with tertiary degrees are paid 
only 66 percent of what their male colleagues earn, a 
statistic that is eight percent lower than the OECD av-
erage.350 To make matter worse, the Mexican higher ed-
ucation system favors higher-income students, because 
the government greatly subsidizes public universities 
and a large proportion of students attending public uni-
versities come from the richest families.351
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access to proper financing and loans these women are 
greatly restricted in the types of jobs and activities they 
can provide to the labor market, contributing to their 
structural disadvantage.
As demonstrated above, women workers are plagued 
by difficulties when it comes to upward mobility. This 
mobility matters not just for individuals and families, 
but also for the broader economy. Countries with lower 
levels of social mobility are more likely to misallocate 
human skills and talents as it reduces innovation, moti-
vations, and productivity, all of which impact the bottom 
line of economic growth. In Mexico, the combination 
of lack of training programs or access to them, cul-
ture of long work hours, high teenage pregnancy rates, 
limited access to quality child and elderly care, policy 
on maternity/paternity leave, and differences regarding 
access to loans and retirement options, all contribute 
to the restrictions placed on female upward mobility. 
If not addressed, Mexico will lose out on the potential 
that these women workers have to offer to the economy. 
f. Retirement
An additional barrier to upward mobility is the differ-
ence in retirement options. As demonstrated before, 
women on average spend more time than men per-
forming domestic work; therefore, it ultimately affects 
their ability to earn a pension as domestic work does 
not pay for retirement. Since women have less time 
to work in the formal sector, they often have limited 
options for retirement and pension. One study found 
that of women in the formal labor sector, the retirement 
rate was 11.5 percent, compared to over 27 percent 
for their male counterparts.352 Furthermore, as women 
workers more frequently participate in the informal la-
bor sector, 67 percent in Mexico are not affiliated with 
any guaranteed pension system.353  The combination 
of informal work and a heavy domestic burden, work 
against women workers when it comes to retirement 
options and pensions as it pushes them outside of the 
formal labor market that generally offers these options. 
g. Access to Financing and Loans
Another barrier to female upward mobility is women’s 
lack of access to loans and other financial resources. 
This obstacle is caused by a lack of property to use as 
collateral, lack of access to education, lack of techno-
logical access (e-commerce), and lack of time.354 This 
combination of factors contributes to the difficulty 
women face when trying to file paperwork to access 
loans and other resources. Often without these loans 
and resources, women are limited in the jobs and type 
of activities they can perform in the labor market. Wom-
en lack the money to invest and therefore do not have 
the support to create their businesses and elevate their 
quality of life.355 It is not surprising then that only 2.5 
percent of businesses are owned by women.356  Without 
352  Representatives from the National Institute for Women 
(INMUJERES), in discussion with the authors, January 2019.
353  OECD, Building an Inclusive Mexico, 140. 
354  Representatives from the National Human Rights Com-
mission (CNDH), in discussion with the authors, January 2019.
355  Representatives from the National Human Rights Com-
mission (CNDH), in discussion with the authors, January 2019.
356  Representatives from the National Institute for Women 
(INMUJERES), in discussion with the authors, January 2019.
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Gender-based discrimination in the workplace is unfor-
tunately all too common, and the maquiladoras prove to 
be no exception. Gender-based discrimination is found 
in wages, occupational segregation, and discrimination 







A. Gender Discrimination 
As discussed, women in Mexico face many barriers 
in education, financial services, and in the workplace. 
Although the Mexican state has many laws enshrined 
in the Constitution, the Federal Labor Law, the Gen-
eral Laws on equality and violence against women, 
and through international obligations on women’s 
rights, women have not yet achieved gender equality 
in Mexico. Through international trade, Mexico has 
experienced economic growth and increased participa-
tion of women in the labor market. While these may 
be positive developments, Mexico lags behind other 
Latin American countries with similar levels of devel-
opment in many respects, thereby underutilizing Mex-
ican women’s economic potential. 
When compared to other countries in the region, the 
OECD found that Mexico has one of the lowest rates 
of female participation in the formal labor market and 
is thus not reaping the full benefits of their productive 
capacity.357 The study showed that only 47 percent of 
working-age women in Mexico are part of the formal 
labor force, compared to 82 percent of males.358 The 
OECD average for female participation is 67 percent, 
and is about 60 percent in other regional countries such 
as Peru, Colombia, Brazil, and Chile.359 That being said, 
it is important to note that there are substantive differ-
ences in these statistics throughout Mexico due to dis-
crepancies in regional labor opportunities. The highest 
rate of female labor participation in Mexico is found 
in Colima, with 55.5 percent, while Chiapas has the 
lowest, with only 26.3 percent female participation.360 
Beyond the obvious societal impacts of the gender gap 
in labor participation, the economic impact is substan-
tive as well. If the labor participation gender gap were 
357  OECD, Building an Inclusive Mexico, 3. 
358   OECD, Building an Inclusive Mexico, 3.
359  OECD, Building an Inclusive Mexico, 3.
360  Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo. Segundo tri-
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reduced by half, it would increase per capita GDP by 
2.46 percent each year through 2040.361 Lack of female 
participation in the labor force slows down the entire 
economy. If Mexico does not reduce the gender gap, the 
country will continue to lose out on valuable resources, 
talent, and the economic potential of women. Because 
the losses are substantial when a woman leaves or is 
unable to enter the workforce, Mexico should use gen-
der equality as a catalyst for development.
a. Informal Labor 
Due to the focus of this report, the legal inclusion of 
informal workers and benefits will not be discussed at 
length. However, it is important to understand this di-
mension, as it contributes to the disenfranchisement of 
women in Mexico. 
While women and men encounter high informal labor 
participation, the gender gap is substantial. According 
to the OECD, 57.2 percent of the informal non-agricul-
tural jobs are held by women.362 This means that almost 
two-thirds of Mexican women are caught in the infor-
mal sector and face economic disadvantages. These 
high rates of informality correspond with low earnings, 
poor quality jobs, and increased income insecurity. 
Employment in the informal sector is a major barrier 
for women’s access to public benefits, especially social 
security and associated benefits like health insurance. 
The gender gap on social protection is significant, with 
48.5 percent of males working in the informal sector 
reporting having never received any social protections 
(social security, pensions, etc.) compared to 64.6 per-
cent of women working in the informal sector.363 This 
puts women at a steeper disadvantage and increases 
their risk of living in poverty. 
mestre, 2018, referenced in discussion with representatives from 
the National Institute for Women (INMUJERES), January 2019.
361  OECD, Building an Inclusive Mexico, 24. 
362  OECD, Building an Inclusive Mexico, 37. 
363  OECD, Building an Inclusive Mexico, 67. 
b. Formal Labor 
In contrast to the informal sector, some women report 
they feel more disadvantaged in certain formal sector 
jobs, such as the maquiladoras. The salaries in the ma-
quiladoras are very low, and as a result, women are 
forced to find other jobs (primarily in the informal sec-
tor), in order to contribute to household costs.364 It is im-
portant to note that while maquiladoras are technically 
considered formal labor, they often operate similarly to 
informal sector work. Women workers in the maquila-
doras generally work 48 hours a week, from Monday 
to Saturday, to make minimum wage.365 Mexico did in-
stitute a new and significantly higher minimum wage 
in January 2019, but it still does not constitute a “living 
wage.” That is, a wage which allows for access to basic 
necessities, including food and shelter.
The Comisión Nacional de los Salarios Mínimos 
(CONASAM) instituted a new minimum wage in 
Mexico based on two geographical zones. The first is 
the Northern Border “Free Zone” geographical area, 
integrated mainly by the municipalities that have a 
border with the U.S., which includes 43 municipalities 
in six states. These areas are home to many of Mexi-
co’s maquiladoras (reference Figure 1). The new min-
imum wage in this zone is $176.72 Mexican pesos a 
day, for each work day/shift, which is the equivalent of 
approximately $8.80 USD/day.366 
The second zone includes all other municipalities in 
Mexico, which now have a minimum wage of $102.68 
Mexican pesos a day or about $5.10 USD/day.367 The 
new minimum wages are positive steps for Mexico, 
but are far from a fair or “living” wage.368 As mentioned 
364  Julia Quiñonez (Coordinator, Comité Fronterizo de Obre-
r@s, CFO), in discussion with the authors, January 2019.
365  U.S. embassy official in discussion with the authors, Janu-
ary 2019.
366  “Border zone minimum wage hike affects 43 municipal-
ities,” Mexico News Daily, December 19, 2018, https://mexi-
conewsdaily.com/news/border-zone-minimum-wage-hike-af-
fects-43-municipalities/.
367  “Border zone minimum wage hike affects 43 municipali-
ties,” Mexico News Daily. 
368  Representative from approved social compliance firm, in 
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above, the Mexican Constitution requires that worker 
receive a minimum wage, that “must be sufficient to 
satisfy the normal material, social, and cultural needs 
of the head of a family and to provide for the compul-
sory education of [their] children.”369 With the opening 
of trade, part of Mexico has become “Americanized” in 
terms of its prices—especially Mexico City. If workers 
are only making minimum wage in the maquiladoras, 
they cannot support themselves.370 Unfortunately, there 
has been little discussion in Mexico, especially in the 
maquiladora sector, around the topic of a fair or “liv-
ing” wage. Factory managers are not taking steps to 
address this, nor are they concerned with instituting a 
living wage for their workers.371 Wages are a primary 
cost, and as the maquiladora sector is a highly com-
petitive industry, much more focus is on reducing this 
cost and paying only the minimum wage (or slightly 
above).372 
There are other barriers which prevent workers in the 
maquiladora sector from accessing social security ben-
efits. Failing to register employees in social security, al-
though unconstitutional, is a common practice among 
businesses including maquiladoras.373 This failure may 
be intentional on the part of businesses to avoid paying 
social security contributions or fines associated with 
failing to register employees. To make matters worse, 
approximately 35 percent of these women’s salary 
goes towards government benefits (like social securi-
ty deductions from paychecks), which can be grossly 
mismanaged.374 While women workers in the maquila-
doras technically receive health insurance, they com-
monly find it inadequate. For example, if they go to 
the hospital, they often do not receive the proper care. 
Thus, they are not reaping the benefits of their contri-
discussion with the authors, January 2019.
369  Mexican Constitution of 1917, art.123. (f). 
370  Representative from approved social compliance firm, in 
discussion with the authors, January 2019.
371  Representative from Maquila Solidarity Network (MSN), 
in discussion with the authors, January 2019.
372  Representative from Maquila Solidarity Network (MSN), 
in discussion with the authors, January 2019.
373  Dr. Kimberly A. Nolan Garcia (Professor, Facultad 
Americana de Ciencias Socials, FLACSO) in discussion with the 
authors, February 2019.
374  U.S. embassy official in discussion with the authors, Janu-
ary 2019.
butions to social security.375 
Another main issue is that the maquiladora sector does 
not pay enough in wages or benefits to make women 
stay at the factories. Therefore, for these women, infor-
mal employment is seen as the better economic option, 
as it can offer higher pay, greater flexibility, and less 
violence compared to the maquiladoras.376 In particular, 
women working in flea markets in border towns found 
that it was more profitable working in the informal 
sector, even if that meant forgoing benefits. Accord-
ing to one statistic, women in border cities working 
in the maquiladoras would be making $10 USD/day, 
whereas in the informal sector, women could make $30 
USD/day.377 Therefore, for many of these women, it is 
more appealing to take up informal sector work. How-
ever, whether these women work in the formal maqui-
ladora sector or the informal sector, both are ultimate-
ly economically disadvantaged, as they lack or do not 
receive an adequate level of social protections. 
c. Education and Income Distribution
Educational attainment is crucial for reducing the 
harmful effects that trade may have had on women. 
Through increased education levels, women will gain 
the skills required to be professionally competitive 
and transition into growing and dynamic industries.378 
However, as mentioned in Part IV, women have high 
educational attainment, but are not seeing the benefits 
of these achievements in the labor force. The maqui-
ladoras present an even more dire situation; it seems 
as though education is not the answer to job promo-
tion, as the average return to schooling is lower than 
that estimated for other formal sectors.379 For example, 
De Hoyos found that the level of formal education in-
creased overall between 1994 and 2000; yet, the av-
375  U.S. embassy official in discussion with the authors, Janu-
ary 2019.
376  Representative from Maquila Solidarity Network (MSN), 
in discussion with the authors, January 2019.
377  U.S. embassy official in discussion with the authors, Janu-
ary 2019.
378  Ernesto Aguayo-Tellez, “The Impact of Trade Liberal-
ization Policies and FDI on Gender Inequalities: A Literature 
Review,” 2012, World Bank, https://openknowledge.worldbank.
org/handle/10986/9220?locale-attribute=en
379  De Hoyos, “Chapter 3 Female Labor Participation and 
Occupation Decisions in Post-NAFTA Mexico.”
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erage education level of female workers in the manu-
facturing sectoring decreased between 1994 and 1996 
and remained below the 1994 level for the same period 
of 1994 to 2000.380 This is consistent with findings that 
trade agreements produced a net loss of about 50,000 
jobs for women with higher education and a net cre-
ation of about 850,000 jobs for intermediate studies/
basic capacity.381 Indeed, in an interview held with a 
former employee of a maquiladora, she emphasized 
that work in the maquiladora perpetuates this unbreak-
able cycle of stagnant professional growth, causing 
negative spillover effects for the children’s educational 
attainment and professional prospects.382 
The employment status of a mother not only affects 
the economic situation of the mother herself but is also 
a determinant factor in child poverty.383  Once again, 
Mexico has one of the highest child poverty rates of 
the OECD countries, which points to the negative cor-
relation between child poverty and maternal employ-
ment.384 The poor pay and the long hours in the ma-
quiladoras cause a shortage of time and resources for 
women to dedicate to their children’s education, result-
ing in their children having a lack of preparation, and 
growing up to work in low-skilled jobs in the maqui-
ladoras.385 Thus, these conditions ultimately replicate a 
cycle of dependence on the maquiladora sector and of 
perpetual poverty.
 
It becomes clear that addressing the issues present in 
380  De Hoyos, “Chapter 3 Female Labor Participation and 
Occupation Decisions in Post-NAFTA Mexico.”
381  Alejandra Eguíluz Zamora, Maria Ines Vásquez, and 
Alma Espino, “Trade and Gender: Advances in the Process of 
Gender Mainstreaming in Trade Operations,” Inter-American 
Development Bank, September 2012, https://publications.iadb.
org/en/publication/11839/trade-and-gender-advances-pro-
cess-gender-mainstreaming-trade-operations. 
382  Julia Quiñonez (Coordinator, Comité Fronterizo de Obre-
r@s, CFO), in discussion with the authors, January 2019.
383  OECD, Building an Inclusive Mexico, 116, 117.
384  OECD, Building an Inclusive Mexico, 116, 117.
385 Julia Quiñonez (Coordinator, Comité Fronterizo de Obre-
r@s, CFO), in discussion with the authors, January 2019.
these factories will have far-reaching effects for the 
Mexican population. While Mexico has made strides 
in improving its education system, there is still more 
to be done. With more investments in education, es-
pecially for women, the gender gap in education will 
tend to decrease in the next few years, allowing more 
women to qualify for tertiary education.386
B. Gender-Based Discrimination and 
Violence at Work
Gender-based discrimination in the workplace is un-
fortunately all too common, and the maquiladoras 
prove to be no exception. Gender-based discrimina-
tion is found in wages, occupational segregation, and 
discrimination practices in recruitment, training, and 
promotion. Gender discrimination can even be found 
in a job posting that requests a specific gender, a prac-
tice outlawed in many countries. Many of these gen-
der-based discriminations in the workplace are exacer-
bated by harassment on the worksite itself or in transit 
to work.
a. Harassment in the Workplace
As mentioned in Part I, Mexico has domestic and inter-
national obligations to prevent gender-based discrimi-
nation in the workplace. The General Law on Women’s 
Access to a Life Free of Violence, specifically address-
es sexual harassment in the workplace.  However, in 
practice, this is still prevalent.  From 2015 to 2016, 
Mexico registered 223 gender-based discrimination vi-
olations of which 58.8 percent of them were violations 
against women.387   Over 10 percent of women reported 
that they had fewer job opportunities than their male 
counterparts, 9 percent reported receiving a lower sala-
ry for the same position held by males, and 5.3 percent 
were forced to take a pregnancy test as a requirement 
for obtaining their position (even though prohibited 
386  OECD, Building an Inclusive Mexico, 71. 
387  Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografia (INEGI), 
”Estadisticas a proposito del dia internacional de los derechos 





Women working in the maquiladoras face many forms 
of violence including both sexual and psychological, as 
well as discrimination and harassment. Although men 
also work in the maquiladoras, this type of violence is 
directed towards women.389 Specifically, systemic sex-
ual harassment is used as a method of control, and all 
too often supervisors expect sexual favors from wom-
en.390 If a supervisor or someone in a position of pow-
er harasses a female worker, and the women worker 
refuses, there often will be retaliation for rejection.391 
Supervisors will give them harder jobs or will assign 
them additional overtime (unwanted) as retribution for 
their rejection. 
Mechanisms to efficiently detect and punish indirect 
gender discrimination in the workplace are rare. Su-
ing an employer for gender discrimination in Mexico 
is still a bureaucratic and complicated process, and 
discrimination is rarely punished.392 Information on 
employment discrimination is also difficult to find in 
Mexico. As mentioned above, CEDAW protects wom-
en against indirect gender discrimination and Mexi-
co prohibits prejudice at the workplace. However, in 
practice, without the existence of a monitoring and en-
forcement mechanism to protect women, discriminato-
ry practices will persist.
Implementing mechanisms is an important step be-
cause many of these prejudicial practices can be con-
textual and depend on the hiring procedures of a firm. 
388  Encuesta Nacional sobre la Dinámica de las Relaciones en 
los Hogares referenced in discussion with Representatives from 
CNDH (National Human Rights Commission), January 2019.
389   Julia Quiñonesz (Coordinator, Comité Fronterizo de 
Obrer@s Maquiladoras, CFO Maquiladoras), in discussion with 
the authors, January 2019.
390  Dr. Kimberly A. Nolan Garcia (Professor, Facultad 
Americana de Ciencias Socials, FLACSO) in discussion with the 
authors, February 2019.
391  Dr. Kimberly A. Nolan Garcia (Professor, Facultad 
Americana de Ciencias Socials, FLACSO) in discussion with the 
authors, February 2019.
392  Área de Derechos Sexuales y Reproductivos, Programa 
de Derecho a la Salud, División de Estudios Jurídicos del Centro 
de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, “Shadow Report on 
employment discrimination against women in Mexico,” June 
2018, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20
Documents/MEX/INT_CEDAW_NGO_MEX_31406_E.pdf.
For instance, a firm may only hire men, claiming that a 
certain type of work requires physical strength. How-
ever, these requirements can be a way of impeding 
women from entering certain positions. The United 
States provides a good example of what could be done 
to improve indirect gender discrimination in Mexico. 
In the U.S., employers in the private and public sector 
are required to conduct a survey for the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) that includes 
disaggregated data by gender and sex regarding their 
employees. Such a mechanism currently does not exist 
in Mexico. Hence, Mexico can use experiences from 
the U.S. to improve indirect gender discrimination in 
the workplace.393
b. Positions of Leadership
Once women arrive to work, they face even more gen-
der-based discrimination when it comes to leadership 
roles. There are fewer women in leadership positions 
than men in the manufacturing sector. Despite the in-
crease in female educational attainment and the de-
crease in the education gender gap in Mexico, women 
in the maquiladoras still face gender-based discrimi-
nation when wanting to move to leadership positions. 
One of the reasons is the lack of training opportunities 
for women to take on these roles. According to a Coor-
dinator of Research at ProDESC, many women are not 
taken seriously in this sector. Furthermore, if they do 
manage to overcome barriers and earn a leadership po-
sition, many question their qualification for the role or 
the reasoning behind their promotion. Others also en-
gage in derogatory action against these female leaders, 
and in some cases, accuse them of conducting sexual 
behavior with peer managers.394 The main goal of this 
type of discrimination is to hurt a woman’s reputation. 
Thus, it becomes increasingly harder for women to 
sustain their leadership position after they are discrim-
inated.
393  Área de Derechos Sexuales y Reproductivos, “Shadow 
Report on employment discrimination against women in Mexi-
co”.
394  A coordinator of research at ProDESC, in discussion with 
the authors, January 2019.
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c. Pregnancy 
Over the past decade, Mexico has made great prog-
ress in reducing forced pregnancy tests. However, de-
spite this progress and although it has been an illegal 
practice under Mexican labor law since 2012, some 
employers still require women to take these tests be-
fore employing them. While this has reduced forced 
pregnancy tests, discrimination of women of child-
bearing-age still occurs. According to a Coordinator of 
Research at ProDESC, maternity leave is not enforced 
properly. Furthermore, when women workers become 
pregnant, they are often not paid overtime if their work 
then takes longer. Rather, they must take their work 
home or stay longer without pay to catch up.395 This 
happens because they are afraid of losing their jobs. 
Despite legal provisions that guarantee paid maternity 
leave, employers often utilize different tactics to avoid 
providing that benefit. For example, pregnant women 
working in maquiladoras are reportedly given harder 
work or isolated from their coworkers to force them 
to quit before taking maternity leave.396 Others report 
being forced to work with harmful chemicals while 
pregnant, which greatly increases the risk of a miscar-
riage.397 
Despite being illegal under Mexican law, some women 
report losing their jobs once they leave to have their 
children.398  As mentioned in Part I, the Federal Labor 
Law guarantees five days of paid paternity leave, sig-
nificantly lower than what is guaranteed to women. 
Thus, this discrepancy between maternity and paterni-
ty leave places the majority of the burden of child care 
on the woman and promotes gender stereotypes, cre-
ating further distortions that negatively impact female 
labor participation.
395  Representative from Maquila Solidarity Network (MSN), 
in discussion with the authors, January 2019.
396  Dr. Kimberly A. Nolan Garcia (Professor, Facultad 
Americana de Ciencias Socials, FLACSO) in discussion with the 
authors, February 2019.
397  A coordinator of research at ProDESC, in discussion with 
the authors, January 2019.
398  Representative from Maquila Solidarity Network (MSN), 
in discussion with the authors, January 2019.
d. Health and Safety
There is also differential treatment for women in terms 
of health and safety. In the maquiladoras, it’s endemic 
that employers choose not to register their employees 
in the Mexican Social Security system to avoid paying 
taxes, which is unconstitutional.399 Therefore, when a 
worker needs these services, they are unable to obtain 
them. 
Additionally, if they need medical attention, employers 
often deny the day off.400 In other situations where a 
woman is injured in the workplace and goes to the doc-
tor, the employer often refuses to pay for it and claims 
the injury occurred at home.401 As women in Mexican 
society perform the most unpaid domestic work, em-
ployers will use it to their advantage to avoid paying 
for workplaces injuries. All of the gender-based dis-
crimination occurring at home and in the workplace 
ultimately affects a women worker’s potential for up-
ward mobility.
399  Dr. Kimberly A. Nolan Garcia (Professor, Facultad 
Americana de Ciencias Socials, FLACSO) in discussion with the 
authors, February 2019.
400  Dr. Kimberly A. Nolan Garcia (Professor, Facultad 
Americana de Ciencias Socials, FLACSO) in discussion with the 
authors, February 2019.
401  Dr. Kimberly A. Nolan Garcia (Professor, Facultad 
Americana de Ciencias Socials, FLACSO) in discussion with the 
authors, February 2019.
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have been making efforts to combat gender-based discrimina-
tion and include a gender lens in mainstream issues, but true 
change requires not only gender specific public policies, but 
also effective implementation to fundamentally reshape gender 
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In recent years both public and private, as well as other CSOs have been mak-
ing efforts to combat gender-based discrimination and include a gender lens in 
many mainstream issues. While there has been progress, the road ahead is long. 
True change requires not only gender specific public policies, but also effective 
implementation. To fully combat gender-based discrimination, Mexico needs 
to fundamentally reshape gender stereotypes and attitudes at school, work, and 
home. This change will only be brought about by active participation from pub-
lic, private, and other CSO actors. The following are some of the key initiatives 
being undertaken by public, private and other non-state actors.
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A. Government Initiatives
a. Gender Mainstreaming Initiatives
The Mexican government has taken several steps to in-
corporate a gender perspective into its policies. There 
is no doubt that laws which protect the status of wom-
en are plentiful in Mexico. In this regard, the country 
has often been a pioneer. As previously mentioned, the 
machismo culture, the lack of capacity, and the lack of 
a gender perspective in politics have served as a coun-
terbalance for the existing protections as women con-
tinue to face discrimination and violence. 
That being said, the government has been receptive to 
its faults, and has openly declared the need for gender 
mainstreaming across the board. An example of this 
new trend can be found in the 2013-2018 National De-
velopment Plan (NDP), which, for the first time ever, 
included the need for a gender perspective as one of the 
countries five “cross-cutting” goals.402  The objective 
402  Government of the Republic of Mexico, Plan Nacional de 
Desarrollo 2013-2018, May 20, 2013,  http://www.cofemer.gob.
being, “to foment a process of deep change that would 
begin within the existing government institutions,” in 
order to stop the federal government from promoting 
gender stereotypes that lead to “inequality, exclusion, 
and discrimination.”403 In this vein, the government of 
Enrique Peña Nieto increased the portion of the federal 
budget dedicated to promoting gender equality by 157 
percent in 2015.404 
b. Scholarships for Women in STEM
One of the primary initiatives to increase women’s 
upward mobility and, ultimately, overall economic 
growth is through funding scholarships and other ed-
ucational programs, especially for STEM. One pub-
licly funded program is Capacita-T which specifically 
mx/documentos/marcojuridico/rev2016/PND%202013-2018.pdf 
403  Government of the Republic of Mexico, Plan Nacional de 
Desarrollo 2013-2018, 11.
404  “Mexico, Country Page,” UN Women, Americas and the 
Caribbean, accessed May 10, 2019, http://lac.unwomen.org/en/
donde-estamos/mexico.
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targets NEETs and provides youths with training and 
resources to encourage them to enter the labor force.405 
Of Capacita-T’s participants, 60 percent are women.406 
In another example, the OECD has partnered with the 
Mexican Ministry of Education to create the program 
Niñas STEM PUEDEN. This program is a joint initia-
tive between the Mexican Ministry of Education and 
the OECD to increase the number of women entre-
preneurs and to help girls pursue careers in STEM—
fields in which women are poorly represented.407 This 
initiative represents a move toward improving gender 
equality in Mexico. 
c. Reduction in Adolescent Pregnancy
For the Mexican government, another major goal is 
to reduce adolescent pregnancy. Mexico continues to 
make great strides when it comes to reducing teenage 
pregnancy, but there is still room for improvement. 
Throughout the past decade the Seguro Popular, Mex-
ico’s public health insurance, has increased the quanti-
ty and availability of contraceptives. However, the use 
of contraceptive measures remains low, with only 51.6 
percent of females using contraception, compared to 
the Latin American and Caribbean average of 67 per-
cent.408 The government has also aimed to improve sex-
ual education throughout the country.409 
d. Educational Reform
As part of the education reform, through the Pro-
grama Sectorial de Educacion 2013-2018, Mexico has 
worked to reduce gender stereotyping in school text-
books.410 Through this program, textbooks were being 
405  OECD, Building an Inclusive Mexico, 98.
406  OECD, Building an Inclusive Mexico, 98. 
407  ”Ninas STEM PUEDEN,” Secretary of Education and 
OECD, accessed on May 10, 2019, http://ninastem.aprende.sep.
gob.mx/en/demo/home 
408  Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografia (INEGI), 
“Encuesta Nacional de la Dinámica Demográfica, Tabulados 
básicos,” Government of Mexico, Mexico City. 2014.
409  OECD, Building and Inclusive Mexico, 7. 
410  Government of the Republic of Mexico, Programa Secto-
rial de Educacion 2013-2018, December 2013: 59, https://www.
sep.gob.mx/work/models/sep1/Resource/4479/4/images/PRO-
updated to eliminate sexist images and content, and 
include gender equality in the curriculum, covering 
material on anti-discrimination.411 This is an effort to 
address the systemic nature of gender stereotyping and 
to avoid ingrained cultural norms that stem from ma-
chismo culture. While this is a good first step in tack-
ling the pervasive nature of machismo culture, there 
still remains work to be done in terms of standardizing 
gender-sensitivity education across the country.
e. Cash Transfer Programs
The Mexican government has focused on empower-
ing women through its conditional cash transfer sys-
tem. It is generally known that when women control 
more of the household income, children are better off. 
With this in mind, Mexico implemented a condition-
al cash transfer program called “Prospera,” which is 
overwhelmingly given to women. It has been relative-
ly successful in providing mothers more control over 
resources entering the household and improving their 
bargaining position.412 Its focus is on improving access 
to food, education, and healthcare in an effort to com-
bat intergenerational poverty in Mexico.413
OECD studies have shown that there is a negative cor-
relation between child poverty and female labor force 
participation.414 Thus, as Mexico increases the number 
of mothers working in its economy, child poverty levels 
should decline. However, the setup of “Prospera” has 
resulted in an additional unpaid work burden for these 
women and served to perpetuate the traditional gender 
role of women as the primary caregiver. To receive the 
conditional cash transfer offered by Prospera, mothers 
are responsible for confirming their children’s preven-
tative health visits and school attendance.415
GRAMA_SECTORIAL_DE_EDUCACION_2013_2018_WEB.pdf.
411  OECD, Building an Inclusive Mexico, 97.
412  OECD, Building an Inclusive Mexico, 42.
413  Laura G. Dávila Lárraga, How Does Prospera Work? Best 
Practices in the Implementation of Cash Transfer Programs in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, Washington DC: Inter-Amer-
ican Development Bank, 2016. https://publications.iadb.org/en/
publication/17104/how-does-prospera-work-best-practices-im-
plementation-conditional-cash-transfer.
414  OECD, Building an Inclusive Mexico, 28. 
415  OECD, Building an Inclusive Mexico: 42.
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f. Gender Certification Programs
Although there are substantial implementation issues 
between government policy and its application, IN-
MUJERES has created a certification for organizations 
across every sector related to labor equality and dis-
crimination. According to the text of these standards, 
they were created to support the state in its compliance 
under many international declarations and protocols, 
in which the government commits its support to gender 
equality and non-discrimination. The standards of la-
bor equality and non-discrimination, legally known as 
NMX-R-025-SCFI-2015, are voluntary certifications, 
which over 2,000 organizations have obtained.416 Some 
of the requirements include having a committee on the 
subject matter, internal audits, work environment as-
sessments, equal opportunities for promotion, training 
on labor equality, and work-life balance.417 Organiza-
tions receive points for their level of adherence to cer-
tain standards, such as supporting “co-responsibility in 
the professional, family, and personal life with equal 
treatment and opportunities,” offering child care, or 
granting flexibility in the workers work schedule.418 
There are different levels of the certifications, allow-
ing for organizations to improve as they better their 
practices. These certifications are only valid for four 
years. Furthermore, the implementation of these stan-
dards has positive spillover effects on society, such as 
increasing the visibility of gender equality and reduc-
ing discrimination in the workplace.419 
Although this is a grand achievement that appears to be 
successful, even INMUJERES cannot fully implement 
this program, according to CEDAW’s 2018 recom-
mendations. Though the government is supporting and 
setting standards for businesses, organizations, and 
government agencies, it must also remember to adhere 
to those same standards, as well as to promote them 
416  INMUJERES, “Norma Mexicana en Igualdad Laboral y 
no Discriminación,”YouTube, December 25, 2015, https://www.
youtube.com/watch?time_continue=321&v=6AL9Gge_D7Q. 
417  Secretary of the Economy, Norma Mexicana: En Igualdad 
Laboral y no Discriminación, 2015, https://www.gob.mx/cms/
uploads/attachment/file/25111/NMX-R-025-SCFI-2015_2015_
DGN.pdf.  
418  Secretary of the Economy, Norma Mexicana: En Igual-
dad Laboral y no Discriminación.
419  Secretary of the Economy, Norma Mexicana: En Igual-
dad Laboral y no Discriminación.
across all levels of government. 
All the work that Mexico has done for gender parity in 
the government and with the certifications are seem-
ingly done to achieve gender equality. But, all of this 
effort means nothing if it does not translate into reality, 
specifically for low-income women and men. These 
reforms and standards mean nothing if the government 
itself does not make them a priority.
B. Private Sector and CSO Initiatives
a. Training and Capacity Building in the Work-
place
To realize gender equality within the workplace, some 
private sector actors have stepped up to increase wom-
en’s inclusion through training and capacity building 
programs. One such initiative is by Caterpillar Inc. 
Caterpillar partnered with the United Way to determine 
the greatest community needs for employees and their 
families. Their research found that education was an 
area highlighted as a need by the local communities 
in which they worked. As a result, Caterpillar began 
investing in universities, with a focus on promoting 
STEM careers and leadership and innovation training 
for women.420 Another initiative targeted at women is 
the “Educate Girls to Change the World” which has 
two main goals. The first is to promote education to 
break the cycle of poverty by providing training on 
sexual health, how to prevent pregnancy, and gender 
violence. The second goal is to encourage girls to pur-
sue careers in STEM.421
Caterpillar also created employer resource groups 
(ERGs). They established ERGs in: the Women’s Ini-
tiative Network, to empower women in leadership; 
Young Professionals, which focuses on career plan-
ning and networking for young professionals joining 
the team; and Maquiladora Connection, which focuses 
on inclusion and diversity initiatives.422 The ERG has 
created a special chapter focused on women in leader-
ship and women’s work-life balance to address obsta-
420  Representative from Caterpillar Inc. in discussion with 
the authors, January 2019.
421  Representative from Caterpillar Inc. in discussion with 
the authors, January 2019.
422  Representative from Caterpillar Inc. in discussion with 
the authors, January 2019.
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cles to advancement and to provide overall support for 
career growth. This support includes training, tuition 
reimbursement for women to pursue their Master’s de-
grees, and guidance on how these women could ad-
vance their careers.423
Additionally, in the maquiladora sector, Caterpillar of-
fers special training on harassment and how to report 
it, as well as workplace flexibility for a better work-life 
balance. They also provide special training for men in 
the workplace to help them recognize their subcon-
scious gender bias. Since this type of awareness is not 
part of the culture, they have found the training helpful 
in reducing gender-based violence in the workplace.424 
Caterpillar also actively invests in intentional succes-
sion planning for leadership positions. To better incor-
porate women in leadership, they identify and provide 
training and education to ensure that women are pre-
pared to take over leadership positions.425 As a result, 
the company has come closer to reaching gender par-
ity, with 45 percent of the employees being female. 
Moreover, women hold 27 percent of the company’s 
leadership positions in maquiladoras.426 
b. Child Care in the Workplace
Another focus area for private sector actors in the ma-
quiladoras is on child care. As women workers have 
limited time to care for themselves, CFO Maquiladoras 
has focused on developing strategies to empower and 
educate women, to help them better compete with their 
male counterparts. A key part of ensuring the success 
of their meetings is a guaranteed access to proper child 
care.427 Since the burden of caring for children often 
falls on women, these women are unable to participate 
without access to child care. Similarly, Caterpillar has 
423  Representative from Caterpillar Inc. in discussion with 
the authors, January 2019.
424  Representative from Caterpillar Inc. in discussion with 
the authors, January 2019.
425  Representative from Caterpillar Inc. in discussion with 
the authors, January 2019.
426  Representative from Caterpillar Inc. in discussion with 
the authors, January 2019.
427  Julia Quiñonez (Coordinator, Comité Fronterizo de Obre-
r@s Maquiladoras, CFO Maquiladoras), in discussion with the 
authors, January 2019.
also worked to provide child care during training and 
other activities to allow women the ability to partici-
pate in events that will help them increase their upward 
mobility.428
c. Financial Literacy Training
Across Mexico, women can find it difficult to access 
formal financial services and educational training. To 
help combat this issue, NGOs have played an active 
role in building the capacity of these women. One 
NGO, Pro Mujer, provides support to over 47,000 
low-income women and provides access to microcred-
it services and financial literacy workshops, to enable 
them to become financially independent.
C. Diversity and Inclusion Initiatives
UN Women has also created outreach programs and 
diversity inclusion initiatives. One of their pillar pro-
grams is UN Women’s Second Chance Education 
and Vocational Learning Programme, which targets 
vulnerable women and girls who have missed out on 
an education. It uses technology to provide women 
with access to learning resources and provides path-
ways to employment and entrepreneurship opportu-
nities. Through these resources, the goal is to combat 
the mentality and cultural notion that women do not 
need to or cannot work.429 The program puts vulnerable 
women back in school and provides them certifications 
and subsequently connects them with the private sector 
to open up their career opportunities.430 Worldwide, the 
program has impacted over nine million women.431 This 
program also works at the national level to enhance 
gender-balance policies and fiscal changes, to ensure 
these advancements in women’s empowerment are 
sustained.
428  Representative from Caterpillar Inc. in discussion with 
the authors, January 2019.
429  Juliette Bonnafé (Program Specialist, UN Women Mexi-
co) in discussion with the authors January 2019.
430  Juliette Bonnafé (Program Specialist, UN Women Mexi-
co) in discussion with the authors January 2019.
431  Juliette Bonnafé (Program Specialist, UN Women Mexi-





The intersection of free trade and the livelihoods of women working in Mexico offers several 
lessons learned. It illustrates the importance of the need for a gender perspective in free trade 
agreements, as well as the necessity of consultations with diverse populations and human rights 
impact assessments prior to signing on to an agreement. Moreover, this case highlights the need 
for national governments to examine and address underlying systemic conditions that impact 
women’s labor participation, working conditions, wages, and access to opportunities. Ultimately, 
NAFTA was both a win and a loss for women working in Mexico, when it could have been closer 
to a win-win situation for this group.
With trade liberalization came employment opportunities for women in the maquiladora sector. 
Although the economy changed, societal norms remained such that employed women were still 
expected to be primary caregivers, resulting in the double shift. The double shift is not only an 
enormous burden in and of itself, but it also limits women’s opportunities for advancement—
which require time, energy, and access. 
Other forms of gender-based discrimination, including gender-based violence, also threaten the 
landscape of women in the workforce, from wage discrimination, to harassment, to the mother-
hood penalty and more. Although Mexico has a progressive legal regime on a number of issues, 
the lack of capacity or willingness to enforce the law remains a barrier to realizing the rights of 
working women. The private sector has stepped in to partially fill the labor protection gap through 
the use of social compliance auditing firms. However, the private sector is no substitute for state 
enforcement.
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The new Mexican administration offers both hope and challenges for the rights of working wom-
en. Recently, President AMLO passed a labor reform bill that could be a gamechanger for work-
ers in Mexico. The bill provides for the right to collectively bargain through independent labor 
unions, which could lead to fairer wages and better working conditions. This would be particular-
ly advantageous for women who are disproportionately stuck in lower wage jobs. However, there 
is another initiative that would undermine the general human rights landscape in Mexico. AMLO 
has been critical of civil society, an important partner for the realization of rights. Going so far 
as to issue an internal cabinet memo banning funding for civil society, and instead providing it 
directly to beneficiaries. This policy fails to recognize the essential role that civil society plays in 
assessing needs, providing information, and giving support. As such, the AMLO administration 
oscillates between promise and concern for working women in Mexico.
As the possibility of the USMCA coming into force inches closer, it is an important time for 
Mexico to reflect on the combined effects of free trade, rule of law, and deeply ingrained cultural 
norms on the rights of working women. Gender should be at the forefront of a national dialogue, 
as women’s labor participation is not only important for the rights of women, but also necessary 
for the collective good. There is a positive relationship between women’s labor participation and 
economic growth. To fully realize the potential of women’s labor participation, women need ac-
cess to the same opportunities and pay as men. They need to be able to work free of harassment 
and discrimination and to travel to work without fear of violence. Women also need to know that 
there is oversight and effective remedies should an employer infringe upon their rights. Finally, 
there needs to be a reduction in gender inequality in household chores and caretaking. The double 
shift is an unjust and inefficient burden on women in Mexico and around the world, and every 







A. Short Term 
1. Extend and enforce paid maternity and paternity leave: The right to maternity leave in 
Mexico is below the OECD average.1 This exacerbates gender-issues in Mexico. Women require 
time to recover after labor and to breastfeed their children. For this reason, extending paid mater-
nity leave for women to the OECD average can have a positive impact on decreasing gender dis-
parity in the labor force in Mexico. For instance, insufficient paid maternity leave can lead wom-
en to either go back to work as quickly as possible after childbirth or decide to stay home and out 
of the workforce. Women should not have to choose between one and the other, especially when 
paid maternity leave is already below the OECD average. The short time for paid maternity leave 
impacts the poor the most because households might rely on the mother’s income. Providing a 
longer maternity leave can help mothers to fully recover and better provide for their children. 
Additionally, a longer paid maternity leave can increase the likelihood that women will return to 
the formal labor force. Paternity leave should also be extended. This extension will help decrease 
the instances of discrimination against hiring women, especially pregnant women. Extending the 
length of paternal leave will also reduce the traditional role of women as caregivers. It would fur-
ther encourage men to take on some of the caregiver responsibilities, as well as destigmatize the 
role of men in child rearing. While the Federal Labor Law has stipulations for both paid maternity 
and paternity leave, for this policy to be effective it is critical that the government enforces and 
ensures that every sector adheres to the requirement.  
1  OECD, “Length of maternity leave, parental leave and paid-specific leave—maternity leave, 2016” accessed on May 10, 2019. 
https://www.oecd.org/gender/data/length-of-maternity-leave-parental-leave-and-paid-father-specific-leave.htm
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2. Increasing fines for companies failing to enroll 
employees in the Social Security System: Per the 
Constitution, social security benefits are a right of any 
worker. However, companies routinely fail to enroll 
employees in social security to avoid paying employ-
er contributions. Companies and organizations should 
face higher sanctions for not enrolling their employees 
in the system, as failure to register restricts these ben-
efits. Employer contributions are high while penalties 
for falling to enroll employees are comparatively low. 
Consequently, some companies can pay off the fines; 
thus, these penalties need to be higher and include 
more stipulations to improve deterrence. Enforcement 
of enrolling employees in social security is also prob-
lematic. More labor inspectors are needed to ensure 
maquiladora employees are enrolled in the social se-
curity system. 
 
3. Increase the number of labor inspectors and 
transparency regarding said number: As highlight-
ed throughout this report, a major challenge in ensuring 
that the rights of women are protected in the workplace 
is the fact that Mexico has a very low number of labor 
inspectors relative to the number of workplaces to be 
inspected, resulting in less-frequent and less in-depth 
labor inspections. The Mexican federal government 
plans to increase the number of labor inspectors in the 
next several years, which is a positive step towards 
better protection of labor rights. However, the federal 
government’s plan must be more holistic than simply 
hiring more inspectors.
The Mexican federal, state, and local governments 
should work cooperatively to make a conscious effort to 
increase the number of labor inspectors employed and 
working, to increase the number of labor inspections 
carried out each year. All three levels of government 
must ensure that these labor inspectors are trained ad-
equately and that there is a gender perspective to these 
trainings, so that labor inspectors are aware of the dif-
ferent risks that women face versus men. The Mexican 
government should also increase the transparency re-
garding the number of labor inspectors that it employs. 
This data is not available online at the federal level, nor 
is the data publicly available online from international 
organizations such as the International Labour Orga-
nization. As Mexico works to increase its number of 
labor inspectors, it should ensure that this information 
is publicly available and easily accessible in order to 
create full transparency regarding its progress in in-
creasing the total number of labor inspectors. 
 
4. Create mechanisms to identify indirect gen-
der-based discrimination at the workplace: Current-
ly, Mexico does not have any mechanisms to detect and 
prosecute indirect discrimination in the workplace—
despite indirect discrimination being prohibited. This 
is a critical issue in Mexico because without a mech-
anism to detect and punish indirect gender discrimi-
nation in the workplace, gender-based discriminations 
will continue to occur and authorities will not be able 
to efficiently assess gender-based issues in the work-
place. One suggestion is creating an annual national 
survey to be collected from employers in the private 
and public sector containing data on their workforce, 
such as disaggregated data by sex and race. Through 
the creation of this national survey, it will be possible 
to monitor and identify patterns of discrimination in 
the workplace, and more efficiently remedy these is-
sues. The body responsible for the survey should also 
have the legal authority to prosecute employers who 
discriminate. An example of the implementation of a 
similar survey is the Survey to the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) implemented in the 
United States. In the United States, the EEOC also has 
the authority to sue employers who discriminate.2 
 
5. Create programs to inform working women in 
Mexico about their rights and available restitution 
mechanisms: In Mexico, many working women are 
unaware of the government protection mechanisms 
that safeguard them against workplace discrimination. 
Even if women are aware, they sometimes fear retri-
bution for reporting their bosses or coworkers. With 
more women gaining knowledge of their legal rights 
and increased employer awareness of these trainings, 
reporting of discrimination will most likely increase.
For this reason, the Mexican government should devel-
op targeted community awareness and outreach pro-
grams to ensure women are cognizant of their work-
place rights. These comprehensive programs should 
include training sessions covering available reporting 
mechanisms for labor violations, as well as informa-
2  Área de Derechos Sexuales y Reproductivos, “Shadow Re-
port on employment discrimination against women in Mexico”.
Part VIII - Policy Recommendations
91
tion pertaining to local, state, and federal processes for 
reporting. 
Furthermore, the government should provide the nec-
essary resources and funding to NGOs and civil so-
ciety for aiding women in this reporting process. It is 
important to note that coordination with civil society 
is a policy currently under threat from the AMLO gov-
ernment. It is critical that the government engage and 
support these groups to improve the lives of working 
women.
 
6. Include gender sensitivity training for law en-
forcement: Often, victims of gender-based violence 
or domestic violence do not report the crimes com-
mitted against them due to fear embedded in cultural 
stigma. One method with which the government can 
encourage victims to report their experience is gender 
sensitivity training for law enforcement. The federal 
government, in conjunction with state and local gov-
ernments, should not only educate law enforcement on 
the rights of women, and specifically women workers, 
but should also oblige all levels of law enforcement 
to attend biannual gender sensitivity or mainstreaming 
training sessions. It is important to note that the Gen-
der Violence Alert System, referenced earlier in the re-
port, has encouraged some states to carry out this type 
of training for law enforcement. That being said, more 
needs to be done at a federal level to ensure that these 
practices are part of an overarching policy across the 
country. 
The government can look to international organiza-
tions, such as UNICEF, UN Women, or ActionAid, for 
tools in implementing these types of programs. For ex-
ample, these organizations have already been operating 
in Tanzania to increase the number of female police 
officers and to establish gender-based violence units.3 
The purpose of these should be to equip law enforce-
ment with the tools to properly aid women who are 
victims of gender-based violence or harassment, either 
at home or the workplace. The goal of gender sensiti-
3  Rebecca Grant, “How to Get Women to Trust the Police? 
‘Gender’ Desks,” NPR, August, 15, 2018, https://www.npr.org/
sections/goatsandsoda/2018/08/15/638872938/how-to-get-wo-
men-to-trust-the-police-gender-desks.
zation programs in law enforcement and the inclusion 
of more female police officers, is to encourage women 
to report cases of domestic violence, which has proven 
to be true in the United States.4 Women should be able 
to seek out local enforcement who do not perpetuate 
existing gender stereotypes, while law enforcement 
should be equipped to properly handle cases involving 
gender-based violence.   
 
7. Implement strategies to mitigate the adverse 
effects of trade agreements on people’s ability to 
enjoy their economic, social, and cultural rights: 
Free trade is a tool to improve the aggregate economic 
well-being of a country; however, it is well-known that 
these aggregate gains will not necessarily be evenly 
distributed. Instead of entering trade agreements under 
the assumption that the entire economy will be better 
off, the government must engage in a more nuanced 
approach that takes into account the situations of vul-
nerable groups, such as women. 
One such tool that has been developed in an attempt 
to reduce the risks of future inconsistencies between 
trade-related and human rights-related goals is the ‘Hu-
man Rights Impact Assessment.’ These assessments 
identify and analyze (and, in some cases, monitor over 
time) “the impact of different policies…on the ability 
of people to enjoy their human rights.”5 Though these 
tools may be unable to predict causally the adverse ef-
fects of trade agreements, they add value by drawing 
attention to issues that might otherwise go unnoticed, 
“such as impacts that are discriminatory between men 
and women.”6 
The ex ante assessment of the Africa Continental Free 
Trade Area provides a notable example of this pro-
cess in practice. The assessment team paid particular 
4  Amalia R Miller and Carmit Segal, “Do Female Officers 
Improve Law Enforcement Quality? Effects on Crime Reporting 
and Domestic Violence,” The Review of Economic Studies, Sep-
tember 18, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdy051.
5  Jennifer Zerk, “Human Rights Impact Assessment of Trade 
Agreements.” Chatham House, 2019. https://www.chatham-
house.org/sites/default/files/2019-02-18HumanRightsTradeA-
greements.pdf. 
6  Zerk, ”Human Rights Impact”.
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attention to groups identified as most vulnerable to 
the effects of the trade agreement (e.g. women, young 
people, and rural food producers). They proceeded to 
pinpoint those human rights which are most import-
ant for trade in the African context, paying particular 
attention to the economic sectors most closely linked 
to these rights and ensuring that relevant stakeholders 
were invited to participate in the negotiation process. 
The team openly acknowledged in their recommen-
dations the difficulty of establishing the causal link 
between trade and human rights. Still, they were able 
to provide several suggestions for the negotiators.7 As 
countries are still in the process of ratification, it is too 
early to draw conclusions about this assessment’s ef-
fectiveness; however, it provides an interesting exam-
ple of how the human rights impact assessment tool 
has been conducted and contextualized.8 Ultimately, 
no matter the tool used, Mexico must not only identi-
fy, but also institute provisions that protect those most 
vulnerable from trade liberalization.  
B. Long Term 
1. Establish gender-sensitization programs in 
schools: Gender stereotypes are developed and in-
grained at an early age. This phenomenon sustains the 
prevalent machismo culture in Mexico, allowing for 
gender stereotypes to be perpetuated. Thus, education-
al materials and scholarly activities must emphasize 
the promotion of gender equality, from early childhood 
development to higher education.
This curriculum should include teaching children at 
an early age about the concept of consent, as well as 
emphasizing that violence against women is never 
acceptable. Textbooks in schools should continue to 
be rewritten to avoid sexism and discrimination, and 
to ensure that gender stereotypes are not perpetuated 
7  United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNE-
CA) and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), The Continental Free 
Trade Area (CFTA) in Africa – A Human Rights Perspective, 
July 2017, https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/Publication-
Files/2017_07_cfta_hria_publication_eng.pdf.
8  Shoshana Kede, ”Africa free trade agreement gets last rati-
fication from Gambia,” African Business, April 2, 2019, https://
africanbusinessmagazine.com/region/africa-free-trade-agree-
ment-gets-last-ratification-from-gambia/.
through educational materials. Some progress has al-
ready been made under Programa Sectorial de Educa-
cion 2013-2018, but Mexico needs to keep this focus 
until gender sensitization in textbooks is reached. 
Furthermore, teachers should have mandatory training 
in gender sensitivity. This training should be available 
for the wider community as well. Additionally, the pro-
motion of young girls in STEM classes should take pri-
ority, as they are often discouraged from these fields, 
with additional funds directed toward programs which 
encourage girls to participate in these fields. 
 
2. Increase the participation of diverse stakehold-
ers in trade negotiations and increase transparency 
and dissemination mechanisms when entering ne-
gotiations of new trade agreements: Recalling the 
political history of Mexico described above, in 1994 
Mexico did not yet have free and fair elections. There-
fore, the political elites ratified NAFTA in a top-down 
fashion which did not first engage stakeholders in the 
negotiation process or explain the benefits that NAFTA 
would have on the Mexican economy. In the long term, 
Mexico needs to make a stronger effort to include a 
diverse set of stakeholders in the trade negotiation pro-
cess and establish dialogue mechanisms through which 
the government will communicate the fundamental 
benefits and drawbacks of what the trade agreement 
ratification will mean for the economy. Because every 
citizen in Mexico is technically a stakeholder in a trade 
agreement, it will be a long process to establish com-
prehensive, permanent consultative structures. 
Canada can serve as an example of a successful strat-
egy, as they invited all interested Canadians to submit, 
via post or e-mail, their thoughts on the renegotiation 
of NAFTA before they even began USMCA negotia-
tions with the U.S. and Mexico.9 No matter what form 
the consultation and dissemination process takes, it 
will be critical for cross-cutting issues, such as gender, 
class, race, and ethnicity, to have a substantial contri-
bution to the discussion.   
 
9  “Consultations on the renegotiation and modernization of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement,” Government of 
Canada, Government Notices, June 3, 2017, http://gazette.gc.ca/
rp-pr/p1/2017/2017-06-03/html/notice-avis-eng.html#na8.
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3. Apply a gender lens and explicit gender language 
in future trade agreements: The rights, provisions, 
and language included in trade agreements are import-
ant especially to  women and other vulnerable groups. 
Lowering barriers to trade has long been assumed to 
expand economic opportunities to women as well as 
improve women’s wellbeing in cultural, social, and 
political contexts. However, given the presented case 
of Mexico, these intentions and beliefs do not neces-
sarily hold. Without the inclusion of explicit gendered 
language and provisions, women will continue to be 
left behind as trade barriers are lowered. Currently, 
few regional trade agreements give explicit attention 
to gender.
In accordance with the new administration’s develop-
ment plan to include gender diversity and the gender 
perspective in Mexico, the country should use a gender 
lens and include explicitly gendered language when 
negotiating future trade agreements to ensure that ben-
efits from trade are evenly divided across genders. The 
incorporation of a gender perspective will promote in-
clusive economic growth throughout Mexico’s econ-
omy. By including gendered language in future trade 
agreements, the social and economic vulnerabilities 
faced by women would be reduced and addressed. 
Thus, it allows Mexico to tap into the potential of wom-
en workers to actively contribute to economic growth, 
which as of now, is grossly underutilized in Mexico.        
   
4. Increase female leadership in unions: The current 
union system, especially Centrals, are primarily led by 
men despite relatively equal rates of gender participa-
tion in unions. Leadership of unions should reflect par-
ticipation and the current Mexican labor market, which 
includes significant participation of women workers. 
Without gender parity in union leadership, the wage 
gap and gender discrimination will continue to occur 
in Mexico. Therefore, augmenting female partici-
pation and leadership must be a goal of all unions in 
Mexico. This increase could be achieved by creating 
female-led committees on women’s participation and 
leadership in all government associated Unions. These 
women’s committees in Centrals should provide train-
ing in leadership skills and offer mentoring as well as 
networking opportunities for women. 
5. Continue efforts of gender mainstreaming by in-
corporating a gender perspective into all legal, eco-
nomic, and political frameworks at every level of 
government: This mainstreaming should be done to 
combat the existing structural disadvantage that women 
face, and to end the government’s replication of gender 
stereotypes that lead to exclusion and discrimination. 
Mainstreaming goes beyond using inclusive language 
and increasing female representation—it means that 
gender issues become central to all policies and prac-
tices. In this way, every single challenge should be 
examined through a gender lens to address the issues 
that create an uneven playing field for women and to 
promote a stronger degree of sensitivity regarding the 
structural inequalities that women face across all levels 
of government and society.  
As mentioned previously, Mexico has already made 
strides toward gender mainstreaming through its 2014-
2018 NAP, which includes several provisions on gen-
der inclusivity.  To this end, new policies should com-
plement existing legal protections with a restructuring 
of every aspect of government, including general laws 
and policies, budgets, planning, and research, as well 
as international treaties. Furthermore, the government 
must strengthen the gender perspective in its data col-
lection processes and should seek the input of women 
of all races and socioeconomic backgrounds to ensure 
that policies reflect the intersectional nature of being a 
woman in Mexico. Lastly, the government must under-
stand the end goal is not gender mainstreaming itself, 
but rather to use mainstreaming as a strategy to build 
an institutional structure that promotes gender equality 
and makes it a central tenant of all its activities.
C. Private Sector Recommendations 
1. Multinational corporations should increase use 
of third-party social compliance auditing firms to 
monitor conditions at their Mexican factories and 
suppliers: To supplement the aforementioned public 
policy recommendations, there are concrete actions 
that MNCs and other private sector actors can take to 
better protect the rights of women workers within the 
formal sector. Since the labor enforcement capacity 
of the state auditors will likely remain constrained in 
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the near-term, it is imperative that MNCs should take 
steps to improve the monitoring and enforcement of 
social compliance standards at their Mexican suppli-
ers. MNCs should partner with third-party social com-
pliance auditing firms to ensure that violations of labor 
protections in Mexico are swiftly identified and reme-
diated, and companies should seek continual worker 
engagement in the improvement of labor conditions 
through worker voice tools and effective grievance 
mechanisms. 
 
2. Institute corporate governance measures to pro-
mote gender balance in management and prevent 
sexual harassment: Beyond protecting specified labor 
rights through observation of existing social compli-
ance standards, private sector corporations should in-
stitute policies to correct the gender imbalance in fac-
tory management roles and reduce sexual harassment 
at workplaces. 
For example, a representative from Caterpillar, the 
world’s largest construction equipment manufactur-
er, explained the company’s relatively broad push to 
create a workplace more amenable to the needs and 
advancement of women. This push includes reinforce-
ment of human resources policies on rooting out sexu-
al harassment in the workplace, adoption of policies to 
enable greater work schedule flexibility and a special 
employee group that guides women hoping to advance 
in their careers at Caterpillar.10 While Caterpillar seems 
to be the only company publicly reporting these types 
of activities at its Mexican facilities, its adoption of 
these policies and programs offers a blueprint for the 
pursuit of greater gender equity within Mexican facil-
ities. 
3. Ensure the safety and security of workers travel-
ing to and from work: Mexico struggles with a weak 
rule of law, which, as highlighted in this report, perme-
ates many aspects of daily life for Mexican women, in-
cluding travel to and from work. Other actors, besides 
the Mexican government, must step in to help to miti-
gate the issue, which affects the ability of many Mex-
ican women to maintain work outside of the domestic 
sphere. When citizens cannot travel to work because 
of safety concerns, not only does this have an effect 
10  Representative from Caterpillar Inc. in discussion with the 
authors, January 2019.
on the ability of women to exercise their rights, but it 
also negatively affects the productivity of the country, 
meaning missed opportunities for GDP growth.
This is a space in which private companies can play a 
large role in helping to increase the well-being of their 
laborers. Private sector companies operating in Mexi-
co, especially those operating in Northern Mexico and 
the border regions, should be aware of the danger that 
their workers might face on the way to and home from 
work. Private sector companies should take steps to 
ensure the safety of their workers during their travels 
to and from work by exploring options such as arrang-
ing company transport for workers. Companies should 
organize focus groups or conduct surveys with em-
ployees to determine the best way that they can assist 
their employees with safe transportation to and from 
the workplace. Special emphasis should be placed on 
the safety of female employees, as they are often at 
higher risk than their male counterparts when it comes 
to transportation. 
Such efforts could also benefit companies themselves, 
in a myriad of ways. By helping to guarantee the safe-
ty of their employees to and from work sites, private 
companies will build better relationships with the com-
munities in which they operate. Companies may find 
themselves with larger employee applicant pools from 
which to select employees. Further, by demonstrating 
this sense of regard towards their employees’ safety, 
companies may build greater trust with their employ-
ees, which may lead to a higher retention of workers. 
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Figure 1:
Source: “Mexico News Daily.” “Border zone minimum wage hike affects 43 municipal-
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